Howard v. Lovett

165 N.W. 634, 198 Mich. 710, 1917 Mich. LEXIS 927
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 27, 1917
DocketDocket No. 58
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 165 N.W. 634 (Howard v. Lovett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howard v. Lovett, 165 N.W. 634, 198 Mich. 710, 1917 Mich. LEXIS 927 (Mich. 1917).

Opinions

Fellows, J.

I do not agree with Mr. Justice Stone in his conclusion in this case. Plaintiff’s name by birth was Joseph Cohen; when only a youngster, he appropriated to himself the name of Joseph B. Howard, one Joseph Howard being somewhat prominent in the theatrical world; later plaintiff, by certain proceedings taken in the courts at Chicago, caused his name to be changed to Joseph Mercedes. Defendant had always been called by her family and friends Mercedes, or an abbreviation thereof, and was so known and called by plaintiff. I am convinced from this record that the performance here involved, and which is only a clever trick by its producers, was gotten up by the joint efforts of plaintiff, defendant, and defendant’s father. I do not place credence in all the testimony of either of the parties, and feel that we should look beyond the oral proofs to documentary evidence, which may be corroborative of the claims asserted. The plaintiff admits that the act is not original with him, or original with the present generation; that he got the idea from a book on magic; that it probably appeared in books before he was bom. Upon his cross-examination a book was submitted to him, [712]*712and on examination of it he admitted that it contained the idea of this trick. He was asked to turn to the fly leaf, and there appeared “J. M. Crane,” who he admitted was the father of defendant. Mr. Crane was a newspaper man on a prominent Chicago paper; had been dead for some time. In view of the fact that plaintiff’s testimony is not consistent with defendant’s, or with itself, I am inclined from this circumstance to give credence to the idea of joint action by these three people in getting up this act.

I am not strongly impressed by the testimony of the witness who said that she “was a palmist at one time, and sang,” and who testifies that in 1908, in the winter time, plaintiff called at her house three or four times to get her to work for him in this mind-reading act, and told her that he was going to call the act “Mercedes.” She admits that she could not play the piano, which was an absolute essential to the act, while in an affidavit, sworn to by her and filed with the bill of complaint for the purpose of obtaining a temporary injunction, she fixes the conversation in the year 1909, in the summer time. In this affidavit she gives as the reason she did not enter the employ of plaintiff, not the fact that she could not play the piano, but that they “were unable to agree upon proper terms.”

The testimony of another witness, much relied upon by plaintiff, that shortly before Labor Day, 1910, he saw a banner at plaintiff's “Temple of Knowledge” upon which was painted two women, one named “Mercedes” and the other “Vera,” is not of probative force of plaintiff’s claim. It is the'claim of defendant that arrangements had been made some time before that for the production of the act, and, while plaintiff insists he did not know the defendant by any other name than Miss Crane, and did not know her given name, a letter was shown him on cross-examination, which he admits having written, addressing her as “Dear [713]*713Friend Merc.” The letter was written in the spring of 1910, several months before the banner was painted. Under these circumstances, this painted banner is as consistent with defendant’s claim as it is with plaintiff’s.

When these parties produced the act, the advertising used and which appears in the record as exhibits, convinces me that the name “Mercedes” was not used as the name of the act, but of the actress. I quote from one of these exhibits:

Mr. Joseph B. Howard Offers
The Bewildering Sensation of the Hour “MERCEDES”
The Psychic Wonder Call Your Name!
SHE WILL Read Your Mind!
Answer Your Questions!

The parties continued together until defendant was forced by plaintiff’s conduct towards her to sever relations with him, when she telegraphed her father for money and returned to Chicago. Thereafter, when defendant appeared on the stage, she appeared under the name of “Mercedes,” although plaintiff claims his attorney prevented her from giving this performance.

I cannot reach the conclusion from plaintiff’s advertising matter found in this record that the act was called “Mercedes.” It was the actor, not the act. I quote three of these advertising bills offered by plaintiff to substantiate his claim. The first one at the Lyric Theater:

Mr. Joseph B. Howard presents
The Bewildering Sensation, of the Hour “MERCEDES”
Startling Sensational Mind Reader LA PIANISTE DE MYSTERIE Presenting an Act that Amazed and Mystified the Entire World.

[714]*714The second one, at the Garrick Theater, reads:

The Season’s Greatest Sensation “MERCEDES”
The Psychic Wonder She Will Tell Your Name Read Your Mind — Answer Your Questions.

The third one, at Keith’s Theater, in Boston, is as follows:

“MERCEDES”
Accompanied by the Marvelous Mystic, Mile. Stantone, in Their Unparalleled Occult Revelation THE MUSICAL ENIGMA
Mercedes Transfers in Silence by Telepathic Waves to Mile. Stantone Any Musical Selection Suggested by the Audience.
MOST EXTRAORDINARY POWER POSSESSED BY MAN.

I am convinced that the claim now asserted by plaintiff that “Mercedes” was the name of the act performed by him is an afterthought on his part, and that “Mercedes” was used to designate the performer, instead of the act performed.

But there is another feature of this case which I think should work its reversal. It is said that plaintiff has built up a valuable business in giving this performance, which should be protected by a court of equity. I realize that a certain degree of latitude is allowed in praising one’s wares; but there is a limit to all things. The methods used by this plaintiff to establish his reputation and build up his business were not such, to my mind, as appeal to the conscience of a court of equity for relief through that court by the strong arm of a writ of injunction. We may lay aside the fact that the performance sought to be protected is a trick pure and simple, that the so-called “thought transfusion,” “mind reading,” or “psychic wonder,” is simply the carrying out of a carefully devised code, understood alone by the performers; that, while it [715]*715amuses and interests, it at the same-time deceives the public. All these may be laid aside while we examine the methods used by the plaintiff to establish his reputation. I quote from one of his press notices, published after he had appropriated to himself the name “Mercedes”:

Mercedes’ Life Story.
The life of Mercedes reads like a page from a book of fiction, teems with adventure, and is colored with real romance. Mercedes is, of course, a nom de theatre. It was chosen by the young man, who is mystifying the world with his peculiar demonstrations of telepathy, because it was the name of his mother, a Spanish lady. In reality Mercedes’ name is Joseph Howard. His father, a Scotchman, wedded to a Spaniard, met reverses which necessitated the son seeking employment at a very early age.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
165 N.W. 634, 198 Mich. 710, 1917 Mich. LEXIS 927, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howard-v-lovett-mich-1917.