MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 20 2018, 9:51 am court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Kimberly A. Jackson Aaron E. Haith Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Howard Robinson, April 20, 2018 Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1709-DR-2119 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Cynthia J. Robinson-Hurdle, The Honorable David J. Dreyer, Appellee-Petitioner Judge The Honorable H. Patrick Murphy, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D10-0308-DR-1487
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 1 of 18 Case Summary [1] Howard Robinson (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s grant of the petition for
contempt and payment of extraordinary expenses filed by Cynthia Robinson-
Hurdle (“Mother”). Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Father and Mother married each other in 1986 and later had three children
together: I.R., born in 1994; O.R., born in 1996; and N.R., born in 1999. They
divorced in 2004, and they agreed that Mother would have primary custody of
the children and that Father would pay child support.
[3] In 2010, Father and Mother reached the following agreement regarding the
children’s future college expenses:
[T]he parties agree to contribute to their children’s post- secondary college expenses, including tuition, room and board, fees, and books, as follows: The child shall be responsible for no less than one-third (1/3) of his/her college expenses through scholarships, grants, student loans, or cash. Each parent shall be responsible for one-third (1/3) of the remaining balance after the child’s contribution. The Bursar’s Statements shall be utilized to determine the amounts owed. Post-secondary expenses shall be limited to the current college expenses to attend Indiana University. The obligation to pay post-secondary expenses shall be limited to an undergraduate degree and the child must maintain a 2.0 GPA (based on a 4.0 scale) each semester and shall maintain full-time status.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 96.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 2 of 18 [4] In August 2016, Father filed a Motion for Modification/Emancipation
regarding O.R., who by then was almost twenty years old. Father explained
that O.R. was living with him in Tennessee, attending college, and seeking
employment, and he asserted that “the existing custody and child support
orders are unreasonable and should be modified” and that “[i]t is in the best
interests of the parties’ child that a modification take place to reflect the current
circumstances with [O.R.] being emancipated.” Id. at 148. The trial court set
Father’s motion for a hearing on December 29, 2016.
[5] On November 29, 2016, Mother filed a combined “Petition for Contempt
Citation; Petition for Extraordinary Expenses and Response to Father’s Petition
for Modification/Emancipation.” Id. at 160. Mother alleged that Father had
failed to pay his full share of college expenses for I.R. (who had graduated from
Notre Dame in May 2016) and asked the trial court to find him in contempt.
She also claimed that N.R. was “involved in volleyball” and asked that Father
be ordered to pay a share of the “extraordinary expenses” (noting that N.R. was
“expected to receive an athletic scholarship to play volleyball in college”). Id.
at 161. At Mother’s request, the trial court ordered that Mother’s petition
would be heard at the same time as Father’s motion on December 29.
[6] Ten days before the hearing, on December 19, the parties filed an “Agreed
Entry” that provided as follows:
1. That [O.R.], born [in 1996], should be deemed emancipated for all purposes.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 3 of 18 2. That neither parent owes any child support and/or any other financial obligation whatsoever to the other regarding [O.R.]. All child support and financial obligations are current and paid in full.
3. This matter concludes all pending matters between the parties and if the Court has set the matter for hearing on the Motion for Modification/Emancipation filed on August 29, 2016, that said hearing date should be vacated as moot.
* * * *
WHEREFORE, the parties respectfully enter into this Agreed Entry, request the Court to approve same, and request the Court to vacate any hearing on the Motion for Modification/Emancipation filed August 29, 2016, and for all other just and proper relief in the premises.
Id. at 164-65. The parties attached a modified child support worksheet to the
Agreed Entry, reducing Father’s child-support obligation (for N.R. only) from
$229 to $161 per week. The same day those documents were filed, Father’s
attorney notified Father that he was “winding [his] practice down” and would
be filing a motion to withdraw from his representation of Father. Id. at 176.
[7] The trial court approved the Agreed Entry and vacated the December 29
hearing, both as to Father’s motion and Mother’s petition for contempt and
payment of volleyball expenses. On December 28, Mother filed a “Request to
Reset Hearing” regarding her petition. Mother asserted that the Agreed Entry
was meant to resolve Father’s motion relating to O.R. but not her petition
relating to I.R. and N.R., that “the parties have not reached an agreement” on
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 4 of 18 her petition, and that the hearing should not have been vacated insofar as it
related to her petition. Id. at 167-68. The trial court granted Mother’s request
and eventually set her petition for hearing on April 13, 2017. There is no
indication in the record that Father ever opposed Mother’s request or asked the
trial court to reconsider its decision to reset the hearing.
[8] On March 15, 2017, Father’s attorney e-mailed Father to remind him that he
was winding down his practice and would be filing a motion to withdraw,
adding that he would not be handling the hearing and that Father should “take
steps immediately to engage new counsel[.]” Id. at 178. The motion to
withdraw was filed on March 27, and the trial court granted it the next day.
[9] At the hearing on April 13, Father appeared without an attorney. Mother
presented her evidence first, including evidence that Father was behind
$6171.22 for his share of I.R.’s college expenses and $2390.52 for his share of
O.R.’s Spring 2017 expenses. She requested that Father be found in contempt
and ordered to pay the past-due amounts and $562.50 of her attorney’s fees.1
Mother also testified that N.R.’s club-volleyball expenses for November 29,
2016 (when Mother filed her petition) through the summer of 2017 were
$13,262, that N.R. was a very highly ranked high-school volleyball player, and
that her participation in club volleyball had helped her earn a full scholarship to
1 Mother did not claim contempt as to O.R.’s college expenses until the hearing. Her written contempt petition mentioned only I.R.’s college expenses. However, Father did not object on this ground at the hearing, and he does not raise the issue on appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 5 of 18 Northwestern University (starting in the fall of 2017). She asked that Father be
required to pay $5835 of the expenses (44%, in line with the disparity in the
parties’ incomes). When asked why she thought Father should pay a portion of
N.R.’s volleyball expenses, Mother explained:
Because of her extracurricular expenses and her Club---- participating in club volleyball she has received a full scholarship to Northwestern University and since we both are going to benefit from that full ride scholarship, which is a direct---directly resulted from the expenses that I incurred paying for these extracurricular---this extracurricular activity we both should participate in the expenses since we are both going to reap the benefit.
Tr. p. 13. After cross-examining Mother, Father took the stand himself and
began testifying. When he said, near the end of the hearing, that his attorney
“put in a motion to withdraw because he was retiring and he asked me to find
another lawyer in two weeks,” the court acknowledged that “it’s hard to
represent yourself” but pointed out that Father had actually been notified of his
attorney’s intent to withdraw almost four months before the hearing, not two
weeks. Id. at 39-40. Nonetheless, Father asked the court to continue the
hearing, explaining that there was “no way I can keep up with what’s going on
right now by myself” and that “I’m going to have to get an attorney.” Id. at 40.
The court denied Father’s request and adjourned the hearing.
[10] After the hearing, the trial court issued a written order granting Mother’s
petition for contempt and payment of volleyball expenses. Regarding
contempt, the court ordered Father to pay $6172.22 for I.R.’s college expenses,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 6 of 18 $2390.52 for O.R.’s Spring 2017 expenses, and $562.50 of Mother’s attorney’s
fees. As for volleyball expenses, the court ordered Father to pay the $5835
sought by Mother. Father then retained a new attorney and filed a motion to
correct error that relied largely on documents that had not been admitted into
evidence at the hearing on Mother’s petition and that included a variety of
arguments that Father did not make (but could have made) at the hearing. The
trial court summarily denied Father’s motion.
[11] Father now appeals.
Discussion and Decision [12] Father raises three issues on appeal. His primary argument is that the Agreed
Entry in December 2016 resolved Mother’s petition for contempt and payment
of volleyball expenses and that the trial court therefore erred when it granted
Mother’s Request to Reset Hearing on the petition. In the alternative, he
contends that the trial court should have granted his request to continue the
hearing to allow him additional time to prepare. Last, he argues that even if the
trial court properly held the hearing and declined to continue the hearing, it
erred by ruling in favor of Mother on the merits of her petition.
I. Scope of the Agreed Entry [13] Father first challenges the trial court’s grant of Mother’s Request to Reset
Hearing on her petition for contempt and payment of volleyball expenses,
arguing that the December 2016 Agreed Entry disposed of that petition and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 7 of 18 that, “[a]ccordingly, res judicata barred re-litigation” of the petition.
Appellant’s Br. p. 21. Setting aside the fact that Father did not argue res
judicata at any time before or during the hearing on Mother’s petition, we
cannot agree with Father’s starting premise that the Agreed Entry disposed of
the petition.
[14] Father emphasizes the second sentence of paragraph 2: “All child support and
financial obligations are current and paid in full.” He also relies on the first part
of paragraph 3: “This matter concludes all pending matters between the parties .
. . .” Read in isolation, these passages would certainly seem to support Father’s
argument that Mother’s petition—which was “pending” and which addressed
certain “financial obligations”—was resolved by virtue of the Agreed Entry.
But when the Agreed Entry is read as a whole and in context, it is quite
apparent that it resolved only Father’s Motion for Modification/Emancipation,
which in turn concerned only O.R.
[15] Paragraph 1 of the Agreed Entry simply says that “[O.R.] . . . should be
deemed emancipated for all purposes.” (Emphasis added). Paragraph 2, before
stating that “[a]ll child support and financial obligations are current and paid in
full,” says, “That neither parent owes any child support and/or any other
financial obligation whatsoever to the other regarding [O.R.].” (Emphasis
added). Paragraph 3, after stating that “[t]his matter concludes all pending
matters between the parties,” says, “and if the Court has set the matter for
hearing on the Motion for Modification/Emancipation filed on August 29,
2016, that said hearing date should be vacated as moot.” (Emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 8 of 18 Finally, the prayer for relief states that “the parties respectfully enter into this
Agreed Entry, request the Court to approve same, and request the Court to
vacate any hearing on the Motion for Modification/Emancipation filed
August 29, 2016, and for all other just and proper relief.” (Emphasis added).
The Agreed Entry’s specific references to Father’s Motion for
Modification/Emancipation and to O.R. (the only child mentioned in Father’s
motion) make it abundantly clear that the parties did not intend for the filing to
dispose of Mother’s November 2016 petition for contempt and payment of
volleyball expenses, which is not mentioned in the Agreed Entry. Therefore,
the trial court did not err by holding a hearing on, and then ruling on, Mother’s
petition.
II. Denial of Father’s request for a continuance [16] Father also contends that even if the Agreed Entry did not dispose of Mother’s
petition, the trial court should have granted his request to continue the hearing
to give him additional time to prepare. We afford our trial courts discretion in
deciding whether to grant a continuance, and we review such a decision only
for an abuse of that discretion. Blackford v. Boone Cty. Area Plan Comm’n, 43
N.E.3d 655, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). When a motion to continue has been
denied, an abuse of discretion will be found if the moving party has
demonstrated good cause for granting the motion, but we will reverse the trial
court’s decision only if the moving party can show that he was prejudiced by
the denial. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 9 of 18 [17] Father argues that he needed a continuance because (1) his attorney withdrew
two weeks before the hearing, (2) he “did not have an opportunity to review
any of Mother’s extensive exhibits prior to her offer of such evidence,” (3) he
had “insufficient time to present his defense,” and (4) his attorney did not tell
him that the contempt issues would be addressed at the hearing “so he was
unprepared to litigate those issues.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 45-49. We are not
convinced. First, while it is true that Father’s attorney did not formally move to
withdraw until about two weeks before the hearing, it is also true that he
informed Father of his intent to withdraw nearly four months before the hearing
and that he told Father almost a full month before the hearing that he would
not be handling the hearing and that Father should “take steps immediately to
engage new counsel[.]” With regard to Mother’s exhibits, even if we accept as
true Father’s claim that he did not receive any of the exhibits before the hearing
(Mother suggested otherwise, see Tr. pp. 18-19), Father makes no argument as
to how he was prejudiced by not having them earlier, i.e., what he might have
done differently if he had seen the exhibits sooner. As for whether Father was
given enough time to present his case, he contends that the trial court “cut[]
short” his presentation of evidence, Appellant’s Br. p. 45, but he does not
develop the argument any further. And to the extent that Father’s attorney
incorrectly told him, as Father claims, that the only issue at the hearing would
be N.R.’s volleyball expenses, that is a matter for Father to take up with the
attorney. Given the fact that Mother’s Request to Reset Hearing made multiple
references to her contempt claim, the trial court’s grant of that request left no
doubt that the claim would be addressed at the hearing. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 10 of 18 III. Ruling on the merits of Mother’s petition [18] Finally, Father contends that even if the trial court properly agreed to consider
Mother’s petition, and even if the trial court properly denied Father’s request
for a continuance, it erred by ruling in favor of Mother on the merits of her
A. Contempt [19] Father argues that the trial court should not have found him in contempt with
regard to I.R.’s and O.R.’s college expenses. Generally, the determination of
whether a party is in contempt is a matter within the trial court’s discretion, and
we will reverse only if we find that the trial court has abused that discretion.
Van Wieren v. Van Wieren, 858 N.E.2d 216, 222-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
“When reviewing a contempt order, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor
judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 223.
[20] Father’s argument regarding I.R. is based solely on the statement in the
December 2016 Agreed Entry that “[a]ll child support and financial obligations
are current and paid in full.” As discussed above, however, that Agreed Entry
concerned only O.R. Therefore, the Agreed Entry did not foreclose a finding
that Father was in contempt as to I.R.’s college expenses.
[21] Father next contends that even if the Agreed Entry did not resolve the issue of
I.R.’s college expenses, he “owed no postsecondary educational expenses” for
O.R. for 2017 because the Agreed Entry established that O.R. was
“emancipated for all purposes.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 51-52. He acknowledges
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 11 of 18 that, under Indiana’s child-support statutes, the emancipation of a child
terminates only an order to pay basic child support, not an order to pay
education expenses (where, as here, such an order exists), see Ind. Code §§ 31-
16-6-6, -7, but he argues that the “only reasonable interpretation” of the phrase
“emancipated for all purposes” is that it terminated the parties’ obligation to
pay college expenses for O.R. Appellant’s Br. p. 31. He bases his argument on
the fact that emancipation for purposes of the basic child-support obligation
generally occurs at age nineteen. See I.C. § 31-16-6-6. O.R.—the argument
goes—was already nineteen (nearly twenty) when the parties filed their Agreed
Entry, and therefore already emancipated for purposes of basic child support, so
the phrase “emancipated for all purposes” would be meaningless if read to
mean only “emancipated for purposes of basic child support.” In order for the
phrase to have any effect, Father contends, it must be read as cutting off the
parties’ obligation to contribute to O.R.’s college expenses.
[22] For three reasons, we cannot agree with Father’s argument. First, because
Indiana Code section 31-16-6-6 specifically provides that a parent can be
required to pay a child’s college expenses even after the child is “emancipated,”
it would be unnatural to read the word “emancipated” as terminating an
obligation to pay college expenses, even when the phrase “for all purposes” is
added. Second, the point of the Agreed Entry was to resolve Father’s Motion
for Modification/Emancipation, and that motion did not say a word about
O.R.’s future college expenses. And third, when Mother testified about
Father’s failure to pay a share of O.R.’s Spring 2017 expenses, Father did not
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 12 of 18 complain that the Agreed Entry relieved him of that obligation. All of this
strongly supports the conclusion that Father’s intent in filing his motion, and
the parties’ intent in filing the Agreed Entry, was simply to obtain a reduction
in Father’s basic child-support obligation based on O.R.’s emancipation. While
O.R.’s emancipation occurred automatically when he turned nineteen, the
reduction of Father’s child-support payment did not, which is why Father filed
his motion and asked the court to recognize the emancipation. In short,
reading the phrase “emancipated for all purposes” as addressing only Father’s
basic child-support obligation does not render the phrase meaningless; to the
contrary, O.R. being emancipated provided the requisite factual basis for the
modification of that support obligation from $229 to $161 per week.
[23] Father also asserts that even if the Agreed Entry did not address O.R.’s college
expenses, O.R. failed to maintain “full-time status and/or a 2.0 grade point
average” and therefore was no longer entitled to assistance with those expenses
under the parties’ agreement. Appellant’s Br. p. 52; see also Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 96 (“The obligation to pay post-secondary expenses shall be limited to
an undergraduate degree and the child must maintain a 2.0 GPA (based on a
4.0 scale) each semester and shall maintain full-time status.”). He points to his
testimony that O.R. “failed out of Jackson College” (in Michigan, according to
Father) before moving to Tennessee and to evidence that O.R. was a part-time
student in 2016. Tr. pp. 11-12, 37. Mother, however, presented evidence that
O.R.’s cumulative GPA was 2.3, see id. at 9, 12; Pet. Ex. 8, and Father said
nothing when Mother’s attorney told the court that O.R. was a full-time student
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 13 of 18 in the spring of 2017, see Tr. p. 41. Therefore, the trial court did not err in
concluding that the parties’ agreement regarding college expenses was still
applicable to O.R.
[24] As an alternative, Father argues that “[e]ven if the trial court properly ordered
Father to pay the allegedly outstanding postsecondary educational expenses for
[I.R.] and [O.R.], the trial court abused its discretion by failing to credit Father
with his overpayments of child support.” Appellant’s Br. p. 53. However, the
argument Father makes on appeal does not appear anywhere in the record of
the hearing before the trial court, at least not in a manner that we can decipher.
To the extent Father raised his argument in the trial court, he did not do so
until his motion to correct error. See Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 12-78. That
was too late. “It is well established that a party may not raise issues for the first
time in a motion to correct error.” Shepherd Props. Co. v. Int’l Union of Painters
and Allied Trades, Dist. Council 91, 972 N.E.2d 845, 849 n.3 (Ind. 2012).
[25] Father also asserts that the trial court should not have ordered him to pay
$562.50 of Mother’s attorney’s fees based on the contempt. However, Father’s
argument on this point is based largely on his belief that Mother’s petition was
without merit. See Appellant’s Br. pp. 54-55. Because we have already held
otherwise, we affirm the trial court’s modest award of attorney’s fees to Mother.
B. Volleyball Expenses [26] Father also challenges the part of the trial court’s order requiring him to
contribute to N.R.’s club-volleyball expenses. Our trial courts enjoy discretion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 14 of 18 in deciding whether to order the payment of extraordinary expenses, and we
review such a decision only for an abuse of that discretion. In re Paternity of
C.H.W., 892 N.E.2d 166, 171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
[27] Initially, we note that much of Father’s argument is based on the premise that
he might be required to pay additional expenses on top of the $5835 he was
already ordered to pay. The premise is faulty. While Father is correct that the
wording of this part of the trial court’s order is open-ended and leaves open the
possibility of additional expenses, Mother made clear at the hearing that the
$13,262 in expenses at issue covered all club-volleyball activities through the
summer of 2017, at which point N.R. would join the Northwestern volleyball
team and would no longer incur club-volleyball expenses. See Tr. p. 14. In her
brief on appeal, Mother confirms that she was not, and is not, asking for Father
to pay for any activities after the summer of 2017. Appellee’s Br. p. 21.
Therefore, though it is true that the trial court’s order regarding N.R.’s
volleyball expenses is not explicitly limited to expenses through the summer of
2017, we fail to see how amending the order to that effect would be of any
benefit to Father at this point, and we do not grant meaningless relief. See Ind.
Appellate Rule 66(A).
[28] Father also argues that the order regarding volleyball expenses “violates
[Indiana] Child Support Guideline 8.” Appellant’s Br. p. 36. That provision
addresses “Other Extraordinary Expenses” as follows:
The economic data used in developing the Child Support Guideline Schedules do not include components related to those Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 15 of 18 expenses of an “optional” nature such as costs related to summer camp, soccer leagues, scouting and the like. When both parents agree that the child(ren) may participate in optional activities, the parents should pay their pro rata share of these expenses. In the absence of an agreement relating to such expenses, assigning responsibility for the costs should take into account factors such as each parent’s ability to pay, which parent is encouraging the activity, whether the child(ren) has/have historically participated in the activity, and the reasons a parent encourages or opposes participation in the activity. If the parents or the court determine that the child(ren) may participate in optional activities, the method of sharing the expenses shall be set forth in the entry.
Specifically, Father asserts that there is no evidence that he “agreed to or
supported” N.R.’s participation in club volleyball. Appellant’s Br. p. 37. But
Guideline 8 does not say that a parent must agree to an activity before being
ordered to pay a share of the cost of the activity. To be sure, the guideline
envisions agreements between parents regarding optional activities. However,
it also explicitly grants courts authority to order parents to pay for such
activities even “[i]n the absence of” such an agreement. Therefore, the trial
court’s order in this case does not violate Guideline 8.
[29] In addition, Father contends that $13,262 is an unreasonable amount of
expenses to incur for one child for one activity for around half a year, at least in
light of the parties’ respective incomes and their other financial obligations. If
we were to consider that figure in isolation, we might agree with Father.
However, we must consider it in the context of N.R.’s full-ride scholarship to
Northwestern. That scholarship, which N.R. obviously would not have
received but for her volleyball activities and accomplishments during high
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 16 of 18 school, relieves Father of his obligation to pay up to 1/3 of the cost of attending
Indiana University. Even one year of that obligation could easily exceed the
$5835 Father was ordered to pay for N.R.’s club-volleyball activities.2 Father
emphasizes the fact that some of the expenses were for activities subsequent to
N.R. being awarded the scholarship in February 2017. Apparently Father
would have had N.R. simply quit her club-volleyball team, midseason, after
securing the scholarship. Suffice it to say, we believe the trial court acted well
within its discretion in allowing N.R. to finish the season.
[30] The remainder of Father’s argument on this point consists of a variety of
picayunish and largely meritless attacks on particular expenses included in the
$13,262. He notes that Mother incurred a $500 charge on November 11, 2016,
more than two weeks before she filed her petition, but he does not question
Mother’s testimony that all the expenses she was presenting were for activities
that took place after she filed her petition (in other words, there is no dispute
that the $500 charge was simply a prepayment for a post-petition activity). He
also claims that Mother included $343 for an Orlando car rental for June 21-
July 2, 2017 (eleven days), even though the volleyball event ran only June 21-27
(seven days). That is incorrect. She included only $218 (approximately seven-
elevenths of $343). See Pet. Ex. 5, p. 1. He complains about paying a portion
of the coaches’ travel expenses and part of Mother’s fuel costs for driving N.R.
2 Father says that he “is responsible for his share of [N.R.’s] postsecondary educational expenses not covered by her athletic scholarship,” Appellant’s Br. p. 40, but he doesn’t identify any such expenses.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 17 of 18 to out-of-town practices, but he cites nothing in the record and no authority
suggesting that these are unreasonable expenses for club-sport participation. In
addition, he takes issue with the fact that some of the hotel bills include charges
for various food and drink, some of which may have been consumed by Mother
(a total of $76.28, to be exact), and that Mother “sought reimbursement at the
IRS 2017 Standard Mileage Rate” when calculating the cost of driving to
certain other volleyball activities “rather than just her out-of-pocket fuel costs.”
Appellant’s Br. pp. 43-44. We will not take a deep dive into these issues; at
most these were close calls on relatively minor details—the sort of calls better
left to the discretion of the trial court.
[31] Affirmed.
May, J, and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-DR-2119 | April 20, 2018 Page 18 of 18