Hover v. United States

158 F. Supp. 179, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2186, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2731
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJanuary 3, 1958
DocketCiv. No. 20853-WM
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 158 F. Supp. 179 (Hover v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hover v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 179, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2186, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2731 (S.D. Cal. 1958).

Opinion

IRVING R. KAUFMAN, District Judge.

This suit was originally brought by plaintiff, proprietor of Ciro’s, a nightclub, for refund of $300 paid pursuant to a deficiency of $67,660.62 in cabaret taxes assessed against him for the period between June 1, 1951 and March 31, 1955. Defendant has counterclaimed for $75,219.13, the unpaid balance of said assessment and interest.1

[181]*181Ciro’s, located on Sunset Boulevard in Los Angeles, is sub-divided into three rooms in which the services and facilities of the Club are offered to the public. In addition to the main entertainment .and dining room, hereinafter referred to as the “Main Room”, there are the '“Pavillion” and “Ciroette” rooms. A .lounge or cocktail bar located adjacent to the Main Room also serviced Ciro’s patrons but its operations are not involved in this suit. In issue in this proceeding are the taxability of receipts from (1) the Pavillion Room, (2) the Ciroette Room and (3) the “closed house parties” — when the entire club was ■closed to the public and reserved for the ■exclusive use of private organizations. In the interest of simplicity and organization, I shall discuss separately these three operations forming the basis of the tax.

Pavillion Room

The Pavillion Room is located adjacent to the lounge (which is basically a raised extension of the Main Room) and is separated therefrom by a movable wall and thick, soundproof curtain. It is undisputed that this room was used primarily to accommodate private organizations which desired to reserve for the ■evening such a room for the exclusive ■use of its members. The charges incurred or expended by these organizations or its members availing themselves of the facilities of the Pavillion Room form the basis of the cabaret tax assessment here in dispute. It is the Government’s contention that the opportunity to witness the floor show in the Main Room was a strong inducement to these organizations to make their arrangements with Ciro’s and that indeed, at the appropriate time the movable partition separating the Main Room and the Pavillion Room was opened so as to permit the Pavillion Room guests to view the floor show in the Main Room. It follows, the Government argues, that such guests were entitled to be present during the furnishing of a public performance for profit within the meaning of Int.Rev. Code of 1954, Section 4231(6),2 and that the receipts obtained in the Pavillion Room both before and after the separation was removed are subject to the cabaret tax. More specifically, the Government is here seeking to sustain a cabaret tax on 94% of the receipts attributed to 304 private parties conducted in the Pavillion Room. ' The 6% of the receipts excluded from the tax represent expenditures by patrons who are presumed to have left prior to seeing the show.3 While there is some variation in the way these 304 parties were conducted, for the most part private organizations would contact Ciro’s for the [182]*182purpose of arranging for the use of the Pavillion Room on a particular night for the exclusive use of its members. A contract would be negotiated and a deposit secured. Generally dinner would be served commencing some time around 7:00 P.M. and terminating before 10:30 P.M. During this period the movable partition separating the Main Room from the Pavillion Room would remain closed and the parties had the complete and uninterrupted privacy of the Pavillion Room to do as they pleased. Depending on the nature of the organization, speeches, awards, community singing, local entertainment or dancing to music either piped in from the Main Room or furnished by their own hired orchestra might follow the dinner. In any event at approximately 10:30 P.M. the separation was usually removed so as to enable the groups to view the floor show in the Main Room. There seems to be no question but that the patrons attending the dinner in the Pavillion Room expected to be able to see the entertainment in the Main Room, it being the understanding, whether committed to writing or not, that the so-called private parties would be afforded this privilege. Upon conclusion of the floor show, the evidence indicates that most of the guests at the private parties left the premises.

It is under these circumstances that I am called upon to construe the meaning of Section 4231(6) which imposes a tax on amounts paid for refreshment or service at a cabaret:

“ * * * furnishing a public performance for profit, by or for any patron or guest who is entitled i to be present during any portion of such performance * * * ”

The statute is not free from ambiguity and must be construed so as not to produce illogical or irrational results. A literal translation of the above provision would ascribe to Congressional intent a most arbitrary and unreasonable basis on which the tax is imposed. Such a literal reading of the statute would subject an establishment which operates as a cabaret in the evening to a tax on its late afternoon receipts since it is conceivable that these afternoon patrons might presumably be entitled to view a portion of the evening entertainment if they were to remain on the premises until show time. To condition a tax on such a tenuous showing that the patrons might if they were to wait long enough view the entertainment does not accord with any meaningful or purposeful distinction that we must impute to Congress. As noted by the Supreme Court, “taxation is an intensely practical matter, and laws in respect of it should be construed and applied with a view of avoiding, so far as possible, unjust and oppressive consequences.” Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota, 1930, 280 U.S. 204, 212, 50 S.Ct. 98, 100, 74 L.Ed. 371. See also Paxson v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 1944, 144 F.2d 772, 776. In connection with the present statute the Internal Revenue Bureau itself, through the issuance of interpretive regulations and rulings, has impliedly recognized the necessity, or at least the desirability, of limiting the broad language of the statute.4

The Internal Revenue Bureau has taken the position however, that payments for food, refreshment, service or merchandise made prior to the beginning of the entertainment in a cabaret, roof garden or other similar place by patrons who are entitled to view a public performance are subject to the cabaret tax where the patrons by or for whom such amounts are paid do in fact remain for any portion of the performance. Rev. Rul. 54-487, 1954-2 Cum.Bull. 376. Though limiting somewhat the broad scope and effect which flows from a literal reading of the statute,5 the revenue ruling nevertheless poses an unrealistic criterion which may in some situations [183]*183lead to results which under no stretch of the imagination could be considered as within the contemplation of Congress in enacting Section 4231(6).

The opinion in La Jolla Casa de Manana v. Riddell, D.C.S.D.Cal.1952, 106 F. Supp. 132, affirmed, 9 Cir., 1953, 206 F. 2d 925, is particularly significant inasmuch as it presumably expresses the Ninth Circuit’s thinking on the subject. Judge Byrne, by noting that Congress in imposing a cabaret tax, “envisioned an essential unity between the service of refreshment and the enjoyment of the entertainment”, adopted an interpretation inconsistent with that placed on the statute by the Revenue Department.

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Bluebook (online)
158 F. Supp. 179, 1 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 2186, 1958 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2731, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hover-v-united-states-casd-1958.