Houston v. City of Fairfield

Opinion

DANIELLE N. HOUSTON, No. 2:22-CV-01045-JAM-SCR Plaintiff, v. ORDER RE CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT CITY OF FAIRFIELD, a public entity; City of Fairfield Police Officers JOSHUA SMITH (BADGE #1730), BRENDAN BASSI (BADGE #1716), DAVID REEVES (BADGE #927), GAIL HILL (BADGE #1201), individually, jointly and severally; Defendants. Before this Court are cross-motions for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The parties filed four briefs in support of and in opposition to the cross motions including Plaintiff Danielle Houston’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for partial summary judgment, Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF no. 70; Defendants’ City of Fairfield (the “City”), Joshua Smith, David Reeves, Gail Hill, and Brendan Bassi (“Officers,” collectively with the City, “Defendants”) cross-motion for summary judgment, Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment, ECF no. 85; Plaintiff’s opposition/reply to Defendants’ cross-motion, Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Plf.’s Reply”), ECF No. 88; and Defendants’ reply in support of cross-motion, Def.’s Reply In Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Reply”), ECF No. 92. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to her unlawful arrest claim. For all other Fourth Amendment claims, the court denies Plaintiff’s motion and grants Defendants’ motion on these claims. The Court also grants Defendants’ motion on Plaintiff’s Monell claim and punitive damages claim.1 Plaintiff Houston filed a civil rights action following an investigatory encounter with the City of Fairfield Police. The key facts are undisputed, and the relevant events were captured on video or body worn cameras (“BWC”). See Video Exhibits, ECF. Nos. 70 & 85. At approximately 8:20pm on August 7, 2020, a concerned citizen called the Fairfield Police and Fire Emergency line to report a physical fight involving a man with a gun in a shopping plaza parking lot. Ex. U (Def.’s Compilation Video), ECF No. 85. The person with a gun was described as a light-skin or Hispanic male wearing a white t-shirt. He was reported to have entered a black four-door vehicle. Id. The shopping plaza was known by law enforcement to be located in a high crime area. Ex. K (Sgt. Gail Hill Depo.) at 125:21-23, 127:10-13.

1 A hearing on this cross-motion was held on September 24, 2024. Sergeant Gail Hill was first to respond to the scene and observed a group of individuals and several black cars that matched the description given by the emergency caller. Id. at 61:17-21. Sgt. Hill subsequently ordered back-up to detain the group of individuals and ordered all black cars in the plaza to be stopped. Id. at 100:18-24; Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”), Fact No. 68, ECF No. 88-1. Around the same time of the call, Plaintiff Houston parked her black four-door vehicle in the shopping plaza and entered a store near the group of individuals. Ex. U at 4:21; Plf.’s Video, Exhibit 5 at ECF No. 70-9. As Plaintiff Houston exited the store, she interacted with some members of the suspect group before getting into her car. Ex. U at 6:35-8:30. As Plaintiff Houston drove out of her parking spot, an individual from the same group wearing a white t-shirt approached her vehicle and appeared to lean into Plaintiff Houston’s open passenger window. Id. at 8:50-9:01. This interaction was witnessed by Sgt. Hill and Officer Bassi, who had parked nearby. Id.; Ex. K at 97:10- 16. Officer Bassi proceeded to follow Plaintiff Houston as she exited the plaza parking lot and initiated a “high-risk” stop to investigate her possible involvement in the reported gun crime. Ex. N (Officer Bassi’s BWC) at 2:00-2:35; Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 89. Plaintiff Houston was then ordered out of her vehicle, questioned, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a patrol vehicle by Officer Reeves. Ex. U at 9:36-12:00; 13:38. Plaintiff’s person and car were searched by Officers Bassi, Smith, and Taylor2, and both her and her vehicle were cleared of any person or weapons within minutes of her being stopped. Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 106; Ex. U at 12:15; 13:30. Indeed, Plaintiff Houston maintained that she “did not have anything” and “didn’t do anything” throughout her detention. However, even after no weapon was uncovered on her person, Plaintiff remained detained in handcuffs in the back of the patrol car for almost twenty more minutes. Ex. U at 13:30-29:46. Plaintiff Houston asked for her handcuffs to be removed and complained of discomfort while being detained, but did not seek any medical care the night of the incident. Ex. U at 27:34; Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 176. Interactions between Plaintiff and Officers were respectful throughout the investigatory stop and Plaintiff Houston fully complied with orders at all times throughout the incident. Plaintiff Houston now brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual police officers involved in the incident and the City, alleging that Defendants violated her rights to not be unlawfully searched or seized under the Fourth Amendment when they stopped her vehicle following the emergency call (First Cause of Action). Plaintiff further alleges a Monell violation against the City of Fairfield (Second Cause of Action). See First Amended Compl., ECF No. 34. A. Legal Standard Summary judgment is granted “if the movant shows that there

2 Officer Taylor was dismissed from this action. is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Nat'l Ass'n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When, as here, a video of the incident exists and neither party questions its accuracy, the Court views “the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007). The Court will not “‘credit a party's version of events that the record, such as an unchallenged video recording of the incident, quite clearly contradicts.’” Sabbe v. Washington Cnty. Bd. Of Comm’rs, 84 F.4th 807, 816 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Williamson v. City of Nat'l City, 23 F.4th 1146, 1149 n.1 (9th Cir. 2022)). The Court therefore takes as true facts that are clearly depicted in the recordings. See Id. at 380–81. B. Analysis 1. Qualified Immunity Because Defendants raise the defense of qualified immunity, Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 23, Plaintiff Houston must demonstrate that Officers Smith, Bassi, Reeves, and Hill violated her Fourth Amendment rights by searching or seizing her in a manner that was clearly established as unconstitutional at the time of the incident. See Nicholson v. City of Los Angeles, 935 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2019). Even if an officer's conduct is objectively unreasonable, “‘[q]ualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Id. (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam)). Public officials are shielded from liability unless the plaintiff can prove (1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right (2) that was clearly established. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). For a right to be “clearly established,” existing “precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” such that “every” reasonable official, not just “a” reasonable official, would have understood that he was violating a clearly established right. Id. at 741. 2. Officers’ Initial Stop Was Constitutional Plaintiff alleges that Officers detained her in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights because they lacked reasonable suspicion. See Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 8- 11. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Officers’ seizure of her was unreasonable because they mistook certain descriptive facts and did not have particularized suspicion to stop her in relation to the reported gun crime. Id. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. There are two categories of police seizures under the Fourth Amendment: Terry stops and full-scale arrests. See Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995). Terry stops require reasonable suspicion and arrests require probable cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that officers may conduct a reasonable search for weapons regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime); Allen 73 F.3d at 236-37 (citing Delgadillo-Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[p]robable cause exists, when at the time of arrest, the agents know reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense”). Neither party argues that Officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and agree that what is in dispute is whether Officers possessed sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Plaintiff. Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), police officers may conduct a brief, investigative stop of an individual when they have reasonable suspicion that the “person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009). An officer cannot rely only upon generalizations that “would cast suspicion on large segments of the law-abiding population.” United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006). Courts proceed from the perspective of a “reasonable officer on the scene” and must “allow for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving— about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 775 (2014) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)). Reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop exists when an officer is aware of specific, articulable facts which form the basis for particularized suspicion, which includes two elements: 1) assessment must be based on totality of the circumstances, and 2) the assessment must include reasonable suspicion that the particular person being stopped has committed or is about to commit a crime. U.S. v. Keeler, 8 Fed.Appx. 631 (9th Cir. 2001). Here, the Court finds that Officers had enough particularized suspicion to stop Plaintiff Houston because she drove and parked a black vehicle in the shopping plaza that matched the description given by the emergency caller and Sgt. Hill observed Plaintiff interacting with the group of reported suspects. See Ex. U. Moreover, a tall male wearing a white shirt leaned into Plaintiff Houston’s open car window, giving rise to the reasonable belief that a gun may have been placed in her vehicle. See Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 166; Ex. H at 77:10–78:10, 92:13-15; Ex. U at 8:50 – 9:02. Thus, a reasonable officer on the scene would have believed Plaintiff was linked to the reported crime. Supreme Court precedent supports the principle that even if officers are ultimately mistaken, as long as their investigations are reasonable, their actions do not violate the Fourth Amendment. For example, U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421 (1981) held that objective facts and circumstantial evidence suggesting that a particular vehicle was involved in unlawful activity was sufficient basis to justify an investigative stop. To be “reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’” Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)). Even though the Officers ultimately determined that Plaintiff Houston did not have any relation to the gun crime, the Supreme Court has recognized that searches and seizures based on mistakes of fact can be reasonable. Id. Thus, even though these Officers mistook certain descriptive facts, this does not detract from the objective reasonableness of their initial stop and detention of Plaintiff under the totality of these circumstances. 3. Officers’ Bodily Frisk and Vehicle Search Were Constitutional Plaintiff next argues that Officers’ bodily frisk and search of her vehicle were also impermissible under the Fourth Amendment. See Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 12, 16-18. However, contrary to this contention, caselaw is clear that an officer may conduct a pat down search when he or she reasonably believes that the subject “may be armed and presently dangerous.” U.S. v. I.E.V., 705 F.3d 430, 432–433 (9th Cir. 2012). Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the Supreme Court held that police may order persons out of an automobile and may frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that they are armed and dangerous. As discussed previously, Officers reasonably suspected that Plaintiff Houston may have been involved in the reported gun crime and that the gun may have been passed through her open window. Thus, based on video footage and Sgt. Hill’s observations, it was reasonable for officers to pat Plaintiff down because they reasonably believed the weapon may have been on her person. With regard to the car search, Plaintiff argues that Officers search of her vehicle, wallet, and purse were unreasonable, and that no Fourth Amendment exception exists because she did not consent to the searches. Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 16-18. However, as Defendants assert in their cross-motion, the Ninth Circuit has stated that all that is required for a protective search under Terry is a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed. See United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007). In Orman, the court emphasized the need for officers to be able to pursue their work without fear of violence and that, where a weapon is readily accessible, limited protective steps are allowable. Id. at 1177-78. Additionally, the need for a protective search applies regardless of whether carrying a concealed weapon violates state law. Id. at 1177 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)). Supreme Court precedent further illuminates the permissibility of car and container searches where officers possess a reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983), the Supreme Court emphasized that protective searches are justified when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, noting that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous and danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. Thus, a search “limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden” is permissible if the officers have a reasonable belief that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. Id. at 1033. Based on these precedents, the Court finds that Officers’ search of Plaintiff’s car, purse, and wallet were reasonable protective measures for officer safety given their suspicion that a gun may have entered through her window and that the gun could have been hidden in her car or purse. Given the independent Fourth Amendment basis justifying Officers’ search, the Court does not need to reach the issue of whether an exception exists or whether Ms. Houston gave voluntary consent for Officers to search her vehicle. Even if there were a question as to the reasonableness of Officers’ search of her car or the items within Plaintiff Houston’s car, Plaintiff has not pointed to any analogous cases that put Defendants on notice as to the unconstitutionality of searching a purse or wallet during an investigatory stop for weapons, necessitating the conclusion that Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity in the alternative case. 4. Plaintiff’s Terry-Stop Became An Unlawful Arrest Despite Officers’ initial compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s constitutional requirements, Plaintiff argues that her Terry stop turned into a de facto arrest unsupported by probable cause. Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 13. Defendants do not challenge that they lacked probable cause to arrest Ms. Houston, Hearing Transcript p. 41, line 6, ECF No. 102, and the Court finds that under Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 1996), Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Rather, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on her unlawful arrest claim because Washington clearly put Officers on notice such that every officer would have understood that he was violating Plaintiff’s clearly established right to not be subject to overly-intrusive police tactics under these circumstances. There is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest. Id. at 1185. Rather, in determining whether stops have turned into arrests, courts consider the “totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Baron, 860 F.2d 911, 914 (9th Cir.1988). In looking at the totality of the circumstances, courts consider the intrusiveness of the stop, the aggressiveness of the officer’s actions and how much the plaintiff’s liberty was restricted, and the reasonableness of the officer’s methods under the circumstances. Washington, 98 F.3d at 1188-89. The Ninth Circuit has advised that “[u]nder ordinary circumstances, when the police have only reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, drawing weapons and using handcuffs and other restraints will violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1187. More intrusive measures may be appropriate: 1) where the suspect is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that raises a reasonable possibility of danger or flight; 2) where the police have information that the suspect is currently armed; 3) where the stop closely follows a violent crime; and 4) where the police have information that a crime that may involve violence is about to occur. Id. at 1189. Courts also consider how many officers are present at the scene. Id. at 1190. In this case, the Court finds that each Washington factor weighs in Plaintiff Houston’s favor because Officers only possessed reasonable suspicion and no factors indicate that this was an extraordinary circumstance requiring the use of more intrusive measures like handcuffs or other restraints. Plaintiff Houston was fully cooperative and did not take any actions at the scene to raise a reasonable possibility of danger or flight; Officers search of Plaintiff revealed she was unarmed; Officers had no specific information Plaintiff Houston was involved in the physical fight; and there was no indication that any future crime was about to occur. By the time Officer Reeves handcuffed Plaintiff and placed her into the patrol vehicle, no facts suggest that Ms. Houston was armed, uncooperative, dangerous, or a flight risk. By all accounts, Plaintiff’s actions demonstrated her absolute compliance with every officer instruction and willingness to answer every question asked. See generally, Ex. U. Moreover, there were sixteen officers on the scene with at least four officers specifically attending to Ms. Houston. See Plf.’s Reply to Def.’s SUF, Fact No. 40; Ex. U. Defendants argue that their intrusive actions of keeping Plaintiff handcuffed in the back of a police vehicle did not turn her detention into an arrest. Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 29. Defendants cite Garza v. City of Salem, 690 F.Supp.3d 1188 (D. Or., Sept. 4, 2023) and Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002) to support their argument. However, these cases are distinguishable because they involved individuals whose uncooperative actions themselves disrupted and prolonged officers’ investigations, implicating the extraordinary circumstances that permit use of more intrusive measures under Washington. In contrast, Plaintiff Houston was fully cooperative throughout the entire investigation. Defendants also suggest that their intrusive actions are justified by the third Washington factor because their investigation followed a violent crime. The Court disagrees and reads the third prong in Washington, as elaborated by fn. 14, to require specific information that an individual be involved in the purported violent crime or “closely match” a description given to police. 98 F.3d 1181 (citing United States v. Jacobs, 715 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1983). The undisputed facts show that Plaintiff Houston did not match the description given by the emergency caller and was not involved in the reported physical fight since she is female and arrived in the parking lot after the altercation occurred. No reasonable officer would have believed Plaintiff to be the individual involved in the physical fight and as such, Plaintiff does not implicate any of the extraordinary factors delineated by Washington. Defendants also argue that having two crime scenes was a unique circumstance justifying Plaintiff’s prolonged arrest. See Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment at 19. However, the fact that other officers were attending to a separate crime scene does not influence the Washington factors as applied to Plaintiff Houston or the priority of her constitutional rights. Under a straightforward application of Washington, Plaintiff Houston’s detention squarely became an unreasonable arrest. In sum, Washington v. Lambert is controlling authority that puts Officers on notice that they unconstitutionality converted Plaintiff Houston’s detention from an investigatory stop into an arrest by using unreasonably intrusive restraints for an unnecessary period of time. The Court finds that Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Because “a plaintiff must establish the integral participation of the officers in the alleged constitutional violation,” Monteilh v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1081 665 F.3d 1076, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2011), and simply “being present at the scene of an alleged unlawful act” is insufficient, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts that Defendants Hill and Smith were integral participants in her unlawful detention. However, Officers Bassi and Reeves, by virtue of handcuffing Plaintiff Houston and keeping her in the police vehicle had “fundamental involvement” in her unlawful arrest and are thus liable for the constitutional violation. Id. 5. Plaintiff Fails to Show Officers Used Excessive Force Plaintiffs final Fourth Amendment challenge alleges that officers used excessive force in two ways: 1) by pointing guns when stopping Plaintiff Houston and 2) by using tight handcuffs. Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 19-23. In an excessive force case, the Court views “the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but [is] ‘limited to considering what facts the officer[s] could have known at the time of the incident.’” Sabbe v. Washington Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 84 F.4th 807, 815-16 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Est. of Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Gelhaus, 871 F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2017)). As discussed above, Officers initially believed that a gun may have passed into Plaintiff’s vehicle and Plaintiff’s temporary detention became an unlawful seizure once reasonable suspicion of her involvement in the alleged gun crime had dissipated. While her prolonged detention without probable cause is clearly unconstitutional under Washington, Washington is not an excessive force case. The principal question in Washington was “whether the police action constituted a Terry stop or an arrest,” Washington at 1185. To the extent that Washington put officers on notice, it only does so with regard to the constitutional standards for unlawful arrest and this Court does not read Washington to extend to excessive force claims. The caselaw cited by Plaintiff for her excessive force claim is not persuasive because the cases do not contain analogous facts and are not sufficiently similar to place officers on notice. For example, Plaintiff cites to Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving a gun pointed at point blank range), Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 2007) (involving a gun pointed at an individual’s head and fifteen to twenty officers), Espinosa v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 537 (involving use of deadly force), and Green v. City & Cnty. Of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1049 (involving six officers conducting an investigation for a stolen vehicle). These cases either involve far more severe conduct by police officers or do not involve investigation of a suspected gun crime. Plaintiff also raises Sen v. City of Los Angeles, 2022 WL 2236085, at *8, 9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2022) (cleaned up), but Sen specifically found that the mere use of handcuffs, without more, did not violate the Fourth Amendment and granted qualified immunity to the officers involved. Similarly, Defendants point to Pernell v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.Supp.3d 910, 927-28 (C.D. Cal 2022), which held that mere use of handcuffs, without more, does not support an excessive force claim. Ultimately Plaintiff’s cited authorities do not clearly establish that the use of drawn weapons or the use of handcuffs constitutes excessive force in similar circumstances. Thus, the Court finds that qualified immunity attaches to the excessive force claims and grants Officers’ motion for summary judgment on this claim. 6. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish Monell Liability Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to summary judgment on her Monell claim because Fairfield Police Department has an unconstitutional practice of employing high-risk stops. See Plf.’s Partial Mot. for Summary Judgment at 23. To avoid summary judgment for the City on the Section 1983 claim, Plaintiff Houston must demonstrate that a City policy, practice, or custom caused a deprivation of rights. Steel v. Alameda Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 428 F. Supp. 3d 235, 238 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). However, as covered in the Court’s Fourth Amendment discussion above, the Court does not find that Officers violated any constitutional right of Plaintiff except when Plaintiff’s prolonged detention became an arrest. Under Monell, proof of “a policy or practice requires more than a few occurrences of challenged conduct. A single or even a few isolated and sporadic incidents of unconstitutional conduct are not enough to impose municipal liability under Section 1983.” See Escobar-Lopez v. City of Daly City, 527 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (citing Gant v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014)); see also Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021). In Plaintiff Houston’s case, her allegation of “no more than an ‘isolated or sporadic incident[ ]’ ... cannot form the basis of Monell liability for an improper custom.” Saved Magazine v. Spokane Police Dept., 19 F.4th 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff has not shown an unconstitutional practice that is “‘so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.’” Escobar, 527 F. Supp. 3d at 1128 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)). In her Reply, Plaintiff also lodges a theory based on “ratification” to support her claim for Monell liability against the City. Plf.’s Reply at 22. Related to this argument, the Court received supplemental briefs regarding Loggervale, et al. v. County of Alameda, et al., No. 23-15483, 2024 WL 4234878 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2024), a recent Ninth Circuit opinion on ratification theory. See Plf.’s Notice of Suppl. Authority, ECF No. 93; Def.’s Suppl. Brief, ECF No. 97. In Loggervale, the jury found that Alameda County ratified the constitutional violations because Sheriff Ahern, an official policymaker, specifically reviewed and approved of the internal investigation findings from the incident, writing on the memo: “Briefed. No further action required.”. Id. at * 3. Loggervale is readily distinguishable from this case. In this case, Plaintiff Houston has not presented evidence that a final policymaker ratified the Officers’ actions or that a Chief reviewed Sgt. Divine’s investigative memorandum. See Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff contends that the Fairfield Police Department Manual and testimony by Jausiah Jacobsen establishes that Plaintiff Houston’s investigation package was reviewed by the Chief of the Fairfield Police Department. See Plf.’s Notice of Suppl. Authority at 1. This representation is not supported by the evidence Plaintiff cites. The Court agrees with Defendants that the deposition transcript is ambiguous at best, and merely establishes that generally, investigative memoranda “should” go to the captain and that chiefs should be made aware. ECF No. 88-7, at 52:20- 56:13. There is no specific evidence that the Fairfield Chief of Police reviewed, approved, or even knew about the investigation surrounding Plaintiff Houston’s incident. Unlike in Loggervale, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that a final decision maker signed off on the investigative memorandum. To prove ratification, Plaintiff must show that a specific policymaker “made a deliberate choice to endorse” the Officer’s actions. Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff has not provided such proof and no reasonable jury could so find. Because Plaintiff Houston does not point to any other instances of unlawful detention, can only show success under her own unlawful arrest claim, and cannot prove ratification theory, no reasonable jury could find the City liable for Officer Bassi or Officer Reeves’s unconstitutional conduct under Monell. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this claim is granted. 7. Punitive Damages Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. To recover for punitive damages against an individual officer in a Section 1983 case, a plaintiff must show that the officers’ conduct is “motivated by evil motive or intent” or “involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). The Ninth Circuit has also explained that “[t]he standard for punitive damages under Section 1983 mirrors the standard for punitive damages under common law tort cases,” which extends to “malicious, wanton, or oppressive acts or omissions.” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 807 (9th Cir. 2005). There are no facts in the record supporting a finding that Officers Bassi or Reeves were motivated by evil intent or that they were recklessly indifferent to Plaintiff’s rights. Indeed, BWC footage reveals that officers were professional and ee nen en NE IE OS ISIE, OE EE Oe ee

attentive throughout the investigation. See Ex. U. Plaintiff’s unlawful arrest was the result of a prolonged delay and nothing in the record demonstrates that Officers maliciously or recklessly prolonged Plaintiff’s detention. Similarly, Plaintiff stated that Officers largely treated her with respect. See Ex. H (Deposition of Danielle Houston) at 40:22-25, 41:1-3. Given the facts, no reasonable jury could find reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s rights to support an award of punitive damages. Til. ORDER For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgement as to her unlawful arrest claim against Defendants Bassi and Reeves for their integral participation in the Fourth Amendment violation. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff's remaining Fourth Amendment claims. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED on the remaining claims: 1) initial seizure of Plaintiff, 2) bodily frisk of Plaintiff, 3) search of Plaintiff’s vehicle and belongings, 4) excessive force, 5) Monell liability, and 6) punitive damages. Dated: November 21, 2024 cp, JOHN A. MENDEZ SENIOR UNITED*STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 21