UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO LARRY HOUSER, Case No. 4:22-cv-00076-DCN Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER vs. BY SCREENING JUDGE
TOM CARTER, Sheriff, Jail in Twin Falls, Medical Department, and Nurse Practitioner,
Defendants.
The Complaint of Plaintiff Larry Houser was conditionally filed by the Clerk of Court due to his status as an inmate and a pauper. Dkts. 3, 1. A “conditional filing” means that Plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. All inmate and pauper complaints seeking relief against a government entity or official must be screened by the Court to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. The Court must dismiss any claims that state a frivolous or malicious claim, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After reviewing the Complaint, the Court has determined that Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed against the individual defendants, but not the entity defendants. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 1. Standard of Law A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an implementing statute that makes it possible to bring a cause of action under the Amendments of the United States Constitution. It is unclear whether Plaintiff was a convicted felon or a pretrial detainee at the time
of his incarceration at the jail. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to pretrial detainees and is violated when the conditions to which the detainee is subjected amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The Eighth Amendment applies to convicted prisoners and protects against cruel and unusual punishment. Pretrial detainees have a due process right to adequate medical and mental health
care while detained. Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). Convicted prisoners have a similar right under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). With respect to pretrial detainees, jail conditions, including medical treatment, violate the Constitution if those conditions amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Detainees’ conditions-of-confinement claims are analyzed using a
standard of “objective deliberate indifference.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
Id. at 1125. The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although the Court uses an objective standard in evaluating conditions-of- confinement claims of pretrial detainees, this standard must not be confused with the objective standard used for evaluating claims of negligence under state law. This is because negligence—the “mere lack of due care” by a governmental official—“does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (stating that negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under § 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”). Therefore, a pretrial detainee complaining of unconstitutional conditions of confinement must “prove
more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. 2. Summary of Allegations
While Plaintiff was housed at the Twin Falls, he allegedly received improper medical treatment for a wound, resulting in amputation of his foot. He asserts that Twin Falls Jail personnel did not follow his doctor’s orders. He seeks monetary damages. He no longer resides at the jail. 3. Discussion A. Claims Against the Twin Falls Jail and Medical Department To bring a § 1983 claim against a government entity, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff
complains. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (Monell applicable to private entities performing government functions). That is, “[an entity] can be found liable under § 1983 only where the [entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO LARRY HOUSER, Case No. 4:22-cv-00076-DCN Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER vs. BY SCREENING JUDGE
TOM CARTER, Sheriff, Jail in Twin Falls, Medical Department, and Nurse Practitioner,
Defendants.
The Complaint of Plaintiff Larry Houser was conditionally filed by the Clerk of Court due to his status as an inmate and a pauper. Dkts. 3, 1. A “conditional filing” means that Plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. All inmate and pauper complaints seeking relief against a government entity or official must be screened by the Court to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. The Court must dismiss any claims that state a frivolous or malicious claim, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). After reviewing the Complaint, the Court has determined that Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed against the individual defendants, but not the entity defendants. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 1. Standard of Law A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints must be liberally construed. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the
Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is an implementing statute that makes it possible to bring a cause of action under the Amendments of the United States Constitution. It is unclear whether Plaintiff was a convicted felon or a pretrial detainee at the time
of his incarceration at the jail. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to pretrial detainees and is violated when the conditions to which the detainee is subjected amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). The Eighth Amendment applies to convicted prisoners and protects against cruel and unusual punishment. Pretrial detainees have a due process right to adequate medical and mental health
care while detained. Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). Convicted prisoners have a similar right under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). With respect to pretrial detainees, jail conditions, including medical treatment, violate the Constitution if those conditions amount to punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Detainees’ conditions-of-confinement claims are analyzed using a
standard of “objective deliberate indifference.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). Under that standard, a detainee must establish the following elements: (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
Id. at 1125. The application of this standard “will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although the Court uses an objective standard in evaluating conditions-of- confinement claims of pretrial detainees, this standard must not be confused with the objective standard used for evaluating claims of negligence under state law. This is because negligence—the “mere lack of due care” by a governmental official—“does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (stating that negligence and ordinary negligence are not actionable under § 1983, because such actions are not an abuse of governmental power but merely a “failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”). Therefore, a pretrial detainee complaining of unconstitutional conditions of confinement must “prove
more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. 2. Summary of Allegations
While Plaintiff was housed at the Twin Falls, he allegedly received improper medical treatment for a wound, resulting in amputation of his foot. He asserts that Twin Falls Jail personnel did not follow his doctor’s orders. He seeks monetary damages. He no longer resides at the jail. 3. Discussion A. Claims Against the Twin Falls Jail and Medical Department To bring a § 1983 claim against a government entity, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff
complains. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (Monell applicable to private entities performing government functions). That is, “[an entity] can be found liable under § 1983 only where the [entity] itself causes the constitutional violation at issue.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
Under Monell, requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against a municipality or private entity performing a state function are the following: (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the municipality or entity had a policy or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir.
2001). All policy-based claims must meet the pleading standards clarified by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Iqbal, supra. That is, mere “formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements” is insufficient. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff has provided insufficient allegations to state a claim against the Twin Falls County Jail or Medical Department Without specific factual allegations about (1) what the
jail and department policies were; (2) what the policy makers actually did, and (3) how the policies caused the medical providers to provide inadequate care, Plaintiff has not stated a claim. For example, he must allege facts raising a plausible inference that the treatment chosen by the individual medical providers, or a detrimental delay in provision of treatment, was not due to the providers’ own independent decisions regarding how to
conservatively treat Plaintiff’s condition, based on their educational training and work experience—because that situation does not equate to deliberate indifference. An official’s erroneous act or omission does not necessarily mean that the entity has a policy encouraging or requiring that act or omission. Plaintiff may be able to amend his Complaint to state additional facts to add the entity after discovery and disclosures.
B. Discussion of Claims against Individual Defendants Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Tom Carter and the Twin Falls County Nurse Practitioner are responsible for the improper medical treatment. The Court will liberally construe the Complaint to state a claim against both Defendants, but Plaintiff will have to amend his Complaint to provide the actual name of the nurse practitioner before the amendment deadline, and he will have to show that Sheriff Carter had supervisory personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation.
4. Conclusion Plaintiff may proceed as outlined above. This Order does not guarantee that any of Plaintiff’s claims will be successful; it merely finds that one or more is colorable, meaning that the claims will not be summarily dismissed at this stage. This Order is not intended to be a final or a comprehensive analysis of Plaintiff’s claims, but it is only a determination
that one or more of Plaintiff’s claims is plausible and should proceed to the next stage of litigation. If, during the course of proceedings, the discovery process reveals facts showing that other defendants were involved in his treatment, he may file an amended complaint with a motion to amend. ORDER
IT IS ORDERED: 1. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis application (Dkt. 1, 8) is GRANTED. 2. Plaintiff may proceed on Eighth Amendment claims against
Defendants Tom Carter and the Twin Falls County Jail Nurse Practitioner. All other claims against all other Defendants are DISMISSED, and the Twin Falls County Jail and Medical Department are TERMINATED as parties to this action. If Plaintiff later discovers facts sufficient to support a claim that has been dismissed, Plaintiff may move to amend the complaint to assert such claims.1 3. Defendants Tom Carter and the Twin Falls County Jail Nurse
Practitioner will be allowed to waive service of summons by executing, or having their counsel execute, the Waiver of Service of Summons as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d) and returning it to the Court within 30 days. If Defendants choose to return the Waiver of Service of Summons, the answer or pre-answer motion will be due in
accordance with Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court will forward a copy of the Complaint (Dkt. 3), a copy of this Order, and a Waiver of Service of Summons to the following counsel: Grant P. Loebs Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney 425 Shoshone St. North Twin Falls, ID 83301.
4. Should any entity determine that the individuals for whom counsel for the entity was served with a waiver are not, in fact, its employees or former employees, or that its attorney will not be appearing for the
1 Any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon or incorporate by reference prior pleadings. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). entity or for particular former employees, it should file a notice within the CM/ECF system, with a copy mailed to Plaintiff, indicating which individuals for whom service will not be waived.
5. If Plaintiff receives a notice from Defendants indicating that service will not be waived for an entity or certain individuals, Plaintiff will have an additional 90 days from the date of such notice to file a notice of physical service addresses of the remaining Defendants, or claims against them will be dismissed without prejudice without further
notice. 6. The parties must follow the deadlines and guidelines in the Standard Disclosure and Discovery Order for Pro Se Prisoner Civil Rights Cases, issued with this Order. 7. Any amended pleadings must be submitted, along with a motion to
amend, within 150 days after entry of this Order. 8. Dispositive motions must be filed no later than 300 days after entry of this Order. 9. Each party must ensure that all documents filed with the Court are simultaneously served upon the opposing party (through counsel if the
party has counsel) by first-class mail or via the CM/ECF system, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5. Each party must sign and attach a proper mailing certificate to each document filed with the court, showing the manner of service, date of service, address of service, and name of person upon whom service was made. 10. The Court will not consider ex parte requests unless a motion may be
heard ex parte according to the rules and the motion is clearly identified as requesting an ex parte order, pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Practice before the United States District Court for the District of Idaho 7.2. (“Ex parte” means that a party has provided a document to the court, but that the party did not provide a copy of the document
to the other party to the litigation.) 11. All Court filings requesting relief or requesting that the Court make a ruling or take an action of any kind must be in the form of a pleading or motion, with an appropriate caption designating the name of the pleading or motion, served on all parties to the litigation, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7, 10 and 11, and Local Rules of Civil Practice before the United States District Court for the District of Idaho 5.1 and 7.1. The Court will not consider requests made in the form of letters. 12. No party may have more than three pending motions before the Court
at one time, and no party may file a motion on a particular subject matter if that party has another motion on the same subject matter currently pending before the Court. Motions submitted in violation of this Order may be stricken, summarily denied, or returned to the moving party unfiled. 13. Plaintiff must notify the Court immediately if Plaintiff's address changes. Failure to do so may be cause for dismissal of this case without further notice. 14. Pursuant to General Order 324, this action is hereby returned to the Clerk of Court for random civil case assignment to a presiding judge, on the proportionate basis previously determined by the District Judges, having given due consideration to the existing caseload.
DATED: August 31, 2022
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INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 10