Howard Gerald Minkin v. United States

Ninth Circuit

Howard Gerald Minkin v. United States

383 F.2d 427, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5349

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided August 11, 1967·No. 20918·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

We find no constitutional objection to giving the United States Attorney an option as to what crime he will prosecute for a conviction where a given set of facts permits a choice.

Also, we reject the contention of appellant that there was ipso facto coerced testimony against him by the plea bargaining indulged in by the government with the other defendants who testified and were sentenced for lesser offenses. This still seems to be one tool left to a prosecutor. See Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166, and Diaz-Rosendo v. United States, 9 Cir., 357 F.2d 124.

Appellant contends he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to exclude the witnesses from the courtroom. Ordinarily this is within the discretion of the trial judge. There might be a case where the failure would be prejudicial. But here the record does not show what witnesses were not excluded. So we are in no position to second-guess the trial judge on the point.

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PER CURIAM:

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

We find no constitutional objection to giving the United States Attorney an option as to what crime he will prosecute for a conviction where a given set of facts permits a choice.

Also, we reject the contention of appellant that there was ipso facto coerced testimony against him by the plea bargaining indulged in by the government with the other defendants who testified and were sentenced for lesser offenses. This still seems to be one tool left to a prosecutor. See Lisenba v. People of State of California, 314 U.S. 219, 62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166, and Diaz-Rosendo v. United States, 9 Cir., 357 F.2d 124.

Appellant contends he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to exclude the witnesses from the courtroom. Ordinarily this is within the discretion of the trial judge. There might be a case where the failure would be prejudicial. But here the record does not show what witnesses were not excluded. So we are in no position to second-guess the trial judge on the point.

Howard Gerald Minkin v. United States, 383 F.2d 427, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5349 (9th Cir. 1967).

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Opinion

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