Rel: July 31, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________
CL-2025-1041 _________________________
Howard Ross
v.
Janet Hampton
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court (CV-25-104)
BOWDEN, Judge.
Howard Ross appeals from a judgment of the Madison Circuit Court
("the circuit court") finding that Janet Hampton had timely asserted her
right to redeem certain real property located in Huntsville ("the real
property") from him. Ross argues that he had acquired title to the real CL-2025-1041
property by purchasing it at a sheriff's sale and that the circuit court
mistakenly applied the law pertaining to redemption of property sold for
the payment of taxes. We agree, and we reverse the judgment of the
circuit court.
Background
The evidence in the record on appeal indicates that Redstone
Federal Credit Union ("Redstone") had obtained a judgment against
Hampton and executed the judgment by a sheriff's sale of the real
property on June 10, 2024. Ross purchased the real property for $4,600
and obtained a sheriff's deed on that same day. On July 11, 2024, Ross
sold the real property to Mark Culbertson for $4,600. Culbertson
subsequently conveyed the real property back to Ross. On November 13,
2024, Ross sold the real property to Anna Konstantinov for $9,200 and
recorded the deed conveying title to Konstantinov in the Madison Probate
Court the next day.
The evidence indicates that Hampton attempted to contact Ross
about redeeming the real property on December 20, 2024. She continued
to try to contact Ross by various means for several months but was
ultimately unsuccessful. Hampton subsequently filed a complaint in the
2 CL-2025-1041
circuit court on June 9, 2025, seeking to redeem the real property from
Ross.
The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 13,
2025, and heard testimony from Ross and Hampton. On that same day,
the circuit court entered a judgment and an order correcting clerical
errors in the judgment. The circuit court found that the deed from Ross
to Konstantinov was "null and void" and that Hampton had "timely
asserted her right of redemption" from Ross. The judgment provided that
Hampton could redeem the real property from Ross by paying $4,600 to
the circuit-court clerk within 30 days of the entry of the judgment.
Ross timely filed a postjudgment motion on September 11, 2025.
See Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court conducted a hearing on
Ross's postjudgment motion on October 23, 2025. During that hearing,
the circuit court cited § 40-10-120, Ala. Code 1975, pertaining to
redemption of property sold for the payment of taxes, as the basis for the
judgment. The circuit court entered an order denying Ross's
postjudgment motion later that same day. Ross filed a timely notice of
3 CL-2025-1041
appeal from the judgment to this court on December 2, 2025.1 See Rule
4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.
Standard of Review
The circuit court's findings of fact based on ore tenus evidence are
entitled to a presumption of correctness. See EBSCO Indus., Inc. v.
Ballard, [Ms. SC-2024-0678, June 6, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2025).
However, we review the circuit court's application of the law to the facts
de novo. Id. at ___.
Analysis
Ross argues on appeal that the circuit court mistakenly applied the
law regarding redemption of property sold for the payment of taxes when
it concluded that the conveyance from Ross to Konstantinov was void and
that Hampton could redeem the real property from Ross.
During the postjudgment-motion hearing, the circuit court correctly
stated that the purchaser of real property sold for the payment of taxes
1Hampton has not filed an appellate brief; however, we assume that
she seeks affirmance of the judgment. See Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 386 So. 3d 443, 445 (Ala. 2023)(" 'Where the appellant submits the cause on brief and no brief is filed by the appellee, the court considers the cause on its merits on the assumption that appellee is interested in having the judgment sustained.' " (citation omitted)). 4 CL-2025-1041
initially acquires only a certificate of sale that demonstrates the tax-sale
purchaser's right of possession to that property. See § 40-10-74, Ala. Code
1975. A tax-sale purchaser cannot, under § 40-10-29, Ala. Code 1975,
acquire a deed demonstrating title to real property sold for the payment
of taxes until three years after he or she receives the certificate of sale,
among other things. See § 40-10-29(b). It follows that a tax-sale
purchaser cannot validly transfer title to real property sold for the
payment of taxes until the receipt of a deed under § 40-10-29, see
Simmons Grp., LTD v. O'Rear, 233 So. 3d 335, 339 (Ala. 2017)("[T]he
basic property rule [is] that a grantor cannot convey more than the
grantor actually owns."), which can occur no earlier than three years from
the receipt of the certificate of sale. Applying those principles of law, the
circuit court found that the deed from Ross to Konstantinov was "null
and void."
However, there was no evidence indicating that the real property
was sold for the payment of taxes. Ross purchased the real property at a
sheriff's sale following the entry of the judgment against Hampton in
favor of Redstone. See § 6-9-140, Ala. Code 1975 (describing conveyance
of title by sale under judicial process). Ross therefore received a sheriff's
5 CL-2025-1041
deed -- not a certificate of sale, see § 40-29-29(a), Ala. Code 1975 -- to the
real property upon payment of the purchase price. The sheriff's deed
conveyed title to the real property to Ross as effectively as if Hampton
had sold it to him. See § 6-9-140 ("A sale regularly made by virtue of
judicial process issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction shall
convey the title as effectually as if the sale was made by the person
against whom the process issues."). Thus, Ross acquired title, not merely
a possessory right, when he purchased the real property at the sheriff's
sale. As a result, Ross validly conveyed title to the real property to
Konstantinov on November 13, 2024.
Anyone seeking to redeem real property sold by virtue of a
judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction must "pay or tender to
the purchaser or his or her transferee the purchase price paid at the sale,"
with interest and all other lawful charges. § 6-5-253(a), Ala. Code 1975
(emphasis added). Our supreme court has construed the use of "or" in
that context to mean that the redemptioner may redeem real property
only from the current owner of the property. Reed v. Skeen, 591 So. 2d
51, 53 (Ala. 1991)("Where property has been sold under a power of sale
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Rel: July 31, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2026 _________________________
CL-2025-1041 _________________________
Howard Ross
v.
Janet Hampton
Appeal from Madison Circuit Court (CV-25-104)
BOWDEN, Judge.
Howard Ross appeals from a judgment of the Madison Circuit Court
("the circuit court") finding that Janet Hampton had timely asserted her
right to redeem certain real property located in Huntsville ("the real
property") from him. Ross argues that he had acquired title to the real CL-2025-1041
property by purchasing it at a sheriff's sale and that the circuit court
mistakenly applied the law pertaining to redemption of property sold for
the payment of taxes. We agree, and we reverse the judgment of the
circuit court.
Background
The evidence in the record on appeal indicates that Redstone
Federal Credit Union ("Redstone") had obtained a judgment against
Hampton and executed the judgment by a sheriff's sale of the real
property on June 10, 2024. Ross purchased the real property for $4,600
and obtained a sheriff's deed on that same day. On July 11, 2024, Ross
sold the real property to Mark Culbertson for $4,600. Culbertson
subsequently conveyed the real property back to Ross. On November 13,
2024, Ross sold the real property to Anna Konstantinov for $9,200 and
recorded the deed conveying title to Konstantinov in the Madison Probate
Court the next day.
The evidence indicates that Hampton attempted to contact Ross
about redeeming the real property on December 20, 2024. She continued
to try to contact Ross by various means for several months but was
ultimately unsuccessful. Hampton subsequently filed a complaint in the
2 CL-2025-1041
circuit court on June 9, 2025, seeking to redeem the real property from
Ross.
The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing on August 13,
2025, and heard testimony from Ross and Hampton. On that same day,
the circuit court entered a judgment and an order correcting clerical
errors in the judgment. The circuit court found that the deed from Ross
to Konstantinov was "null and void" and that Hampton had "timely
asserted her right of redemption" from Ross. The judgment provided that
Hampton could redeem the real property from Ross by paying $4,600 to
the circuit-court clerk within 30 days of the entry of the judgment.
Ross timely filed a postjudgment motion on September 11, 2025.
See Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P. The circuit court conducted a hearing on
Ross's postjudgment motion on October 23, 2025. During that hearing,
the circuit court cited § 40-10-120, Ala. Code 1975, pertaining to
redemption of property sold for the payment of taxes, as the basis for the
judgment. The circuit court entered an order denying Ross's
postjudgment motion later that same day. Ross filed a timely notice of
3 CL-2025-1041
appeal from the judgment to this court on December 2, 2025.1 See Rule
4(a)(3), Ala. R. App. P.
Standard of Review
The circuit court's findings of fact based on ore tenus evidence are
entitled to a presumption of correctness. See EBSCO Indus., Inc. v.
Ballard, [Ms. SC-2024-0678, June 6, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2025).
However, we review the circuit court's application of the law to the facts
de novo. Id. at ___.
Analysis
Ross argues on appeal that the circuit court mistakenly applied the
law regarding redemption of property sold for the payment of taxes when
it concluded that the conveyance from Ross to Konstantinov was void and
that Hampton could redeem the real property from Ross.
During the postjudgment-motion hearing, the circuit court correctly
stated that the purchaser of real property sold for the payment of taxes
1Hampton has not filed an appellate brief; however, we assume that
she seeks affirmance of the judgment. See Protective Life Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 386 So. 3d 443, 445 (Ala. 2023)(" 'Where the appellant submits the cause on brief and no brief is filed by the appellee, the court considers the cause on its merits on the assumption that appellee is interested in having the judgment sustained.' " (citation omitted)). 4 CL-2025-1041
initially acquires only a certificate of sale that demonstrates the tax-sale
purchaser's right of possession to that property. See § 40-10-74, Ala. Code
1975. A tax-sale purchaser cannot, under § 40-10-29, Ala. Code 1975,
acquire a deed demonstrating title to real property sold for the payment
of taxes until three years after he or she receives the certificate of sale,
among other things. See § 40-10-29(b). It follows that a tax-sale
purchaser cannot validly transfer title to real property sold for the
payment of taxes until the receipt of a deed under § 40-10-29, see
Simmons Grp., LTD v. O'Rear, 233 So. 3d 335, 339 (Ala. 2017)("[T]he
basic property rule [is] that a grantor cannot convey more than the
grantor actually owns."), which can occur no earlier than three years from
the receipt of the certificate of sale. Applying those principles of law, the
circuit court found that the deed from Ross to Konstantinov was "null
and void."
However, there was no evidence indicating that the real property
was sold for the payment of taxes. Ross purchased the real property at a
sheriff's sale following the entry of the judgment against Hampton in
favor of Redstone. See § 6-9-140, Ala. Code 1975 (describing conveyance
of title by sale under judicial process). Ross therefore received a sheriff's
5 CL-2025-1041
deed -- not a certificate of sale, see § 40-29-29(a), Ala. Code 1975 -- to the
real property upon payment of the purchase price. The sheriff's deed
conveyed title to the real property to Ross as effectively as if Hampton
had sold it to him. See § 6-9-140 ("A sale regularly made by virtue of
judicial process issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction shall
convey the title as effectually as if the sale was made by the person
against whom the process issues."). Thus, Ross acquired title, not merely
a possessory right, when he purchased the real property at the sheriff's
sale. As a result, Ross validly conveyed title to the real property to
Konstantinov on November 13, 2024.
Anyone seeking to redeem real property sold by virtue of a
judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction must "pay or tender to
the purchaser or his or her transferee the purchase price paid at the sale,"
with interest and all other lawful charges. § 6-5-253(a), Ala. Code 1975
(emphasis added). Our supreme court has construed the use of "or" in
that context to mean that the redemptioner may redeem real property
only from the current owner of the property. Reed v. Skeen, 591 So. 2d
51, 53 (Ala. 1991)("Where property has been sold under a power of sale
in a mortgage and the purchaser has conveyed to another, the mortgagor
6 CL-2025-1041
must redeem from the vendee."); accord Wyatt v. Mortgage Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 2007)("[I]t
is clear that the thrust of the statute is toward the current owner. The
use of the disjunctive 'or' in the statute means the mortgagor may seek
redemption from either the purchaser or his transferees based on who is
the current owner.").
Ross had already conveyed title to Konstantinov and recorded the
deed in the Madison Probate Court when Hampton reached out to him
about redeeming the real property in December 2024. See § 35-4-63, Ala.
Code 1975 ("The recording in the proper office of any conveyance of
property or other instrument which may be legally admitted to record
operates as a notice of the contents of such conveyance or instrument
without any acknowledgment or probate thereof as required by law.").
Thus, after Ross had conveyed title to the real property to Konstantinov,
Hampton could no longer redeem the real property from Ross.
Conclusion
Ross acquired title, not just a possessory interest, when he
purchased the real property at the sheriff's sale, and the November 13,
2024, deed validly conveyed title to the real property to Konstantinov.
7 CL-2025-1041
Because the evidence indicates that Ross no longer holds title to the real
property, Hampton cannot redeem the real property from him. The
judgment is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit
court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.