Howard J. Redmond Jr. A/K/A Howard J. Redmond v. PNC Bank, National Association

Opinion

Opinion filed August 13, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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No. 11-25-00123-CV

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HOWARD J. REDMOND, JR., Appellant V.

PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2 Denton County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV-2023-03544

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N1 Appellant, Howard J. Redmond, Jr., as he did in the trial court, appears pro se and challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee, PNC Bank, National Association (the Bank). The Bank sued Redmond, alleging

1 Pursuant to Misc. Docket Order No. 25-9016 issued by the Texas Supreme Court on April 2, 2025, this appeal was transferred to us from the Second Court of Appeals. Therefore, as the transferee court, we must decide the issues raised in this appeal in accordance with the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals if its precedent conflicts with ours. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

that he defaulted on a promissory note with an outstanding balance of $19,004.71. The Bank moved for summary judgment and submitted the loan agreement, account balance records, and an affidavit to support its motion.

Redmond presents five issues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment because material facts remained in dispute; (2) the Bank failed to conclusively establish that it is the owner of the loan; (3) the promissory note is void or voidable due to a lack of lawful consideration; (4) the trial court violated Redmond’s right to due process when it accepted legal conclusions and inadmissible affidavits; and (5) the Bank’s failure to produce the original promissory note renders the debt uncollectible. Because the loan agreement and the Bank’s supporting affidavit are inconsistent regarding the ownership of the note, and no other evidence in the record establishes a valid chain of title, we hold that the Bank failed to carry its summary judgment burden. Consequently, we reverse and remand.

I. Background

When the Bank filed its petition, it attached a copy of the loan agreement and account statement records showing Redmond’s loan payment history. According to the loan agreement, Redmond borrowed $25,000 from BBVA USA on February 18, 2020, and that amount was disbursed to him around the same time. When Redmond defaulted on the loan, the Bank accelerated it and filed the underlying lawsuit for the remaining balance—$19,004.71.

Redmond filed a document entitled “Validation,” which did not respond to the factual allegations in the Bank’s petition. Overall, Redmond’s filings were unusual. For example, he filed numerous exhibits with the trial court, unattached to any pleading or motion, including a set of Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) finance

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statements, which he apparently filed in Maryland, and which were accompanied by a list of wide-ranging questions directed at the Bank.2 The Bank moved for summary judgment and attached the loan agreement, account balance records, and an affidavit by a “Default Litigation Specialist,” which purported to authenticate the agreement and records in support of the motion. Redmond did not respond, and the trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of the Bank. Redmond subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court granted, and the trial court vacated its summary judgment. Redmond then filed a response to the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court thereafter granted the motion and signed a final judgment in the Bank’s favor. This appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Tex. 2018). To prevail under the traditional summary judgment standard, the movant has the burden to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); 3 ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d

2 Appellant appears to be an adherent to the Moorish sovereign citizen movement, some members of which believe that the federal and state courts of the United States have no jurisdiction over them; they also file fraudulent financing statements under UCC articles. See Bey v. Bray, No. 4:22-CV-933-SDJ-KPJ, 2023 WL 5987393, at *5–6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6162742 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2023). This tired old tune that is comprised of inaccurate case law quotes, self-serving readings and interpretations of the United States Constitution, and proffered definitions from outdated legal dictionaries has been summarily rejected by federal and state courts alike. Royal v. State, 703 S.W.3d 895, 913 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d); see Villani v. Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc., No. 11-24-00321-CV, 2026 WL 1593648, at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 4, 2026, no pet. h.).

3 The Texas Supreme Court recently revised Rule 166a. Although the “rewrite is not intended to substantively change the law,” it has resulted in a renumbering of the rule’s provisions. See Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Tex. Feb. 27, 2026). The amendments to this rule only apply to motions for summary judgment that are filed on or after March 1, 2026. Because the Bank’s motion for summary judgment was filed prior to the effective date of the rule’s revision, we refer to the rule in effect at the time the motion was filed. See id.

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858, 865 (Tex. 2018). If the movant meets its summary judgment burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to raise a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the grant of summary judgment. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 510–11 (Tex. 2014).

To determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. 2019). We credit evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could do so, and we disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. Samson Expl., LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc., 521 S.W.3d 766, 774 (Tex. 2017); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). The evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact if reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions, considering all the summary judgment evidence presented. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007).

III. Analysis

We understand Redmond’s first four issues to be interrelated. 4 In his first issue, Redmond contends that the Bank did not carry its summary judgment burden and material issues of fact remain. Beneath this umbrella issue, his second, third,

4 Although pro se litigants are not exempt from compliance with the applicable laws and procedural rules, pro se pleadings and appellate filings must nonetheless be liberally construed. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Barrientos v. Barrientos, 675 S.W.3d 399, 404 n.2 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2023, pet. denied); Aaron v. Fisher, 645 S.W.3d 299, 312 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.). Unfortunately, Redmond’s four-page appellate brief is jumbled, cursory, and fails to adequately develop many of the assertions it contains. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring an appellant’s brief to “contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record” (emphasis added)). Nevertheless, Redmond raises the dispositive point— proof of ownership of the note—in his appellate brief and in his summary judgment response below. Further, the Texas Supreme Court has emphasized that courts “should hesitate to resolve cases based on procedural defects and instead endeavor to resolve cases on the merits.” See Bertucci v. Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534, 541–42 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. 2020)).

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and fourth issues each concern some aspect of the summary judgment evidence, and whether the Bank carried its summary judgment burden to establish that no genuine issues of material fact remains and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d at 865. Here, Redmond’s first issue and his second issue, that the Bank failed to establish that it owned the loan, are, on this record, dispositive of this appeal.

The Bank pled and argued its claim as a breach-of-contract cause of action, the elements of which are: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance; (3) breach; and (4) damages. See Jim Maddox Props., LLC v. WEM Equity Cap. Invs., Ltd., 446 S.W.3d 126, 132–33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). A plaintiff who sues for recovery on a promissory note need not prove all the essential elements of a breach-of-contract claim but rather need only establish that: (1) the note exists; (2) the defendant signed it; (3) the plaintiff is the legal owner and holder of the note; and (4) a balance is due and owing. See Kinsey v. Duchman, Ltd., 730 S.W.3d 489, 499 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, pet. denied); Roth v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 439 S.W.3d 508, 512 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).

Testimony in an affidavit that an entity owns a note is sufficient to conclusively establish ownership of it, even absent supporting documentation, if there is no summary judgment evidence to the contrary. De La Garza v. Bank of New York Mellon, No. 02-17-00427-CV, 2018 WL 5725250, at *9 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth Nov. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing First Gibraltar Bank v. Farley, 895 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied)). And a photocopy of a note that is attached to the affidavit of a holder who swears it is a true and correct copy of the original note is sufficient to prove the status of the owner and holder of the note if there is no controverting summary judgment evidence. Id.

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However, an issue of material fact exists regarding the ownership of a note when the summary judgment evidence presents an unexplained gap in the chain of title. Id.

The Bank attached the affidavit of Stephen Pisha, a “Default Litigation Specialist,” to its motion for summary judgment. Pisha’s affidavit included two exhibits: the loan agreement and account statement records. In his affidavit, Pisha testified that the attached loan agreement is a “true and correct copy” of the original, Redmond opened an account with the Bank on February 18, 2020, and the Bank provided the loan agreement to him, which he signed. Pisha further testified that Redmond’s account had “not been sold or assigned by [the] Bank, the original creditor of the account.” However, and importantly, the loan agreement identifies BBVA USA, not the Bank, as the lender. Moreover, nothing in the summary judgment evidence before us identifies a chain of title of the loan from BBVA USA to the Bank. See id. (“Put differently, BNYM’s summary judgment evidence presents an unexplained gap in BNYM’s chain of title because it appears that title to the Note stopped in FHHL.”).

Although the account balance records show that the Bank is the owner of the account that Redmond opened with it, and that the loan number, 650, corresponds with the loan number identified in the loan agreement, these records compound the chain of title gap rather than resolve it because—like Pisha’s affidavit—they are inconsistent with the loan agreement regarding the owner of the loan’s obligations, and that inconsistency is unexplained. See id.

The summary judgment evidence does not show any merger or transfer of the loan from BBVA USA to the Bank, and the Bank did not request that we take judicial notice of its merger with BBVA USA.5 See City of Glenn Heights v. Sheffield Dev.

5 See PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/713676/000071367621000106/pnc-20211008.htm. In the first sentence of the fact section of its brief, the Bank states that its “predecessor-in-interest BBVA USA issued

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Co., Inc., 55 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied) (recognizing that “courts may take judicial notice of certain matters at any time, even on appeal”). Even if it had, “[a]ppellate courts are reluctant to take judicial notice of matters which go to the merits of a dispute” when that evidence was not presented to the trial court. Oloyede v. Citizens Bank, N.A., No. 05-22-00141-CV, 2023 WL 4881392, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 1, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing SEI Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Bank One Tex., N.A., 803 S.W.2d 838, 840–41 (Tex. App. —Dallas 1991, no writ)); see also Hendee v. Dewhurst, 228 S.W.3d 354, 377 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. denied) (holding that an appellate court’s decision whether to take judicial notice of a fact on appeal is generally discretionary).

To take judicial notice of matters that are central to the merits of a dispute “runs the risk that an appellate court is effectively functioning as one of original, not appellate, jurisdiction.” Oloyede, 2023 WL 4881392, at *4 (citing City of Glenn Heights, 55 S.W.3d at 163). We decline to do so here. See id. at *3–4 (declining to take judicial notice of a plaintiff bank’s name change to uphold summary judgment on the issue of the ownership of the subject note).

Consequently, because the Bank’s summary judgment evidence—the supporting affidavit and attached loan documents—is internally inconsistent regarding the ownership of the note, and because no other evidence in the summary judgment record explains the apparent gap in the Bank’s chain of title, we conclude that the Bank has failed to carry its summary judgment burden. See De La Garza, 2018 WL 5725250, at *9; see also FFP Mktg. Co., Inc. v. Long Lane Master Tr. IV, 169 S.W.3d 402, 410–11, 413 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (reversing summary judgment when the movant’s affidavit and attachments were “internally

an unsecured loan (‘the Loan’) to Redmond.” But a statement in the fact section of an appellate brief, like a pleading, is not summary judgment evidence. See Sher v. Fun Travel World, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 500, 502 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.).

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inconsistent” regarding the movant’s ownership interest in the note); First Gibraltar Bank, 895 S.W.2d at 428–29 (concluding the bank agent’s affidavit testimony stating that the bank was the holder of the attached note without explaining or showing how title to the note passed to the bank created “internal inconsistencies” and a fact issue concerning ownership of the note, which precluded summary judgment).

We have reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Redmond, and we conclude that the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact concerning the ownership of the note. Accordingly, we sustain Redmond’s first and second issues.6 IV. This Court’s Ruling

We reverse the judgment of the trial court, and we remand this cause to it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

W. STACY TROTTER JUSTICE

August 13, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

6 Because these issues are dispositive, we do not address Redmond’s remaining issues. TEX. R.

APP. P. 47.1.