OPINION
TERRY JENNINGS, Justice.
In this interlocutory appeal,1 appellant, Houston Municipal Employees Pension System (“HMEPS”), challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, the action for declaratory judgment2 and injunctive relief asserted against it by appellees, Craig E. Ferrell Jr., Al Pena, B.L. Chebret, Brad Piel, Bubba Caldwell, C. Newman, Cole Lester, G.L. Blankenship, Gary Gryder, George Shaw, Harold Barthe, J.J. Berry, J.M. Demartin, Jeff Larson, Joe Pyland, John Miller, John Walsh, John Yencha, M. Donato, M.R. Clark, Matt Calley, Patricia [507]*507Murray, R.D. Mosley, R.L. Martin, Robert Sondoval, Rodney Johnson, Shawn Palin, T.J. Carr, Tom Hayes, and Warren Givens (collectively, “the plaintiffs”).
In four issues, HMEPS argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion because: (1) HMEPS is a governmental unit and is entitled to immunity from suit, (2) HMEPS has exclusive jurisdiction over pension benefit eligibility determinations and there is no statutory right to judicial review of such decisions, (3) any claims asserted by the plaintiffs regarding HMEPS’s denial of pension service credits are not ripe, and (4) the plaintiffs failed to plead an amount in controversy within the trial court’s jurisdictional limits.
We affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Craig Ferrell Jr. was a Houston Police Officer from 1977 until 1990 and during that time participated in the Houston Police Officers Pension System.3 In 1990, after obtaining his law degree, Ferrell was hired by the Houston Police Department’s Legal Services Division and began accruing credit in “Group B” of HMEPS, which is a separate pension system covering the municipal employees of the City of Houston.4
In 1998, HMEPS’s Board of Trustees issued a written “Acknowledgment of Statutory Application” that, in pertinent part, reads as follows:
A person is not eligible for HMEPS membership for the time period during which the person was in a position covered by another pension system to which the City of Houston contributes (“City pension system”).
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A person cannot receive any credited service in HMEPS for the time during which the person was not a member of HMEPS.
Later that same year, Ferrell requested that HMEPS give him service credit for his 13 years of employment as a police officer. In January 1999, David Long, HMEPS’s Executive Director, sent a letter to Ferrell denying his request for additional credit and informing him that “a person may receive credited sendee in HMEPS only for time during which the person is a member of HMEPS.”
In March 2003, Ferrell filed an original petition against HMEPS, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, unilateral mistake, estoppel, fraud, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, “detrimental reliance,” “unconstitutional impairment of contract,” “interference with attainment of benefits,” and “unconseionability.” Ferrell also sought a declaratory judgment to establish “his entitlement to Pension Benefits in the HMEPS retirement system for all of his years of service while working for the City of Houston ... starting 5/23/1977 until the present” in “HMEPS retirement PLAN A.” HMEPS moved to dismiss Ferrell’s suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of governmental immunity. Ferrell then filed a first amended petition, maintaining his action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, but dropping all of the other claims. In his second amended petition, Ferrell expressly eliminated his request for money damages, but sought an additional declaration that he was entitled to service credit in [508]*508HMEPS for the time that he had been enrolled as a cadet in the Houston Police Academy.
Subsequently, in a first supplemental petition, 29 additional plaintiffs joined the action for declaratory judgment and in-junctive relief, also seeking a declaration that they were entitled to service credit in HMEPS for the time period from May to September 1977, during which they had been enrolled as cadets at the Houston Police Academy. The plaintiffs asserted that, during this four-month period, they had been employed as municipal employees of the City of Houston and were entitled to corresponding service credit in HMEPS.
In a supplemental motion to dismiss, HMEPS, again asserting that it was immune from suit, also asserted that the plaintiffs’ action regarding service credit for their time enrolled in the Houston Police Academy was not ripe because HMEPS had not made any determination as to whether the plaintiffs were entitled to such credit. HMEPS also argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Ferrell’s claims for service credit for the years of his employment as a police officer because a declaratory judgment in Ferrell’s favor would entitle him to additional pension benefits that would exceed the maximum jurisdictional limits of the trial court.
The trial court denied HMEPS’s motion to dismiss, but, in its order, noted that it had done so solely on the basis of HMEPS’s argument that it was entitled to immunity from suit. The trial court’s order expressly recites that, “[a]ll other issues raised by [HMEPS] are reserved for further consideration and are expressly not ruled upon at this time.” HMEPS objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule on all of the grounds presented in its motion and supplemental motion to dismiss, and HMEPS has included this refusal in its notice of appeal.5
Standard of Review
An appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction filed by “a governmental unit.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp.2004-2005); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.001(3)(D) (Vernon Supp.2004-2005). We review a trial court’s disposition of a plea to the jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. Hoff. v. Nueces County, 153 S.W.3d 45, 48 (Tex.2004); Reese v. City of Hunter’s Creek Village, 95 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction, we consider the facts alleged by the plaintiffs and, to the extent relevant to the jurisdictional issues, any evidence submitted by the parties. Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2001).
Governmental Immunity
In its first issue, HMEPS argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs’ action for declaratory judgment because HMEPS is a governmental unit entitled to immunity from suit. HMEPS asserts that the plaintiffs’ action is really a claim for money damages and that the plaintiffs seek to control HMEPS’s lawful actions. HMEPS also generally contends that the plaintiffs have not properly asserted an injunction action and that it is improper to seek an injunction against a governmental entity rather than some individual in authority at the entity.
[509]*509In support of its argument that the plaintiffs’ action is barred by governmental immunity, HMEPS relies on this Court’s previous holding that HMEPS, as a state-created governmental unit, is “generally entitled to governmental immunity.” Thayer v. Houston Mun. Employees Pension Sys., 95 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). HMEPS notes that we also held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Thayer’s tort claims because there is no waiver of immunity in the legislation creating HMEPS. Id. It asserts that the plaintiffs are making an “effort to escape” immunity through an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and that they “have no rights to declare.”
Under the doctrine of governmental immunity, a unit of government may not be sued without the express consent of the Legislature. Thayer, 95 S.W.3d at 576; Scott v. Prairie View A & M Univ., 7 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). We defer to the Legislature to waive immunity from suit because the Legislature is better suited than the courts “to weigh the conflicting public policies associated with waiving immunity and exposing the government to increased liability, the burden of which the general public must ultimately bear.” Texas Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex.2002). Such immunity generally serves to protect the State and governmental units from lawsuits for money damages. General Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex Insulation Co., Inc., 39 S.W.3d 591, 594 (Tex.2001). It also protects the State and governmental units from lawsuits that seek to control their lawful actions by a final judgment made by a court of law. Texas Mun. Power Agency v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 100 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied).
In the absence of a waiver of governmental immunity, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a suit against a governmental unit. Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). When a trial court learns that it lacks jurisdiction to hear a cause, the court must dismiss the cause and refrain from rendering a judgment on the merits. Freedman v. Univ. of Houston, 110 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
Here, the plaintiffs seek declaratory relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“DJA”), which is a “remedial” statute designed “to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations,” and “it is to be liberally construed and administered.” Tex. Civ. PRAc. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 1997). It allows courts to declare relief whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Id. at § 37.003(a). Such a declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect and has the “force and effect of a final judgment or decree.” Id. at § 37.003(b). The DJA provides:
A person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
Id. at § 37.004(a) (emphasis added).
The Texas Supreme Court has noted that certain declaratory judgment actions do not implicate the doctrine of governmental immunity. See, e.g., Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, [510]*510446 (Tex.1994) (declaratory judgment action to determine proper construction of compulsory school-attendance law); Texas Highway Comm’n v. Texas Ass’n of Steel Importers, Inc., 372 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tex.1963) (declaratory judgment suit against Highway Commission to determine parties’ rights); Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1945) (declaratory judgment suit against State Comptroller to determine parties’ rights under tax statute). The governmental immunity doctrine is not implicated in such actions because they do not attempt to subject the State to liability. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855. Accordingly, Texas courts “distinguish suits to determine a party’s rights against the State from suits seeking damages,” and “[a] party can maintain a suit to determine its rights without legislative permission.” Fed. Sign v. Texas S. Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 404 (Tex.1997).
Moreover, the DJA expressly provides that persons may challenge statutes and that “governmental entities must be joined or notified” in such circumstances. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 446. All persons who have or claim any interest that would be affected by a declaration must be made parties; those not made a party are not prejudiced by any declaration. Tex. Civ. PRác. & Rem.Code Ann. § 37.006(a) (Vernon 1997). Thus, a governmental entity joined as party may be bound by a court’s declaration on its statutes. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 446. By authorizing declaratory judgment actions “to construe the legislative enactments of governmental entities and authorizing awards of attorneys fees, the DJA necessarily waives governmental immunity for such awards.” Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 446.
A review of the live pleadings in the instant case reveals that the plaintiffs, contrary to HMEPS’s contention, do have rights to declare and have properly asserted their declaratory judgment action. Ferrell, in his second amended petition, seeks declaratory relief to establish “his entitlement to Pension Benefits in the HMEPS retirement system for all of his years of service while working for the City of Houston ... starting 5/23/1977 until the present” in “HMEPS retirement PLAN A.” He expressly asserts that this is “not a suit for money damages.” Ferrell contends that he is “entitled to all benefits described in Article 6243h of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated” and that he is “seeking to force government officials to follow the law or quit acting outside the scope of their authority.” See Tex.Rev.Civ. Stats. Ann. art. 6243h, §§ 1-28 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). In support of his contentions, Ferrell also specifically states that a review of the municipal pension statute in effect at the time of his transfer between plans “reveals support for his position” that he is entitled to benefits “starting 5/23/1977 until the present.” He requests a review of the statutory definitions of “employee,” “previous service,” and “credited service,” which, he asserts, “indicate that he should receive credit in the Municipal Plan for all his credited service time.” Ferrell further asserts that HMEPS has “misplaced” its “reliance” on other statutory provisions which list certain people ineligible to become members of HMEPS. Ferrell also requests a review of the pertinent legislative history of the pension statute, which, he asserts, supports his position.
In their first supplemental petition, the plaintiffs seek declaratory relief to establish their “entitlement to Pension Benefits in the HMEPS retirement system for all of their years of service while working for the City of Houston,” including “the period they were employed as police cadets which the City of Houston classified them as civilian employees.” They also expressly [511]*511assert that this is “not a suit for money damages.” The plaintiffs contend that they are “entitled to all benefits described in Article 6243h” and that they are “seeking to force government officials to follow the law or quit acting outside the scope of their authority.” They also rely on other statutory provisions in support of their contentions.
Because the plaintiffs have brought a declaratory judgment action to determine the proper construction of the applicable statutes and to obtain a declaration of them rights, status and legal relations under the statutes to establish their entitlement to pension benefits in HMEPS, we hold that their action does not implicate the doctrine of governmental immunity. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855. Moreover, because their suit is one brought to construe the applicable legislative pronouncements, we hold that the D JA waives governmental immunity for an award of their costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys fees as are equitable and just. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 446.
We cannot construe, as HMEPS does, the plaintiffs’ live pleadings as an “effort to escape” immunity through an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Private parties may not circumvent a governmental unit’s immunity from suit merely by characterizing a suit for damages as a declaratory judgment action. Thayer, 95 S.W.3d at 578. However, because Ferrell actually dropped all of his claims for money damages, and because the plaintiffs have expressly stated that this “is not a suit for money damages,” we cannot conclude that the plaintiffs have merely “re-characterized” a claim for money damages as a declaratory judgment action. Thus, HMEPS’s reliance on our holding in Thayer to support the contrary proposition is misplaced.
Moreover, we cannot agree with HMEPS’s contention that the plaintiffs are merely seeking to control HMEPS’s “lawfully authorized acts.” A suit that seeks to control a governmental official’s “exercise of discretion” within the official’s “legal authority” is a suit to “control” governmental action. McLane Co., Inc. v. Strayhorn, 148 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied). Discretionary acts require the exercise of “personal deliberation, decision and judgment.” Id. (quoting City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex.1994)). HMEPS asserts that the plaintiffs, “unhappy with [HMEPS’s] decision[s],” have asked the trial court to “reverse” those decisions. It is true that Ferrell asked HMEPS to transfer him from one pension group to another and that David Long, HMEPS’s Executive Director, has denied his request for additional credit. It is also true that the plaintiffs disagree with HMEPS’s written “Acknowledgment of Statutory Application.” However, the plaintiffs base their disagreement on HMEPS’s alleged misinterpretation of the governing statutory provisions, not HMEPS’s exercise of lawful discretion. This difference of interpretation reveals the existence of a justiciable controversy between the plaintiffs and HMEPS, not that the plaintiffs seek to control the “lawfully authorized acts” of HMEPS.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying HMEPS’s motion to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs’ action for declaratory judgment on the grounds that HMEPS is a governmental unit generally entitled to immunity from suit.6
We overrule HMEPS’s first issue.
[512]*512Exclusive Jurisdiction
Alternatively, in its second issue, HMEPS argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action because HMEPS has “exclusive jurisdiction” over pension benefit eligibility determinations and there is no statutory right to “judicial review” of such decisions.7
We note that HMEPS’s board administers, manages, and operates the state-created pension system8 and is, thus, “in the nature of a public administrative body.” Williams v. Houston Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund, 121 S.W.3d 415, 426 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Williams III”). Our analysis as to whether such an entity has exclusive jurisdiction over certain administrative determinations must begin with a recognition of the presumption that Texas courts are authorized to resolve disputes. In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex.2004). A statutory county court has jurisdiction over all causes and proceedings prescribed by law for county courts, including, within amount-in-controversy limitations, concurrent jurisdiction with district courts in civil cases. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 25.0003(a), 26.042(d) (Vernon 2004). A district court’s jurisdiction “consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred ... on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. Thus, these courts of general jurisdiction will generally have subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute absent a showing to the contrary. In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 322; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tex.2000). A similar presumption “does not exist for administrative agencies, which may exercise only those powers the law confers upon them in clear and express statutory language and those reasonably necessary to fulfill a function or perform a duty that the Legislature has expressly placed with the agency.” In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 322. Courts will not imply additional authority to agencies, nor may agencies create for themselves any excess powers. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 220 (Tex.2002).
Accordingly, we must determine whether the “Constitution or other law” has conveyed exclusive jurisdiction on HMEPS. Tex. Const, art. V, § 8; see In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 322. Whether such an entity has exclusive jurisdiction depends on statutory interpretation. Id. In construing a statute, our objective is to determine and give effect to [513]*513the Legislature’s intent, and, in doing so, we look to the plain and common meaning of the statute’s words. Id. When a statute’s meaning is unambiguous, we interpret that statute according to its plain language. Id.
Under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, “the Legislature grants an administrative agency the sole authority to make an initial determination in a dispute.” Subaru of Am., Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 221. The Texas Supreme Court has explained that:
[a]n agency has exclusive jurisdiction when “a pervasive regulatory scheme indicates that [the Legislature] intended for the regulatory process to be the exclusive means of remedying the problem to which the regulation is addressed.”
Id. (quoting Andrew G. Humphrey, Comment, Antitrust Jurisdiction & Remedies in an Electric Utility Price Squeeze, 52 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1090, 1107 n. 73 (1985)). If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, typically, “a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking review of the agency’s action.” Id. When exhaustion is required, courts have only limited review of the administrative action. Id. As we stated in Williams III, when “a cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived from statute, the statutory provisions for review are mandatory and exclusive.” 121 S.W.3d at 427.
Here, section 2 of article 6243h, entitled “Pension board” and which discusses the administration, management, and operation of HMEPS, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(x) The pension board shall manage the pension fund under this Act ... and may:
(1)adopt, for the administration of the pension fund, written rules and guidelines;
(2) interpret and construe this Act and any summary plan, descriptions, or benefits procedures ...;
(3) correct any defect, supply any omission, and reconcile any inconsistency that appears in this Act in a manner and to the extent that the pension board considers expedient to administer this Act for the greatest benefit of all members;
(4) determine all questions, whether legal or factual, relating to eligibility for membership, service, or benefits or relating to the administration of the pension fund to promote the uniform administration of the pension fund for the benefit of all members and retirees; and
(5) establish and maintain records necessary or appropriate for the proper administration of the pension fund.
(y) The determination of any fact by the pension board and the pension board’s interpretation of this Act are final and binding on any interested party, including members, deferred participants, retirees, eligible survivors, beneficiaries, and the city.
Tex.Rev.Civ. Stats. Ann. art. 6243h, §§ 2(x), (y) (emphasis added).
In support of its argument that the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action is barred under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, HMEPS asserts that (1) the plain language of section 2(y) “demonstrates that [HMEPS’s] decisions are final and are not subject to judicial review”; (2) “[w]here a statute is silent on the issue of judicial review, [an] agency’s decision is final, and [a] court has no subject matter jurisdiction to review it,” citing Pruitt v. City of Houston, 548 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ); and (3) this Court’s opinion in Williams [514]*514III “makes clear that [HMEPS] has exclusive jurisdiction over benefit eligibility determinations like those at issue here and that there is no statutory right to judicial review of those decisions.”
First, the plain language of section 2(y) of article 6243h does not reveal a legislative intent to grant HMEPS the absolute authority to act as the sole and final arbiter of its disputes with HMEPS’s members, not subject to any type of judicial oversight. It is true that article 6243h does not expressly provide for judicial review of HMEPS’s determinations of its members’ benefits or eligibility and section 2(y) does state that the pension board’s factual determinations and interpretations of the statute “are final and binding” on any interested party. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6243h, § 2(y). However, such an administrative finality seems necessary for the efficient management and operation of HMEPS, and administrative finality is not the same as exclusivity. Under sections 2(x) and 2(y), it is readily apparent that the Legislature granted broad statutory powers to HMEPS’s board to administer, to manage, and to operate the pension plan. As noted above, section 2, entitled “Pension board,” concerns the board’s administration, management and operation of HMEPS, but it does not at all address the rights of aggrieved interested parties in the context of the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, ie., whether HMEPS has “the sole authority to make an initial determination in a dispute.” Subaru of Am., Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 221. Article 6243h does not create a “pervasive regulatory scheme” designed as “an exclusive means of remedying” the “problem” to which a “regulation is addressed.” Rather, it provides a pension system that “shall operate for the benefit of the employees of a city.” Tex. Rev.Civ. Stats. Ann. art. 6243h, § 2(b). Unlike other statutes previously held to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon an agency, the plain language of the statute at issue here does not evidence an intent by the Legislature to grant HMEPS exclusive jurisdiction in contested matters. See In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d at 323 (holding agency’s jurisdiction exclusive where statute acknowledged its purpose was to “establish a comprehensive and adequate regulatory scheme” and granted agency “exclusive original jurisdiction” over certain functions); Subaru of Am., Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 223 (holding agency’s jurisdiction exclusive where statute expressly granted agency “exclusive original jurisdiction”).
Moreover, as noted above, the Texas Supreme Court has stated that, “typically,” if an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, “a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the agency’s action.” Subaru of Am., Inc., 84 S.W.3d at 221. The doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction contemplates an aggrieved party’s “appeal” to a court from administrative decisions or orders; it presupposes judicial review, albeit at the appropriate time. Although the plaintiffs disagree with HMEPS’s alleged misinterpretation of the governing statutory provisions, the plaintiffs are not appealing from an administrative agency’s “initial determination in a dispute” as contemplated under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine. See id.
Second, HMEPS’s reliance on Pruitt is misplaced. Pruitt, a Houston firefighter who was passed over for promotion by the fire chief, attempted to have a district court review the decision of the Firemen’s and Policemen’s Civil Service Commission upholding the bypass. Pruitt, 548 S.W.2d at 91. This Court noted that the pertinent statute provided authority for “appeal” to a district court from certain orders of the Commission, “but not from the sustaining [515]*515of a promotional bypass.” Id. at 93. We noted that because the statute did not provide “for an appeal from such an order,” the Commission’s administrative action was “final and the courts have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal unless the administrative action complained of violates a constitutional provision.” Id. Here, again, we are dealing solely with a declaratory judgment action, not an “appeal” to a court challenging an administrative order. Significantly, in Pruitt, we actually went on to hold that the trial court “had jurisdiction to determine whether the Civil Service Commission failed to comply with [a] provision” of the statute, and we remanded the cause for entry of a mandamus order directing the Commission to afford Pruitt the opportunity to participate in the Commission’s review of the validity of the fire chiefs reasons for denying him the promotion. Id. at 96.
Finally, Williams III is substantively different from the instant case and its holding is not controlling. Williams, a Houston firefighter, challenged the Houston Firemen’s Relief and Retirement Fund’s (“the Fund”)9 denial of his request to purchase prior service credit for his six years and five months’ service with two other cities’ fire departments. Williams III, 121 S.W.3d at 422-23. He asserted numerous constitutional and common law “claims” against the Fund and sought “compensatory and punitive damages, declaratory relief, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorney’s fees and costs.” Id. at 424. Treating his entire suit as an appeal from the Fund’s benefit decision, this court addressed all of Williams’s “claims,” including his request for declaratory relief regarding the Fund’s construction of the pertinent retirement statute, together10 in the context of the statutory scheme for the determination of benefits, and we held that the Fund “had exclusive jurisdiction over Williams’s claims.” Id. at 427-29. This decision was based on the specific language of two pertinent statutory provisions that expressly addressed “rights of appeal” and judicial review of the Fund’s benefit decision. Id. at 427-28. We noted that “[bjoth Williams’s cause of action and remedy for its enforcement [were] derived from statute, [and that] the statutory provisions for review [were] mandatory and exclusive.” Id. at 427.
Williams requested a review, based on his interpretation of a “former” retirement statute, of the Fund’s method of calculating his future retirement benefits, and he sought an award of the credit, under his interpretation of the superseded statute. Id. at 426-29. We pointed out that Williams was not eligible for retirement and that he could not use the courts to require the Fund to calculate his future unvested pension benefits under already superseded law. Id. The retirement statute at issue expressly limited judicial review of the board’s decision accepting or rejecting a claim for benefits to members “eligible for retirement.” See id. at 427-29. Accordingly, we agreed with the Fund that the statute, “on its face [did] not allow judicial review of the Fund’s credit determination until Williams [met its] requirements.” Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
Williams III should not be read as holding that all declaratory judgment actions against administrative entities to determine the proper construction of perti[516]*516nent statutes or to obtain a declaration of rights, status and legal relations under pertinent statutes are precluded under the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine. Here, the plaintiffs seek an interpretation of a current statute and a determination of their rights under that statute in accordance with the courts’ inherent power to construe statutes. We are dealing solely with a declaratory judgment action, not multiple claims that are, in effect, an improper appeal of an administrative decision. The DJA action before us is, in fact, an action for a declaration of the plaintiffs’ rights, status and legal relationship with HMEPS, not a request for judicial review of an administrative benefits determination that is unappealable under the express language of the statute.
As noted above, here, the plaintiffs’ disagreement with HMEPS merely reveals the existence of a justiciable controversy between the. plaintiffs and HMEPS. The plaintiffs seek declaratory relief under the DJA, which is a “remedial” statute designed “to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” Tex. Crv. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.002(b). The DJA itself provides that persons may challenge “statutes” and “governmental entities must be joined or notified” in such circumstances. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d at 446. We hold that the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction does not apply in the context of this action for declaratory judgment.
Accordingly, we further hold that the trial court did not err in denying HMEPS’s motion to dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs’ action for declaratory judgment on the grounds that HMEPS has “exclusive jurisdiction” over pension benefit eligibility determinations and there is no statutory right to “judicial review” of such decisions.
We overrule HMEPS’s second issue.
Amount in Controversy and Ripeness
In its third issue, HMEPS argues that the trial court erred in “denying” its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action concerning service credit for their time in the police academy because no determination as to the plaintiffs’ eligibility for such credit has been made by HMEPS. In its fourth issue, HMEPS argues that the trial court erred in “denying” its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action because they did not allege an amount of damages in controversy-
HMEPS did raise these issues as grounds for dismissal in the trial court, but the trial court, in the written order which is before us on appeal, expressly denied HMEPS’s motion to dismiss solely on the basis of immunity. The trial court further noted that “[a]ll other issues raised by [HMEPS] are reserved for further consideration and are expressly not ruled upon at this time.” HMEPS included the trial court’s refusal to rule upon these additional grounds as issues in its notice of appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(2)(B). However, the grounds permitting a party to seek an interlocutory appeal from a trial court ruling are specific and narrow. In the present case, HMEPS’s appeal is limited to the specific “interlocutory order” of the county court at law denying its “plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.” Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(8).
Because the trial court, in its interlocutory order, expressly denied HMEPS’s motion to dismiss solely on the basis of immunity and did not rule on the grounds asserted in HMEPS’s third and fourth issues, we hold that no interlocutory appeal based on these additional grounds is au[517]*517thorized. Accordingly, we further hold that we are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of HMEPS’s third and fourth issues.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.
Justice TAFT, concurring.