Santaniello, J.
The issue in this appeal is whether, under the facts of this case, the plaintiff, the housing authority of the city of Norwalk, was required by Gen[602]*602eral Statutes § 47&-151 to give notice to the defendant, Mary Harris,2 before instituting a summary process action against her. The trial court held that notice was [603]*603not required. The Appellate Court reversed,3 and the plaintiff appealed.4 We affirm.
The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following undisputed facts. “The defendant, a widowed mother of seven, has been living in Roodner Court, federally subsidized public housing, in Norwalk since 1959. In September of 1983, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a written lease of apartment 3F in building twenty-three of Roodner Court. Also living in the apartment and specifically named on the lease are the defendant’s children, Mary Harris, Jr., and Parks Harris, Jr. On March 1,1990, Mary, Jr., was arrested for selling narcotics in an outdoor stairwell between buildings eleven and twelve at Roodner Court, an area that could not be seen from the defendant’s apartment. The police connected neither the defendant nor her apartment with the daughter’s illegal conduct. As a direct result of the daughter’s arrest, the plaintiff caused a notice to quit possession to be served on the defendant on June 1,1990.5 The notice to quit alleged that the defendant had failed to meet her duty as a tenant under General Statutes § 47a-ll (g)6 to require [604]*604others on the premises with her consent to conduct themselves in a manner that does not constitute a serious nuisance. Specifically, the notice to quit alleged that she created a serious nuisance by using or permitting the use of the premises for illegal sale of drugs. The notice did not inform the defendant of her statutorily guaranteed right to rectify the alleged violations within twenty-one days. General Statutes § 47a-15. The defendant remained in possession and the plaintiff instituted a summary process action seeking a judgment of possession against the defendant. The plaintiffs complaint in the summary process action alleged that Mary Harris, Jr., ‘committed acts upon the premises which constituted use of the premises for the illegal sale of drugs’ and that ‘[her] conduct ... on the premises constitutes a serious nuisance as defined in [General Statutes] § 47a-15, in violation of [General Statutes] § 47a-ll (g).’ There is no reference to any conduct on the part of the defendant. In her fourth special defense, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff failed to notify her as required by § 47a-15.
“The trial court concluded, inter alia, that the defendant ‘failed to require Mary, Jr., to conduct herself in a manner that did not constitute a serious nuisance’ and that‘[the notice provided by § 47a-15] . . . is not required where a tenant has caused a serious nuisance.’ On the basis of these findings, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff.” Housing Authority v. Harris, 28 Conn. App. 684, 686-87, 611 A.2d 934 (1992).
The Appellate Court interpreted the language of § 47a-15 narrowly and concluded that the defendant’s [605]*605conduct, in not controlling her daughter’s activities, did not constitute a serious nuisance. The Appellate Court held, therefore, that the plaintiff was not relieved of its duty to provide notice of and an opportunity to correct the violation. Id., 691.
Summary process statutes that grant a landlord rights in derogation of the common law have been “ ‘narrowly construed and strictly followed.’ ” Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 143, 520 A.2d 173 (1987); Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 600-601, 96 A.2d 217 (1953). The Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear a summary process action only if the landlord has previously served the tenant with a notice to quit. Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 728, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S. Ct. 3244, 106 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1989).
In the case of a residential eviction, § 47a-15 “provides that under certain circumstances, in which a tenant fails to comply with his or her rental obligations under § 47a-ll, the landlord is required to deliver to the tenant a written notice ‘specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach’ and to give the tenant [twenty-one] days to abate the violation or risk the termination of the tenancy. This notice provision has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to [General Statutes] § 47a-23.” Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). The notice must be sufficient to apprise the tenant of the information the tenant “needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of § 47a-15 must be construed strictly.” (Citations omitted.) Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 143-44.
[606]*606Reading the statute as a whole indicates that notice should be given for all violations except those specifically excluded. If the tenant can remedy the violation by repair or by paying damages, and does so within twenty-one days, the rental agreement continues. If the violation is not or cannot be remedied, the landlord may institute a summary process action thirty days after the tenant received the notice. This interpretation will further the legislative purpose, recognized by the Appellate Court, of giving the tenant “one opportunity to eliminate the cause of the nuisance.” Housing Authority v. Harris, supra, 692.
In addition, § 47a-15 specifically provides: “If the landlord elects to evict based upon an allegation, pursuant to subsection (g) of section 47a-ll, that the tenant failed to require other persons on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not constitute a serious nuisance, and the tenant claims to have had no knowledge of such conduct, then, if the landlord establishes that the premises have been used for the illegal sale of drugs, the burden shall be on the tenant to show that he had no knowledge of the creation of the serious nuisance.” Although removing the person who sold drugs from the apartment will eliminate the cause of the nuisance, it cannot eliminate any effects of the drug sale that have already occurred. The notice period provided by § 47a-15 provides a tenant who claims no knowledge of the activity an opportunity to gather evidence of that tenant’s lack of knowledge. Unless the tenant can show that the tenant had no knowledge of the activity, the tenant faces eviction.
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Santaniello, J.
The issue in this appeal is whether, under the facts of this case, the plaintiff, the housing authority of the city of Norwalk, was required by Gen[602]*602eral Statutes § 47&-151 to give notice to the defendant, Mary Harris,2 before instituting a summary process action against her. The trial court held that notice was [603]*603not required. The Appellate Court reversed,3 and the plaintiff appealed.4 We affirm.
The Appellate Court opinion sets forth the following undisputed facts. “The defendant, a widowed mother of seven, has been living in Roodner Court, federally subsidized public housing, in Norwalk since 1959. In September of 1983, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a written lease of apartment 3F in building twenty-three of Roodner Court. Also living in the apartment and specifically named on the lease are the defendant’s children, Mary Harris, Jr., and Parks Harris, Jr. On March 1,1990, Mary, Jr., was arrested for selling narcotics in an outdoor stairwell between buildings eleven and twelve at Roodner Court, an area that could not be seen from the defendant’s apartment. The police connected neither the defendant nor her apartment with the daughter’s illegal conduct. As a direct result of the daughter’s arrest, the plaintiff caused a notice to quit possession to be served on the defendant on June 1,1990.5 The notice to quit alleged that the defendant had failed to meet her duty as a tenant under General Statutes § 47a-ll (g)6 to require [604]*604others on the premises with her consent to conduct themselves in a manner that does not constitute a serious nuisance. Specifically, the notice to quit alleged that she created a serious nuisance by using or permitting the use of the premises for illegal sale of drugs. The notice did not inform the defendant of her statutorily guaranteed right to rectify the alleged violations within twenty-one days. General Statutes § 47a-15. The defendant remained in possession and the plaintiff instituted a summary process action seeking a judgment of possession against the defendant. The plaintiffs complaint in the summary process action alleged that Mary Harris, Jr., ‘committed acts upon the premises which constituted use of the premises for the illegal sale of drugs’ and that ‘[her] conduct ... on the premises constitutes a serious nuisance as defined in [General Statutes] § 47a-15, in violation of [General Statutes] § 47a-ll (g).’ There is no reference to any conduct on the part of the defendant. In her fourth special defense, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff failed to notify her as required by § 47a-15.
“The trial court concluded, inter alia, that the defendant ‘failed to require Mary, Jr., to conduct herself in a manner that did not constitute a serious nuisance’ and that‘[the notice provided by § 47a-15] . . . is not required where a tenant has caused a serious nuisance.’ On the basis of these findings, the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff.” Housing Authority v. Harris, 28 Conn. App. 684, 686-87, 611 A.2d 934 (1992).
The Appellate Court interpreted the language of § 47a-15 narrowly and concluded that the defendant’s [605]*605conduct, in not controlling her daughter’s activities, did not constitute a serious nuisance. The Appellate Court held, therefore, that the plaintiff was not relieved of its duty to provide notice of and an opportunity to correct the violation. Id., 691.
Summary process statutes that grant a landlord rights in derogation of the common law have been “ ‘narrowly construed and strictly followed.’ ” Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 143, 520 A.2d 173 (1987); Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella, 139 Conn. 598, 600-601, 96 A.2d 217 (1953). The Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear a summary process action only if the landlord has previously served the tenant with a notice to quit. Lampasona v. Jacobs, 209 Conn. 724, 728, 553 A.2d 175, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 919, 109 S. Ct. 3244, 106 L. Ed. 2d 590 (1989).
In the case of a residential eviction, § 47a-15 “provides that under certain circumstances, in which a tenant fails to comply with his or her rental obligations under § 47a-ll, the landlord is required to deliver to the tenant a written notice ‘specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach’ and to give the tenant [twenty-one] days to abate the violation or risk the termination of the tenancy. This notice provision has been interpreted to be separate from and preliminary to the maintenance of a summary process action pursuant to [General Statutes] § 47a-23.” Ossen v. Kreutzer, 19 Conn. App. 564, 569, 563 A.2d 741 (1989). The notice must be sufficient to apprise the tenant of the information the tenant “needs to protect herself against premature, discriminatory or arbitrary eviction. . . . To further this salutary purpose, the notice requirements of § 47a-15 must be construed strictly.” (Citations omitted.) Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, supra, 143-44.
[606]*606Reading the statute as a whole indicates that notice should be given for all violations except those specifically excluded. If the tenant can remedy the violation by repair or by paying damages, and does so within twenty-one days, the rental agreement continues. If the violation is not or cannot be remedied, the landlord may institute a summary process action thirty days after the tenant received the notice. This interpretation will further the legislative purpose, recognized by the Appellate Court, of giving the tenant “one opportunity to eliminate the cause of the nuisance.” Housing Authority v. Harris, supra, 692.
In addition, § 47a-15 specifically provides: “If the landlord elects to evict based upon an allegation, pursuant to subsection (g) of section 47a-ll, that the tenant failed to require other persons on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not constitute a serious nuisance, and the tenant claims to have had no knowledge of such conduct, then, if the landlord establishes that the premises have been used for the illegal sale of drugs, the burden shall be on the tenant to show that he had no knowledge of the creation of the serious nuisance.” Although removing the person who sold drugs from the apartment will eliminate the cause of the nuisance, it cannot eliminate any effects of the drug sale that have already occurred. The notice period provided by § 47a-15 provides a tenant who claims no knowledge of the activity an opportunity to gather evidence of that tenant’s lack of knowledge. Unless the tenant can show that the tenant had no knowledge of the activity, the tenant faces eviction.
The plaintiff argues that the decision of the Appellate Court renders superfluous the requirement in § 47a-ll (g) that a tenant “require other persons on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not . . . constitute a . . . serious nuisance.” The plaintiff contends that if the tenant can [607]*607remove the offending occupant within twenty-one days and remedy the violation, then the tenant can ignore the conduct of other occupants and avoid eviction simply by removing the offending occupant upon the receipt of notice from the landlord. The plaintiff suggests that this interpretation would encourage a recurring pattern of drug activity followed by removal of the offending person for six months upon receipt of the notice.7
The plaintiffs argument is unpersuasive. The defendant’s daughter was convicted for selling drugs. General Statutes § 47a-26h (c) authorizes the plaintiff to evict Mary, Jr., from the apartment because a judgment was entered against her for using the premises for the illegal sale of drugs.8 Allowing a person who has been evicted under § 47a-26h (c) to return to the apartment is one of the exceptions to the notice requirement provided in § 47a-15.9 If the defendant had allowed her daughter to return to the apartment at any [608]*608time, the plaintiff could institute a summary process action against the defendant without providing notice and an opportunity to remedy the violation. Accordingly, the plaintiffs scenario of recurring incidents of drug sales, removal of the offending person and return of that person after six months could not materialize.
Section 47a-15 states that notice should be given for all violations except those specifically excluded. The exception at issue in this case is “conduct by the tenant which constitutes a serious nuisance.” In this case, the tenant is the defendant, Mary Harris. She alone signed the rental agreement. Mary Harris, Jr., Kim Harris and Parks Harris, Jr., are identified in the rental agreement as household members. As the Appellate Court noted, § 47a-ll (g) distinguishes between the duty of a tenant to refrain from conduct that constitutes a serious nuisance and the duty of a tenant to require other persons on the premises with her permission to conduct themselves in a manner that will not constitute a serious nuisance. Housing Authority v. Harris, supra, 690. The legislature has not included the failure to control the conduct of other persons within the definition of a serious nuisance.
To fall within the exceptions set forth in § 47a-15, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s conduct constituted a serious nuisance. In the notice to quit, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant created a serious nuisance “by using or permitting the use of the premises for the illegal sale of drugs.” In its complaint, however, the plaintiff offered no facts to support this claim; the complaint does not allege any conduct by the defendant. At trial, the defendant testified that she set strict rules for her children and that she had repeatedly attempted to discover whether Mary, Jr., had been selling drugs. All the defendant had learned was that her daughter used drugs. The plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to estab[609]*609lish a claim that the defendant’s conduct constituted a serious nuisance. We agree with the holding of the Appellate Court that the plaintiff was required to give the defendant notice pursuant to § 47a-15 before instituting a summary process action against her.10
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.