IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF SEATTLE, a Washington public No. 88425-5-I body corporate and politic, DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
JOAN HUYNH, HUNG TRAN, and JONATHAN TRAN, et al.,
Respondent.
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — The Housing Authority of the City of Seattle appeals from the dismissal of its unlawful detainer action against tenants in default as to rent, based on the trial court’s interpretation of RCW 59.18.190. Because the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statute, we reverse, vacate the order of limited dissemination, and remand.
FACTS
On September 16, 2024, the Housing Authority of the City of Seattle (SHA), in its capacity as a landlord, issued a notice to Joan Huynh, Hung Tran, and Jonathan Tran (collectively, Huynh) to pay their past due rent or vacate the apartment where they resided. The notice stated that Huynh was “not in compliance with the terms of the lease agreement” because they owed $6,686 in rent payments from the preceding nine consecutive months and nonpayment of
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the rent owed within 30 days of the notice would result in the termination of the lease on October 17. On November 7, Huynh was still in possession of the apartment, and SHA personally served them with a summons and complaint for unlawful detainer. Among other relief requested in the complaint, SHA sought damages in the amount of the unpaid rent and a writ of restitution to restore its possession of the apartment. SHA did not file the complaint in the superior court until February 20, 2025. On February 28, a commissioner issued an order to show cause and set a hearing for April 2. On March 6, SHA filed a declaration of service signed by a SHA paralegal who declared that she served three copies of the show cause order on the tenants via regular mail.
Huynh appeared remotely at the April 2 hearing and was present when the trial court certified the case for assignment to a judge and set a subsequent hearing on April 30. The following day, the chief civil judge assigned the case to a judge, struck the April 30 hearing, and set a trial date in June. On April 11, the assigned judge struck the June trial and reset the show cause hearing for April 21. On April 14, the same SHA paralegal who had done so previously filed another declaration of service indicating that she had served three copies of the order setting the April 21 show cause hearing by regular mail.
Huynh was not present at the April 21 show cause hearing, and the trial court ultimately entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment in the case. The judge found that Huynh had been properly served the notice to pay or vacate on September 16, 2024, “materially breached the lease by failing to pay rent when due and failing to pay the amount alleged before the expiration of time
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in the statutory notice to [p]ay or [v]acate,” “failed to cure the breach within the time specified in the statutory notice,” and continued both to “be in arrears in rent . . . and . . . in possession of the unit.” The court concluded that this material breach entitled SHA to both damages and immediate possession of the premises and entered a judgment and a writ of restitution to that effect.
Three days later, Huynh filed a handwritten pro se motion to vacate the judgment and stay enforcement of the judgment and the writ. Therein, Huynh explained that she did not understand that the court date had been moved to April 21 and thought that the scheduling order she received was for a settlement meeting. She further asserted that she did not recall receiving scheduling information about the hearings, requested a Vietnamese interpreter, and attached an image of a check to SHA as proof of partial payment of the delinquent rent. SHA opposed Huynh’s motion to vacate; it argued that Huynh had failed to pay rent for over a year, despite its attempts to provide opportunities for repayment, and otherwise failed to show grounds to justify vacatur of the judgment. Specifically, it argued the relevant standards under CR 60 regarding motions to vacate, that the judgment was not obtained by irregular means or void due to a lack of jurisdiction, and Huynh had not shown excusable neglect in their failure to timely contest entry of the judgment.
The trial court granted Huynh’s motion to vacate on May 2 and set a new show cause hearing for later that month. On May 9, Huynh, now represented by counsel, disclosed their defenses as ordered by the trial court, including the one relevant to this appeal: that SHA had “failed to comply with RCW 59.18.190, as [it]
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failed to seek a remedy within 60 days of purportedly serving the predicate notice on” Huynh.
On May 16, the trial court held the show cause hearing. Huynh again argued procedural defenses and emphasized that SHA had failed to comply with RCW 59.18.190, a key provision of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973 1 (RLTA), because service of a summons and complaint “are not contemplated as pursuing a remedy.” SHA disagreed and asserted that RCW 59.18.190 did not “provide specific guidelines for filing and service,” SHA was simply required “to seek a remedy,” and it had done so by effectuating service of process on Huynh. Due to time constraints, the trial court continued the hearing and allowed both parties to submit additional briefing prior to the next court date. On May 27, the trial court took up the remaining issues, heard from the parties, and entered its written order.
In its order on SHA’s motion to show cause, the trial court “agree[d] that service of a summons and a complaint may commence an action” but concluded that this did not constitute the pursuit of a remedy for purposes of the RLTA. It further noted a remedy cannot be “awarded without first filing a complaint” and “RCW 59.18 [sic] must be strictly construed in favor of the tenant.” It reasoned that because SHA had “not pursue[d] a remedy within the 60-day timeline pr[e]scribed by RCW 59.18.190, the predicate eviction notice expired” and the court lacked authority to grant SHA relief. The trial court dismissed the unlawful
1 Ch. 59.18 RCW.
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detainer action without prejudice, agreed that an order of limited dissemination was warranted, and struck the trial dates that had been set.
SHA timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Interpretation of RCW 59.18.190 SHA’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in its interpretation of RCW 59.18.190 because “commencing an unlawful detainer action is the first step in obtaining a judicial order to evict a tenant who remains in possession of the property.” It avers that “pursuing a remedy,” as used in the statute, “clearly means electing and initiating a process through which the landlord can begin to enforce its rights and obtain legal relief provided by the statute through the judicial process.” Huynh responds that there are no remedies “available to a landlord that has not both served the tenant with process and filed the case with the court” and “service of process alone is not sufficient to pursue a remedy because it does not place the controversy within the power of the court to adjudicate.” SHA is correct.
“The meaning of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo.” Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). The reviewing “court’s fundamental objective is to ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent.” Id. at 9-10. “Plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions,
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and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365, 373, 173 P.3d 228 (2007). “We must assign familiar legal terms in a statute their familiar legal meaning.” Floeting v. Grp. Health Co-op., 200 Wn. App. 758, 764, 403 P.3d 559 (2017), aff’d, 192 Wn.2d 848, 434 P.3d 39 (2019). “Statutory provisions and rules should be harmonized whenever possible.” Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 373. We consider “‘the broader statutory context for guidance,’” but “‘we must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them, and we must construe statutes such that all of the language is given effect.’” Randy Reynolds & Assocs., Inc. v. Harmon, 193 Wn.2d 143, 155-56, 437 P.3d 677 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lake v. Woodcreek Homeowners Ass’n, 169 Wn.2d 516, 526, 243 P.3d 1283 (2010)). “[I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.” Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 12.
The RLTA requires tenants to “pay the rental amount at such times and in such amounts as provided for in the rental agreement.” RCW 59.18.130. If the landlord learns that a tenant is in breach of this obligation, they “may immediately give notice to the tenant to remedy the nonconformance. Said notice shall expire after sixty days unless the landlord pursues any remedy under this chapter.” RCW 59.18.190 (emphasis added).
“The unlawful detainer statute is in derogation of the common law, and must therefore be strictly construed in favor of the tenant.” Hous. Auth. of City of Everett v. Terry, 114 Wn.2d 558, 563, 789 P.2d 745 (1990). The unlawful detainer cause
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of action is “‘designed to hasten the recovery of possession’” by the landlord but, “in order to take advantage of its favorable provisions, a landlord must comply with the requirements of the statute.” Id. at 563-64 (quoting Wilson v. Daniels, 31 Wn.2d 633, 643-44, 198 P.2d 496 (1948)). Tenants can be liable for unlawful detainer for a variety of reasons, including when they remain in possession of the residence “after a default in the payment of rent, and after notice in writing requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises.” RCW 59.12.030(3). “Once a tenant is in the status of unlawful detainer, the landlord may commence an unlawful detainer action by serving a summons and complaint.” Indigo Real Est. Servs., Inc. v. Wadsworth, 169 Wn. App. 412, 421, 280 P.3d 506 (2012) (emphasis added); RCW 59.12.070.
To determine the plain meaning of the phrase “pursues any remedy,” as used in RCW 59.18.190, we consider the “ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.” Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 373. While “remedy” is not explicitly defined, the phrase “remedy under this chapter,” as well as similar variations, is used throughout the statutory scheme. See, e.g., RCW 59.18.020; 2 .090; 3 .160. 4 We have previously held that remedies available under the RLTA include “recovery of related possession, related damages, and attorney
2 “Every duty under this chapter and every act which must be performed as a condition
precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.” RCW 59.18.020 (emphasis added).
3 Authorizes tenants to pursue “an action in an appropriate court, or at arbitration if so
agreed, for any remedy provided by this chapter or otherwise provided by law; or . . . [p]ursue other remedies available under this chapter.” RCW 59.18.090(2), (3) (emphasis added).
4 Authorizes landlords to file “an action in an appropriate court, or at arbitration if so agreed
for any remedy provided by this chapter or otherwise provided by law; or . . . [p]ursue other remedies available under this chapter.” RCW 59.18.160(1), (2) (emphasis added).
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fees.” Kiemle & Hagood Co. v. Daniels, 26 Wn. App. 2d 199, 213-14, 528 P.3d 834 (2023); see also RCW 59.18.290. Because “remedy” is not defined in the RLTA, we give the term its “familiar legal meaning.” See Floeting, 200 Wn. App. at 764. The familiar legal meaning of “remedy” is the “means of enforcing a right or addressing a wrong; legal or equitable relief.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1551 (12th ed. 2024). Additionally, “[a]n undefined statutory term should be given its usual and ordinary meaning.” Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 373. “Pursue” is defined as “to seek to follow, obtain, attain to, or accomplish.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1848 (2002). Accordingly, the plain meaning of “pursues any remedy” in RCW 59.18.190 is to seek to address the legal wrong created by a tenant’s breach of their lease obligations or enforcement of the landlord’s rights under the RLTA. This necessarily includes commencement of an unlawful detainer action which, as established by our holding in Indigo Real Estate, may be accomplished “by serving a summons and complaint.” 169 Wn. App. at 421; see also Kiemle, 26 Wn. App. 2d at 214.
We must endeavor to interpret statutes in a manner that is harmonized, in so far as is possible, with related statutes and civil rules. Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 373. In addition to consistency with the plain meaning of the terms at issue, our interpretation of “pursues any remedy under this chapter” to include commencement of an unlawful detainer action by service of a summons and complaint can be harmonized with RCW 59.18.370, the statute that provides the procedures to obtain a writ of restitution through an unlawful detainer action. There, the legislature describes filing the complaint by the landlord and
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commencement of an action in unlawful detainer by service of process on the tenant as distinct steps. It states, in relevant part, that a
plaintiff, at the time of commencing an action of forcible entry or detainer or unlawful detainer, or at any time afterwards, upon filing the complaint, may apply to the superior court in which the action is pending for an order directing the defendant to appear and show cause, if any [they] ha[ve], why a writ of restitution should not issue restoring to the plaintiff possession of the property in the complaint described . . . A copy of the order, together with a copy of the summons and complaint if not previously served on the defendant, shall be served upon the defendant.
RCW 59.18.370 (emphasis added). By its plain language, the statute expressly anticipates, and therefore permits, varied approaches in the manner by which an unlawful detainer action comes before the court. It explicitly authorizes the plaintiff to seek an order to show cause at the time of commencement “or at any time afterwards, upon filing the complaint”; logically, the sole interpretation of this language is that the legislature understood commencement of an action by service of process to be a distinct step from the filing of a complaint, which allows a landlord to proceed toward the specific RLTA remedy of a writ of restitution and/or entry of judgment. Further, the legislature drafted the statutes contained in Title 59 RCW, “Landlord and Tenant,” in a manner that recognizes the role of our other statutes that govern commencement of an action and explicitly allows for multiple methods of achieving that critical procedural step.
RCW 59.12.180, part of the chapter governing unlawful detainer, among other actions, definitively states,
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the provisions of the laws of this state with reference to practice in civil actions are applicable to, and constitute the rules of practice in the proceedings mentioned in this chapter.
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Consistent with that stated direction of our legislature, our state Supreme Court has observed that courts “have applied the civil rules to proceedings under the unlawful detainer statute in the absence of express inconsistencies” and the civil rules provide for “‘the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated.’” Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 374-75 (quoting Emwright v. King County, 96 Wn.2d 538, 543, 637 P.2d 656 (1981)). Contrary to Huynh’s argument in the trial court and on appeal, service of a summons and complaint by the plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the trial court; a “civil action is commenced by service of a copy of a summons together with a copy of the complaint, as provided in rule 4 or by filing a complaint.” CR 3(a). This is consistent with the statute governing jurisdiction:
From the time of the commencement of the action by service of summons, or by filing of the complaint, or as otherwise provided, the court is deemed to have acquired jurisdiction and to have control of all subsequent proceedings.
RCW 4.28.020. Under this procedural framework, service of summons and a complaint both commences the proceeding and invokes the trial court’s jurisdiction over the dispute.
At oral argument before this court, Huynh did not dispute that service of process on the tenants commenced the unlawful detainer action but rather confusingly contended that “until the action is filed with the court . . . the landlord has not meaningfully invoked the remedial authority of the court.” 5 (Emphasis
5 Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral arg., Hous. Auth. of City of Seattle v. Huynh, No. 88425-5-I
(June 10, 2026), at 17 min., 25 sec. to 18 min., 10 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-of-appeals-2026061171/.
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added.) This proffered interpretation is inconsistent with a plain meaning of the relevant jurisdictional statute, RCW 4.28.020. Further, Huynh’s interpretation adds language not present in the statute, “meaningfully invoked the remedial authority of the court,” which is contrary to the rules of statutory interpretation. See Randy Reynolds, 193 Wn.2d at 155-56. RCW 4.28.020 does not provide for different levels of invocation of the court’s jurisdiction. The jurisdiction and control of the court may be invoked solely by service of process; there is no other step required for that invocation to become “meaningful,” and Huynh’s contention to the contrary is incorrect.
“We assume the legislature means exactly what it says and interpret the wording of statutes according to those terms.” In re Forfeiture of One 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 842, 215 P.3d 166 (2009). If the legislature had intended RCW 59.18.190 to require that the landlord file their complaint for unlawful detainer in the trial court, a narrower and more specific step than the broad pursuit of any remedy, it would have done so. SHA correctly contends that when the trial court “erroneously limited ‘pursuing a remedy’ to the subsequent filing of the complaint with the court, the trial judge effectively rendered commencement of an unlawful detainer action through service meaningless.” That position cannot be reconciled with the legislature’s express incorporation of the rules and statutes regarding commencement of action into the title of the RCW that contains the RLTA and governs actions in unlawful detainer generally.
Critically, our interpretation of the disputed portion of RCW 59.18.190 comports with the directive from our Supreme Court to construe the RLTA
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“‘liberally in order to accomplish the purpose for which it is enacted.’” Silver v. Rudeen Mgmt. Co., 197 Wn.2d 535, 548, 484 P.3d 1251 (2021) (quoting State v. Douty, 92 Wn.2d 930, 969, 603 P.2d 373 (1979)). Again, our state’s unlawful detainer process is “‘designed to hasten the recovery of possession,’” provided that landlords strictly comply with the procedures set out in the statutory scheme. Terry, 114 Wn.2d at 563 (quoting Wilson, 31 Wn.2d at 643). If, subsequent to the issuance of a statutorily valid notice of breach, the landlord elects to effectuate service of process on the tenant to preserve their path to the remedy of an unlawful detainer action but the parties opt to actively engage in negotiation to resolve the issues presented in the notice and complaint, there is little to be gained by a requirement that the landlord nonetheless file the complaint with the superior court in order to comply with RCW 59.18.190. In fact, such a requirement would create potentially unnecessary work on the part of the superior court clerk’s office should the parties end up resolving the breach through those negotiations. Further, the tenant is almost certainly harmed if the landlord must file the complaint for unlawful detainer with the court in order to preserve access to that remedy but ultimately elects not to pursue an unlawful detainer action after the breach is resolved. This is so because that complaint would become part a public record and, unless the tenant could obtain an order of limited dissemination, it would likely impact their ability to secure housing in the future. This particular point is illustrated by the trial court’s issuance of an order of limited dissemination for Huynh here; such action by the judge reflects recognition of the downstream consequences from filing a complaint for unlawful detainer against a tenant.
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Notably, the record here establishes that the parties attempted to resolve this breach in a manner that avoided such collateral consequences for Huynh. After serving the statutory notice of the breach and allowing 30 days for Huynh to remedy it or surrender possession of the apartment, SHA delayed filing the complaint for nearly four months after commencing the unlawful detainer action through service of process. SHA averred in the trial court, and Huynh does not dispute, that it “tried to work with [Huynh] in gathering documentation to lower the rental amount during the time of service of the unlawful detainer action and filing” and Huynh “did in fact make a significant payment towards their balance due.” Had the parties been able to satisfactorily remedy the breach during that four-month period, it is possible if not likely, that SHA would never have filed the complaint and there would not have been any need for an order of limited dissemination to protect Huynh from the negative consequences to their rental history. In fact, even at the time of the May 16 show cause hearing, SHA and Huynh persisted in their attempts to negotiate a settlement and, prior to the hearing, had discussed a joint motion to continue the case toward that end. To hold, as Huynh suggests, that RCW 59.18.190 requires the filing of a complaint for unlawful detainer within 60 days of service of a statutorily valid notice on the tenant in order to have “pursue[d] any remedy available under” the RLTA, would harm countless tenants throughout our state by unnecessarily tarnishing their rental histories with complaints for unlawful detainer that could have been resolved short of direct court intervention. 6
6 Further, neither Huynh’s nor the trial court’s erroneous interpretation of the statute can
be reconciled with the fact that remedies other than an action for unlawful detainer are available under the RLTA; RCW 59.18.315 authorizes mediation if the parties agree and RCW 59.18.320- .340 govern arbitration between a landlord and tenant. Mediation and arbitration are explicitly
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Huynh relied on Kiemle in the trial court and continues to do so on appeal in support of their flawed interpretation of the statutory language. However, that case is factually distinguishable and does not control here. In Kiemle, the landlord issued seven successive notices to the tenant regarding her violation of “cleaning obligations.” 26 Wn. App. 2d at 205. Division Three of this court held that a “landlord’s service of a notice to terminate a tenancy is not a remedy. It is a legal prerequisite to avail oneself of the superior court’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 214 (emphasis added). It also noted that a “‘remedy’ is generally defined as something ‘a court can do for a litigant who has been wronged.’” Id. at 213 (quoting DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (5th ed. 2019)). Division Three concluded that because the landlord “did not pursue a remedy under the RLTA within 60 days of providing [the tenant] with a notice to cure or vacate,” the notice had expired for the purposes of RCW 59.18.190. Id. at 214.
We agree with the panel in Kiemle; notice is a prerequisite to obtaining relief, not a remedy in and of itself. This holding is consistent with our state Supreme Court, which, again, has held that proper notice is a “‘jurisdictional condition precedent’ to the commencement of an unlawful detainer action.” Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Terry, 114 Wn.2d at 564-65); see also Hall v. Feigenbaum, 178 Wn. App. 811, 819, 319 P.3d 61 (2014); Hous. Auth. of City of Seattle v. Bin, 163 Wn. App. 367, 377, 260 P.3d 900 (2011). However, we decline Huynh’s request to extend the holding from
anticipated as alternate paths to resolution of disputes, or “remedies,” between landlords and tenants “under this chapter.”
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Kiemle, which was specific only to notice, to formal commencement of an action by service of summons and a complaint. Division Three did not consider whether the service of a summons and complaint fell within the language “pursues any remedy” as used in RCW 59.18.190. As such, Kiemle is unavailing here.
In the case before us, SHA provided Huynh with a notice on September 16, 2024 that advised the tenants of their obligation to pay rent or vacate the premises within 30 days. Under RCW 59.18.190, the 60-day time limit for SHA to “pursue[] any remedy” began to run on the date of that notice. On November 4, within the statutory 60-day timeframe, SHA served Huynh with the eviction summons and complaint for unlawful detainer. SHA delayed filing the complaint, and therefore also delayed triggering the necessity to consider an order of limited dissemination, until February 20, 2025 while the parties attempted to cure Huynh’s breach of the lease through a negotiated resolution. When SHA completed service on Huynh, however, it had commenced the action pursuant to the governing statute and court rule and therefore properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction such that it had “pursue[d] a[] remedy” under RCW 59.18.190. See also RCW 4.28.020; CR 3(a). This is consistent with our state’s jurisprudence regarding commencement of an unlawful detainer action. See Sangha v. Keen, 4 Wn.3d 852, 858-59, 568 P.3d 1118 (2025); Christensen, 162 Wn.2d at 373; Indigo Real Est., 169 Wn. App. at 421; Sherwood Auburn LLC v. Pinzon, 24 Wn. App. 2d 664, 674, 521 P.3d 212 (2022). The trial court erred when it reached a contrary conclusion.
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II. Attorney Fees Huynh requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1 and the prevailing party provision of the RLTA, RCW 59.18.290(2). RAP 18.1 permits an award of attorney fees on appeal if the party seeking fees devotes a section of its brief to the request and the right to recover fees is granted by the applicable law. Tenants are entitled to attorney fees if they prevail on appeal. Faciszewski v. Brown, 187 Wn.2d 308, 324, 386 P.3d 711 (2016); RCW 59.18.290(2). Because we have concluded that Huynh is not the prevailing party, they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.
For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse, vacate the order of limited dissemination, and remand.
WE CONCUR: