1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Howard Leon Haynie, No. CV-26-00011-TUC-JCH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Camping World RV Sales LLC,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma 16 Pauperis (Doc. 2) and Motion to Allow Electronic Filing (Doc. 3). The Court will also 17 screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will grant 18 Plaintiff’s Application (Doc. 2) and Motion (Doc. 3) and dismiss the Complaint. 19 I. Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) 20 In Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, he states that he is unable 21 to pay the filing fees and costs because he is currently unemployed and homeless. He 22 records an average monthly income from self-employment of $350.00, $5.00 in a savings 23 account, $100.00 in assets, and $220.00 in monthly expenses. He also records three 24 children as dependents who rely on his income for support. The Court is persuaded that 25 Plaintiff cannot afford the costs associated with filing suit and will grant Plaintiff in forma 26 pauperis status. 27 . . . . . . . . 28 1 II. Motion to Allow Electronic Filing (Doc. 3) 2 Within Plaintiff’s “Motion to Allow Electronic Filing by a Party Appearing Without 3 an Attorney,” Plaintiff has included a declaration affirming that he is willing and able to 4 comply with the electronic filing requirements. (Doc. 3.) Accordingly, the Court will grant 5 Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Electronic Filing. Plaintiff is reminded that pro se litigants 6 must generally follow the same court rules and procedures as represented litigants. 7 See Carter v. Comm’r, 784 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, Plaintiff should 8 review the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Civil Procedure to 9 avoid impermissible findings. 10 III. Statutory Screening of Pro Se Complaint 11 A. Legal Standard 12 The Court must screen in forma pauperis complaints and under § 1915(e)(2) and 13 dismiss a case if the Court determines the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a 14 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 15 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 16 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 17 not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, 18 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 19 (2009). Conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of 20 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient 21 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 22 Iqbal, 566 at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 23 claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 24 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 25 Determining whether a claim is plausible is “a context-specific task that requires the 26 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 27 Still, the Court must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 28 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than 1 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 2 (2007) (per curiam)). If the Court determines a complaint could be cured by the allegation 3 of additional facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend that complaint 4 before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) 5 (en banc). 6 B. The Complaint 7 Plaintiff asserts one claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. 8 §§ 1681 et seq., against Defendant Camping World RV Sales, LLC. (Doc. 1 at 4.) The 9 Complaint alleges Defendant accessed Plaintiff’s Experian consumer credit report in 10 connection with a credit application for a vehicle and then “took adverse action or failed to 11 approve the credit application based in whole or in part on information contained in 12 Plaintiff’s consumer report.” (Id.) Plaintiff is requesting compensatory damages and, if 13 permitted, punitive damages and declaratory relief. (Id.) The FCRA “was crafted to protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate 14 information about them” in consumer reports. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 15 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th 16 Cir. 1995)). “‘To achieve this end,’ [the] FCRA imposes on consumer-reporting agencies 17 ‘a host of [procedural] requirements concerning the creation and use of consumer reports’ 18 and . . . allows individuals to sue those which are non-compliant.” Id. at 1113–14 (quoting 19 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 334–35 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016)). As 20 pertinent here, the FCRA permits a consumer reporting agency to furnish a credit report 21 relating to a consumer in connection with a credit transaction under certain circumstances. 22 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3), (c). “The FCRA provides a private right of action against 23 those who violate its statutory requirements in procuring and using consumer reports.” Syed 24 v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 2017). The affected consumer is entitled to actual 25 damages, court fees, and costs for a negligent violation, § 1681o, in addition to statutory 26 damages ranging from $100 to $1,000 and punitive damages for a willful violation, 27 § 1681o. See Syed, 853 F.3d at 497. 28 1 Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant obtained his consumer report for any 2 prohibited purpose. Instead, he alleges that Defendant’s “adverse action” or failure to 3 “approve his credit application” violated the FRCA. The FRCA does not prohibit adverse 4 action under the circumstances here. See generally § 1681b. Rather, the FRCA places 5 notice requirements upon the person using the consumer’s credit report to perform an 6 adverse action. See § 1681m(a). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant failed to comply 7 with these notice requirements. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim under the 8 FRCA. 9 C.
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1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
9 Howard Leon Haynie, No. CV-26-00011-TUC-JCH
10 Plaintiff, ORDER
11 v.
12 Camping World RV Sales LLC,
13 Defendant. 14 15 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff’s Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma 16 Pauperis (Doc. 2) and Motion to Allow Electronic Filing (Doc. 3). The Court will also 17 screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court will grant 18 Plaintiff’s Application (Doc. 2) and Motion (Doc. 3) and dismiss the Complaint. 19 I. Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) 20 In Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, he states that he is unable 21 to pay the filing fees and costs because he is currently unemployed and homeless. He 22 records an average monthly income from self-employment of $350.00, $5.00 in a savings 23 account, $100.00 in assets, and $220.00 in monthly expenses. He also records three 24 children as dependents who rely on his income for support. The Court is persuaded that 25 Plaintiff cannot afford the costs associated with filing suit and will grant Plaintiff in forma 26 pauperis status. 27 . . . . . . . . 28 1 II. Motion to Allow Electronic Filing (Doc. 3) 2 Within Plaintiff’s “Motion to Allow Electronic Filing by a Party Appearing Without 3 an Attorney,” Plaintiff has included a declaration affirming that he is willing and able to 4 comply with the electronic filing requirements. (Doc. 3.) Accordingly, the Court will grant 5 Plaintiff’s Motion to Allow Electronic Filing. Plaintiff is reminded that pro se litigants 6 must generally follow the same court rules and procedures as represented litigants. 7 See Carter v. Comm’r, 784 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, Plaintiff should 8 review the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Civil Procedure to 9 avoid impermissible findings. 10 III. Statutory Screening of Pro Se Complaint 11 A. Legal Standard 12 The Court must screen in forma pauperis complaints and under § 1915(e)(2) and 13 dismiss a case if the Court determines the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a 14 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 15 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 16 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 17 not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, 18 the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 19 (2009). Conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of 20 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient 21 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 22 Iqbal, 566 at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A 23 claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 24 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. 25 Determining whether a claim is plausible is “a context-specific task that requires the 26 reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 27 Still, the Court must “construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 28 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than 1 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 2 (2007) (per curiam)). If the Court determines a complaint could be cured by the allegation 3 of additional facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend that complaint 4 before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) 5 (en banc). 6 B. The Complaint 7 Plaintiff asserts one claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. 8 §§ 1681 et seq., against Defendant Camping World RV Sales, LLC. (Doc. 1 at 4.) The 9 Complaint alleges Defendant accessed Plaintiff’s Experian consumer credit report in 10 connection with a credit application for a vehicle and then “took adverse action or failed to 11 approve the credit application based in whole or in part on information contained in 12 Plaintiff’s consumer report.” (Id.) Plaintiff is requesting compensatory damages and, if 13 permitted, punitive damages and declaratory relief. (Id.) The FCRA “was crafted to protect consumers from the transmission of inaccurate 14 information about them” in consumer reports. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 15 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th 16 Cir. 1995)). “‘To achieve this end,’ [the] FCRA imposes on consumer-reporting agencies 17 ‘a host of [procedural] requirements concerning the creation and use of consumer reports’ 18 and . . . allows individuals to sue those which are non-compliant.” Id. at 1113–14 (quoting 19 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 334–35 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016)). As 20 pertinent here, the FCRA permits a consumer reporting agency to furnish a credit report 21 relating to a consumer in connection with a credit transaction under certain circumstances. 22 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3), (c). “The FCRA provides a private right of action against 23 those who violate its statutory requirements in procuring and using consumer reports.” Syed 24 v. M-I, LLC, 853 F.3d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 2017). The affected consumer is entitled to actual 25 damages, court fees, and costs for a negligent violation, § 1681o, in addition to statutory 26 damages ranging from $100 to $1,000 and punitive damages for a willful violation, 27 § 1681o. See Syed, 853 F.3d at 497. 28 1 Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant obtained his consumer report for any 2 prohibited purpose. Instead, he alleges that Defendant’s “adverse action” or failure to 3 “approve his credit application” violated the FRCA. The FRCA does not prohibit adverse 4 action under the circumstances here. See generally § 1681b. Rather, the FRCA places 5 notice requirements upon the person using the consumer’s credit report to perform an 6 adverse action. See § 1681m(a). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant failed to comply 7 with these notice requirements. As such, the Complaint fails to state a claim under the 8 FRCA. 9 C. Leave to Amend 10 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss all counts and Defendants without 11 prejudice. Within 30 days, Plaintiff may submit a first amended complaint to cure the 12 deficiencies outlined above. The first amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten in 13 its entirety, and no part of the original Complaint may be incorporated by reference. Any cause of action raised in the original Complaint is waived if not alleged in the first amended 14 complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 15 Should Plaintiff choose to amend his Complaint, the Court cautions Plaintiff that 16 the PDF Complaint filed with the Court appears incomplete. It appears Plaintiff also 17 intended to assert a claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. 18 §§ 1691 et seq, and may have typed additional information in the “Basis for Jurisdiction” 19 and “Statement of Claim” sections. (Doc. 1 at 3–4.) However, the PDF form did not permit 20 additional space, and any extra sentences are cut off. Should he amend, Plaintiff should 21 attach additional pages to the end of the PDF packet for sections that do not provide 22 adequate space and clearly label the information on any attached pages. 23 III. Warnings 24 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 25 LRCiv. 83.3(d). Plaintiff must not include a motion for other relief with a notice of change 26 of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this action. 27 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these 28 warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, || 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 3\| IV. Order 4 IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff's Application for Leave to Proceed In Forma 5 || Pauperis (Doc. 2). 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff?’s Motion to Allow Electronic || Filing (Doc. 3). 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing without prejudice the Complaint 9|| (Doc. 1). Plaintiff has 30 days from the date of filing of this Order to file a first amended 10 || complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within 30 days, the Clerk of Court 1] || must enter a judgment of dismissal of this action, without prejudice and without further notice to Plaintiff and deny any pending unrelated motions as moot. 13 Dated this 12th day of January, 2026. 14 15 / A
17 / / John C. Hinderaker ig _/United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28
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