Howard v. Commonwealth

139 S.W.2d 742, 282 Ky. 663, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 233
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedApril 23, 1940
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 139 S.W.2d 742 (Howard v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Howard v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.2d 742, 282 Ky. 663, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 233 (Ky. 1940).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court by

Judge Cammack

— Affirming.

*664 Hubert Howard shot and killed Hiram Ingle at the Frozen Inn in Breathitt County early in the morning of March 14, 1939. Howard and Marcus Mann were jointly indicted for the crime at the March 1939 term of the court. The regular trial judge, being related to both Mann and Howard, disqualified himself, and the Commonwealth’s Attorney, because of his relationship to Mann, disqualified himself. After proof was heard the Commonwealth’s motion for a change of venue was ■overruled. Only five jurors of the regular panel having tentatively qualified, the special judge sent to the ■adjoining county of Wolfe for veniremen to complete the jury. Following the completion of the jury, only two of whom were from Breathitt county, the defendants moved for a severance of trial and the Commonwealth -elected to try Mann first. He was acquitted.

Howard was tried at the August 1939 term. The 'Commonwealth again moved for a change of venue, the Commonwealth’s Attorney stating that, among other things, because of the wide publicity given the Mann trial at the March term, he did not believe an impartial jury could be selected from Breathitt county. This motion was overruled. The Commonwealth moved also that a jury be obtained from another county. Only ■eleven members of the regular panel tentatively qualified for the trial. The special judge then ordered 60 veniremen from Owsley county to complete the making of the jury. This was done over Howard’s objection. As a basis for this action the trial judge reviewed, among ■other things, the circumstances heretofore referred to, and also set forth his reasons for not sending to either Magoffin or Wolfe county, the other two counties in the judicial district, for a jury primarily because of the wide relationship of Howard in these counties. Upon trial Howard was found guilty of murder and his punishment fixed at life imprisonment in the State Reformatory. He is now appealing.

Three grounds are urged for reversal. They are -• (1) The court erred in sending to Owsley county for a jury; (2) the verdict is so palpably and flagrantly against the evidence as to indicate it was the result of passion and prejudice against Howard; and (3) the ■court erred in excusing John Pelfrey, a juror, for cause.

Section 194 of the Criminal Code of Practice pro *665 vides when a trial judge may send into an adjoining-county for a jury. This section reads as follows:

“If the judge of the court be satisfied, after having-made a fair effort, in good faith, for that purpose,, that, from any cause, it will be impracticable to obtain a jury free of bias in the county wherein the prosecution is pending, he shall be authorized to order the sheriff to summon a sufficient number of' qualified jurors from some adjoining county in which the judge shall believe there is the greatest probability of obtaining impartial jurors, and from, those so summoned the jury may be formed.”

It was said in the case of Carter v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 640, 102 S. W. (2d) 1020, that this section of the Code vests the trial judge with a discretion which should not be interfered with unless it is manifest that it has been abused. Nine jurors had tentatively qualified in the Carter case when the court ordered a venire from an adjoining county. In the case of Canter v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 508, 119 S. W. (2d) 864, a venire from an adjoining county was ordered after eleven jurors of the regular panel had tentatively qualified. In that case it was said that a judgment will not be reversed on such a ground unless an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge affirmatively appears. Under the circumstances we are not prepared to say that the special judge abused his discretion in sending to Owsley county for veniremen. It was shown' that Howard was widely related throughout Breathitt county, being a relative-of the regular judge; that before the Commonwealth elected to try Mann first it was necessary to send to Wolfe county for veniremen to complete the jury; and that wide publicity was given to the trial of Mann, who. was jointly indicted with Howard.

The third ground urged for reversal is directed to the action of the special judge in excusing John Pelfrey, a juror. While the jury was being examined Pelfrey was asked whether he had served as a juror at a trial more than a year previous when Hubert Howard was. being tried on a murder charge. Pelfrey said that he had, and it was later brought out that Howard was acquitted on that trial. In excusing Pelfrey, over Howard’s objection, the court said:

“There being a difference between counsel as to the *666 form of question asked this juror, and in view of the statement above given by the juror himself as to what questions were asked, the Court excused said juror and inasmuch as the examination of the juror was not taken down, the original interrogation, the court is of the opinion that the juror should not sit and admonished the counsel for the Commonwealth whether said question had or had not been asked, no similar question should be asked in further examination of the jurors, that is as to what the verdicts were in cases in which jurors had heretofore sat.”

Howard insists that the excusing of Pelfrey was prejudicial to his substantial rights, and that the Criminal Code includes no such ground for challenging a juror. Section 209 of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

“Actual bias is the existence of such a state of mind on the part of the juror, in regard to the case, or to either party, as satisfies the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that he can not try the case impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the parties challenging. (It shall not be a cause of challenge that a juror has read in the newspapers an account of the commission of the crime, with which the prisoner is charged, if such juror shall state on oath that he believes he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence; and provided further, that in the trial of any criminal cause' the fact that a person called as a juror has formed an opinion or impression, based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements (about the truth of which he' has expressed no opinion), shall not disqualify him to serve as a juror in such case, if he shall, upon oath, state that he believes he can fairly and impartially render a verdict therein in accordance with the law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied of the truth of such statement.)”

Pelfrey was raised in Breathitt county, and even had he been tentatively accepted for service he might have been challenged by either party. Under the circumstances we are not prepared to say that the trial judge abused a sound discretion in excusing him. But even *667 if the action was erroneous, we are of the Opinion that it was not so prejudicial to Howard’s substantial rights as to warrant the reversal of the judgment.

The second ground necessitates a review of the evidence.

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165 S.W.2d 829 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1942)
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139 S.W.2d 745 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1940)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
139 S.W.2d 742, 282 Ky. 663, 1940 Ky. LEXIS 233, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/howard-v-commonwealth-kyctapphigh-1940.