Houston, Darren Latodd
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Opinion
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS NO. WR-74,954-02
EX PARTE DARREN LATODD HOUSTON, Applicant
ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CAUSE NO. 2016R-152-A IN THE 155TH DISTRICT COURT FROM FAYETTE COUNTY
Per curiam.
ORDER
Applicant pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to four
years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. Applicant filed this application for a writ
of habeas corpus in the county of conviction, and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See
TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 11.07.
Applicant contends that he is being denied due process in the mandatory supervision
revocation process, and that he is being unlawfully confined past his sentence discharge date.
Applicant alleges that while out on mandatory supervision he was arrested for a new charge, and
made bond on that charge. A parole revocation warrant was issued and executed, and Applicant was
advised of his rights in the revocation process. Applicant requested a preliminary hearing, but before 2
he was granted a preliminary hearing, he was transferred to Colorado County to face a new
misdemeanor charge. Applicant alleges that he was released from Colorado County and told that
he had discharged his sentence in this case. However, Applicant alleges that he was arrested again
on a revocation warrant, which had been re-issued. Applicant alleges that he again invoked his right
to a preliminary hearing, but has yet to be afforded a preliminary hearing. He alleges that he should
have discharged his sentence in this case, and that he is being unlawfully confined. He also alleges
that he is being denied due process by the failure to timely afford him a preliminary hearing.
Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S 471, 488, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972); TEX . GOV ’T CODE SEC . 508.2811; TEX .
GOV ’T CODE § 508.283(b) and (c); Ex parte Spann, 132 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Accordingly, the record should be developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings
of fact. TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order the Board of Pardons
and Paroles’s Office of the General Counsel and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Office
of the General Counsel to obtain responses from people with knowledge of relevant facts. In
developing the record, the trial court may use any means set out in Article 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial
court elects to hold a hearing, it shall determine whether Applicant is indigent. If Applicant is
indigent and wants to be represented by counsel, the trial court shall appoint counsel to represent him
at the hearing. See TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial
court shall immediately notify this Court of counsel’s name.
The response from the Board of Pardons and Paroles shall state whether Applicant has been
arrested pursuant to a revocation warrant, and if so, when that warrant was issued and executed. The
response shall state whether Applicant has been advised of his rights in the revocation process, 3
whether he requested or has received a preliminary hearing, and whether he has received a final
revocation hearing. The trial court shall make findings of fact as to whether Applicant was arrested
for a new offense, and if so, whether he has been formally charged with a new offense.
The response from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice shall state whether Applicant
has discharged his sentence in this case. If not, the response shall state whether Applicant is serving
a sentence for, or has been previously convicted of, an offense described by § 508.149(a) of the
Texas Government Code. If not, the response shall state the following:
(1) Applicant’s sentence-begin date, (2) how much time was remaining on Applicant’s sentence when was released, (3) how much time Applicant spent on mandatory supervision before any revocation warrants were issued, (4) the dates any revocation warrants were issued and executed, and (5) whether Applicant received credit while released on mandatory supervision.
The trial court shall make findings of fact as to whether Applicant’s sentence in this case has
discharged. The trial court shall also make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether
Applicant is being afforded due process in the mandatory supervision revocation process. The trial
court may make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to
Applicant’s claims.
The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from
the date of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court’s
findings and conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things,
affidavits, motions, objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcripts from
hearings and depositions. See TEX . R. APP . P. 73.4(b)(4). Any extensions of time must be requested
by the trial court and obtained from this Court. 4
Filed: February 3, 2021 Do not publish
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