Howard Hanna v. Ford

2025 Ohio 5524

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: December 11, 2025
• Docket: 115086
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Howard Hanna v. Ford, 2025-Ohio-5524.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

HOWARD HANNA, DBA HOWARD : HANNA PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 115086

v. :

JOHNNITA FORD, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 11, 2025

Civil Appeal from the Shaker Heights Municipal Court Case No. 23-CVG-01591

Appearances:

John Wood, for appellant.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

In this accelerated appeal, defendant-appellant Johnnita Ford

(“Ford”) appeals the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Howard

Hanna, dba Howard Hanna Property Management (“HH dba HHPM”) (separately

referring to “Howard Hanna,” “Howard Hanna Property Management,” and “Howard Hanna Real Estate Services” for the purposes of Ford’s argument). Upon

review, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In November 2023, HH dba HHPM filed a two-count complaint

against Ford, the tenant of a property located on Kendall Road in Shaker Heights

(“the property”). Count 1 asserted a forcible-entry-and-detainer claim from Ford’s

alleged failure to pay rent. Count 2 asserted a money-damages claim for any unpaid

or accruing rental payments, fees, and utility bills.

Relevant to this appeal, the complaint asserted that William and Blair

Steck (“the Stecks”) owned the property and HH dba HHPM managed it on their

behalf. HH dba HHPM attached the following exhibits to its complaint: a Property

Summary Report, confirming the Stecks’ ownership of the property beginning in

August 2022; a certified Ohio Secretary of State document listing Howard Hanna’s

registered-trade-name filings and identifying Smythe, Cramer Co., as the

agent/registrant; the lease agreements for tenancy terms spanning from July 2020

through June 2022 between then-owner Search Management, LLC and Ford; notice

that Search Management, LLC was not extending the lease expiring in June 2022

because the property was being offered for sale; and a three-day notice to leave the

property issued by Howard Hanna Property Management and served in October

2023. Ford filed a notice of appearance of counsel and an answer. The

answer generally denied the allegations of the complaint and raised one affirmative

defense: the statute of frauds.

An eviction trial was held before a magistrate in February 2024.

According to the magistrate’s decision, Ford did not offer any evidence to rebut HH

dba HHPM’s contention that she failed to pay rent. Rather, Ford asserted several

defenses, including that 1) HH dba HHPM was an unregistered, fictitious name and

was prohibited from bringing suit under Ohio law; 2) HH dba HHPM could not file

suit as an agent of the owner where the agent was not listed in the governing lease;

and 3) HH dba HHPM’s three-day notice was defective because it was from Howard

Hanna Property Management.

The magistrate found that Howard Hanna was the plaintiff in this

matter, was registered with the Ohio Secretary of State, and was permitted to bring

an action under Ohio law. The magistrate further found that Search Management,

LLC sold the property to the Stecks in August 2022, the Stecks hired HH dba HHPM

to manage the property, and HH dba HHPM was permitted to seek and obtain a

judgment under R.C. 1923.01 as a “landlord.” Finally, the magistrate found that

because Howard Hanna Property Management delivered the three-day notice and

HH dba HHPM filed the complaint, R.C. 1923.04(A)’s jurisdictional prerequisites

were not met. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended judgment in Ford’s favor

as to HH dba HHPM’s first cause of action. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and dismissed the

forcible-entry-and-detainer claim without prejudice.1 HH dba HHPM’s money-

damages claim remained pending. A litigation schedule was established, including

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines; trial was set; and the matter was

referred to the magistrate. Prior to trial, the parties filed briefs describing the case,

identifying witnesses, listing exhibits, and stating anticipated issues.

Trial was held in July 2024 on HH dba HHPM’s second cause of

action. Testimony was offered by the property manager for HH dba HHPM and

Howard Hanna Real Estate Services, and exhibits were submitted by both parties.

The property manager testified that she believed Howard Hanna, Howard Hanna

Property Services, and Howard Hanna Real Estate Services were “all . . . one.”

A magistrate’s decision was issued, making findings of fact and

conclusions of law based on the evidence presented at trial. The magistrate found

that, after their purchase of the property in August 2022, the Stecks hired Howard

Hanna Real Estate Services to be their agent and property manager. The Stecks

directed Ford to make payments to Howard Hanna based on their rental agreement.

Howard Hanna and Howard Hanna Real Estate Services were registered trade

names of Smythe, Cramer Co., which was a for-profit corporation registered to do

business in Ohio. Ford made several payments to Howard Hanna but did not make

1 Howard Hanna refiled its forcible-entry-and-detainer action in Shaker Heights

M.C. No. 24CVG00359, which ultimately resulted in Ford’s removal from the property in July 2024. An appeal was filed from the trial court’s judgment; however, the appeal was dismissed as moot after possession was restored to Howard Hanna. See Howard Hanna v. Ford, No. 113874 (8th Dist. Aug. 1, 2024). full, timely payments. The magistrate concluded that Ford breached her lease and

owed unpaid rent and late fees. The magistrate further concluded that HH dba

HHPM was permitted to bring the action because Howard Hanna and Howard

Hanna Real Estate Services, the agent and property manager hired by the Stecks,

were not separate legal entities from Smythe, Cramer Co.

The magistrate also addressed Ford’s statute-of-frauds defense,

finding that it had no merit. The magistrate then found that Ford “attempt[ed] to

bootstrap other affirmative defenses, such as failure to bring the action by the real

party in interest, standing, or capacity” and concluded that those defenses were

waived since she failed to raise them in her answer.

Ford objected to the magistrate’s decision. Relevant to this appeal,

Ford challenged the magistrate’s finding regarding Ford’s “bootstrapped”

affirmative defenses, arguing that she did not waive her lack-of-standing defense.

Ford also objected to the magistrate’s finding that HH dba HHPM was permitted to

bring suit. HH dba HHPM filed a response, requesting that Ford’s objections be

overruled. Ford filed a reply and reasserted her arguments.

The trial court thoroughly analyzed Ford’s objections to the

magistrate’s decision in a subsequent order. The trial court found that Ford’s

standing defense was based on whether HH dba HHPM had capacity to sue and was

the real party in interest, noting:

[Ford] acknowledges that the [p]roperty[’s] owners, the Stecks, have standing. [Ford] does not object to the [m]agistrate’s finding that Howard Hanna and Howard Hanna Real Estate Services are registered trade names of Smythe, Crame Co. [Ford] likewise does not object to the [m]agistrate’s finding that Smythe, Cramer Co. doing business as Howard Hanna Real Estate Services entered into a contract with William Steck wherein [he] assigned the right to collect rent and bring legal action to collect those rents. However, [Ford] argues that Howard Hanna and Howard Hanna Property Management “could only appear as [the p]laintiff if it could establish a representative relationship with [the Stecks] per Civ.R. 17, R.C. 1329.10, or R.C. 5321.01[.]” . . . Thus, it is clear that [Ford’s] “standing” defense is predicated on other defenses, which must be properly asserted.

The trial court found that Ford’s answer did not include affirmative defenses for lack

of capacity or failure by the real party in interest to bring the action. The trial court

further found that Ford was permitted to engage in discovery and properly raise any

applicable defenses prior to trial; however, she did not seek leave to amend her

answer. The trial court concluded that Ford could not “recast her ‘standing’ defense”

and that her failure to timely raise and assert those defenses resulted in waiver.

Accordingly, the trial court overruled Ford’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s

decision.

Ford appeals, raising a single assignment of error for review.

Assignment of Error

It was an error of law to grant judgment for [HH dba HHPM].

II. Law and Analysis

Ford limits her appeal to the issue of standing. First, Ford asserts that

standing is a jurisdictional requirement that can be raised at any time during the

proceeding and cannot be cured by later substitution of the real party in interest.

Ford then challenges HH dba HHPM’s capacity to sue, arguing that an entity doing business as a trade name is limited to enforcing its own contracts and may not

enforce contracts executed by another trade name solely because both trade names

are used by a common corporation. Throughout her appellate brief, Ford

acknowledges that suit could have properly been brought by the Stecks, as owners

of the property and parties to the lease, or by Howard Hanna Real Estate Services

or Smythe, Cramer Co., dba Howard Hanna Real Estate Services, as an agent and

property manager.

As an initial matter, we identify the statutory provision governing HH

dba HHPM’s money-damages claim. R.C. 1923.081 addresses the joinder of causes

of action in a forcible-entry-and-detainer case and provides:

A trial in an action for forcible entry and detainer for residential premises . . . may also include a trial on claims of the plaintiff for past due rent and other damages under a rental agreement, unless for good cause shown the court continues the trial on those claims. For the purposes of this section, good cause includes the request of the defendant to file an answer or counterclaim to the claims of the plaintiff or for discovery, in which case the proceedings shall be the same in all respects as in other civil cases.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, we analyze the trial court’s disposition of HH dba HHPM’s

second cause of action as we would any other civil case and apply the applicable rules

of civil procedure.

Next, we address Ford’s contention that standing presents

jurisdictional issues that can be raised at any time. In support of her argument,

Ford relies on Fed. Home Loan Mtge. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017. In

Schwartzwald, the Ohio Supreme Court noted in a parenthetical that “‘the issue of standing, inasmuch as it is jurisdictional in nature, may be raised at any time during

the pendency of the proceedings.’” Id. at ¶ 22, quoting New Boston Cake Corp. v.

Tyler, 32 Ohio St.3d 216 (1987). There, the plaintiff conceded that there was no

evidence that it suffered any injury at the time it commenced the underlying

foreclosure action. Id. at ¶ 28. The Ohio Supreme Court found that because it failed

to establish an interest in the note or mortgage at the time it filed suit, the plaintiff

had no standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court. Id. The Court explained:

It is fundamental that a party commencing litigation must have standing to sue in order to present a justiciable controversy and invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Civ.R. 17(A) does not change this principle, and a lack of standing at the outset of litigation cannot be cured by receipt of an assignment of the claim or by substitution of the real party in interest.

Id. at ¶ 41. The Court concluded that a trial court could not substitute a real party in

interest for another party if no party with standing invoked its jurisdiction in the

first instance. Id. at ¶ 38.

However, in Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 18, the

Ohio Supreme Court revisited its holding in Schwartzwald and provided further

guidance regarding “[t]he general term ‘jurisdiction’[, which] can be used to

connotate several distinct concepts, including jurisdiction over the subject-matter

jurisdiction over the person, and jurisdiction over a particular case.” The Court

explained that “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction is the power of a court to entertain and

adjudicate a particular class of cases” and “is determined without regard to the rights

of the individual parties involved in a particular case.” Id. at ¶ 19. The Court noted that a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction can be challenged at any time. Id. at

¶ 17. The Court then clarified that subject-matter jurisdiction is distinct from a trial

court’s jurisdiction over a particular case, which “refers to the court’s authority to

proceed or rule on a case that is within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction” and

“involves consideration of the rights of the parties.” Id. at ¶ 19.

With these concepts in mind, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “a

[trial] court that has subject-matter jurisdiction over an action does not lose that

jurisdiction merely because a party to the action lacks standing.” Id. at ¶ 17. The

Court explained:

Standing is certainly a jurisdictional requirement; a party’s lack of standing vitiates the party’s ability to invoke the jurisdiction of a court — even a court of competent subject-matter jurisdiction — over the party’s attempted action. But an inquiry into a party’s ability to invoke a court’s jurisdiction speaks to jurisdiction over a particular case, not subject-matter jurisdiction.

(Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 22 (finding that lack of standing cannot support a

Civ.R. 60(B)(3) motion for relief from judgment after the defendant failed to appeal

from a trial court’s judgment in a foreclosure action, even if the plaintiff’s assertion

of standing was patently false). This court recently discussed Kutcha’s distinction,

stating: “In other words, lack of standing is not a basis to collaterally challenge a

final judgment, but it remains a jurisdictional prerequisite that must be established

if the objection is timely preserved.” (Emphasis in original.) Paul v. Kingsbury,

2024-Ohio-5819, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.) (noting that a challenge to plaintiff’s standing was

timely preserved when the defendant included the lack of standing as an affirmative defense in her answer and the issue was challenged on direct appeal). Thus, we

decline to adopt Ford’s broad conclusion that lack of standing always presents a

nonwaivable jurisdictional issue that can be raised at any point in a proceeding.

Finally, we analyze the substance of Ford’s challenge. We agree with

the trial court and find that Ford’s lack-of-standing argument does not present a

nonwaivable-jurisdictional question; rather, Ford challenges HH dba HHPM’s

capacity to sue and questions whether HH dba HHPM is the real party in interest —

both of which are waivable defenses. Brantley, Inc. v. Tornstrom, 2024-Ohio-2908,

¶ 15 (8th Dist.) (finding that defenses challenging a party’s capacity to bring an

action or whether that party is the real party in interest may be waived).

Capacity to sue merely concerns a party’s right to appear in court, is

determined without regard to the claims being asserted, and does not impact a trial

court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate a matter. CapitalSource Bank v. Hnatiuk, 2016-

Ohio-3450, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing Bank of Am., N.A. v. Stewart, 2014-Ohio-723,

¶ 44-46 (7th Dist.). Civ.R. 9(A) provides:

It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader’s knowledge.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, lack of capacity to sue is waived if a party does comply

with Civ.R. 9(A) and fails to specifically raise the defense in an answer. Hnatiuk at ¶ 25, citing State ex rel. Downs v. Panioto, 2006-Ohio-8, ¶ 30; Campolieti v.

Cleveland Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2013-Ohio-5123, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.) (appellant waived

the defense of lack of capacity where the answer was devoid of any specific negative

averment under Civ.R. 9(A)); Civ.R. 8(C) (establishing that any matter constituting

an avoidance or affirmative defense must be raised in a party’s answer).

Civ.R. 17(A) governs the procedural requirement that “every action

shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” “A real party in interest

is one who has a real interest in the subject-matter of the litigation, and not merely

an interest in the action itself, i.e., one who is directly benefitted or injured by the

outcome of the case.” (Cleaned up.) First Rehab. Funding, LLC v. Milton, 2025-

Ohio-2677, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.). Relevant to this appeal, a real party in interest under

Civ.R. 17(A) includes “a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been

made for the benefit of another” or “a party authorized by statute.” Civ.R. 17(A)

further provides:

No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest. Such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.

“‘Because compliance with Civ.R. 17 is not necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the

court, the failure to name the real party in interest is an objection or defense to a

claim that is waived if not timely asserted.’” Milton at ¶ 27, quoting State ex rel.

Browning v. Browning, 2012-Ohio-2158, ¶ 39 (5th Dist.); Hang-Fu v. Halle Homes, Inc., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3625, *21 (8th Dist. Aug. 10, 2000) (“[T]he defense that

the plaintiff is not the real party in interest is an affirmative defense and, therefore,

must be specifically pled or it is waived.”); Civ.R. 8(C).

Our review of the record reveals that Ford generally denied the

allegations of the complaint in her answer and asserted statute of frauds as her sole

affirmative defense. Ford’s answer did not include lack-of-capacity-to-sue or real-

party-in-interest defenses. Nor did Ford seek to amend her answer to preserve those

defenses. Therefore, Ford waived any lack-of-capacity or real-party-in-interest

defenses and cannot subsequently raise them, even under the guise of standing.

Accordingly, we overrule Ford’s sole assignment of error.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

municipal court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

__________________________ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR