Houghton v. Dodge

5 Bosw. 326
CourtThe Superior Court of New York City
DecidedNovember 5, 1859
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 5 Bosw. 326 (Houghton v. Dodge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering The Superior Court of New York City primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Houghton v. Dodge, 5 Bosw. 326 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1859).

Opinion

By the Court—Bosworth, Ch. J.

On the evidence presented at the trial, the note in suit must be assumed to be a business note. The evidence tends to show that six, seven or eight hundred dollars of its amount had been received in premiums upon policies issued to the deilndants by the Company. To this extent, at least, it was a valid note in the hands of the Company, without any d.-fense against it. The sale by Mills to Oakes, even though made at a rate of discount exceeding seven cent per atmnrn, would not make the transaction usurious, as the note a vas a business note, made upon a valuable consideration. '

[336]*336Treating the note as not so indorsed that the plaintiff can, by the rules of the common law, sue in his own name, the important question is, did P. J. Avery acquire such a title to it as would enable him to recover upon it upon the evidence before us, if he were the plaintiff in this action ? If he acquired a valid title to the note, he or his vendee can sue in his own name (under the Code) as being the actual party in interest. The 10th of the by-laws authorized the Finance Committee to settle and audit all,accounts and liabilities of the Company.

.■ As early as the 29th of October, 1855, the Finance Committee audited and allowed the claim of P. J. Avery, for his services and expenses in procuring the charter and amendments to it, at $25,000. A formal resolution to that effect, and of that date, signed by the Finance Committee, was entered on the book of the minutes of its proceedings, (at page 105.) That committee was competent to audit and settle this claim, and was the appropriate committee to make a legal decision in respect to it, which, at the least, would be, prima facie, valid as against the Company.

No action was ever taken or initiated by the Board of Trustees to disapprove of this settlement, much less to rescind or reopen it. None has been taken by the Receiver, if a Receiver has been appointed, nor does it appear by the evidence that he makes any claim to the note.

No testimony was given on the present trial with a view to question the propriety or justice, in whole or in part, of any other'item of credit allowed to P. J. Avery in the settlement of the 21st of April, 1856.

If it be assumed, for the purposes of this trial, that the settlement of the 29th of October, 1855, was valid, then it follows, for aught that has been shown, that the final settlement of the 21st of April, 1856, was just as between Avery and the Company.

At and prior to that time, Avery was possessed of the note in suit, and the fact of such possession, and the manner in which he acquired the note, and his refusal to restore it to the Company, constituted part of their claim against him.

There was not any transfer made or attempted to be made in form by the Finance Committee of the note in suit, and the eight other notes of which Avery had previously possessed himself, [337]*337and which he insisted upon retaining. In the account with him, as settled on the 21st of April, 1856, they are charged to him under the date of October 81, 1855. It is not an unnatural inference that he had them as early as that date, if not prior thereto. Indeed, the testimony of Mr. Marsh tends to show that Avery had the note at as early a day as that on which it is charged to him.

An action could have been maintained against him for the conversion of these nine notes, or to recover the possession of them. The liability of P. J. Avery for these notes constituted a part of the claim of the Company against him.

On the 21st of April, 1856, all claims, either of Avery against the Company, or of the Company against him, were fully and finally settled. Many of the Trustees were parties to discussions in relation to it, and knew at the time of the terms of the settlement. The settlement was laid before the Board in May, but at how early a day does not appear. Whatever the date, the Trustees, as a Board, were then officially informed of the fact of the settlement and of its details. As a part of the terms of the settlement, P. J. Avery gave his .note, payable thirty days thereafter, to the Company, as, and it was received by the officers acting in its behalf in that matter, “ in full satisfaction and discharge of all and every claim of every name, nature and description, on the part or behalf of the International Insurance Company against the said Perez J. Avery.” This note was for the sum of $4,361.

' Subsequently to this, “ the Company used the. note which Avery gave .for the balance of the account They paid it to the Globe Insurance Company in payment of a debt which they’ owed to the Globe Company.” There was no attempt to prove that this note was not paid at maturity. It matured on the 24th of May, 1856.

Such a use of this note by the u International Insurance Companjq” with a knowledge of the circumstances and agreement under which Avery had given it, and the officers of the Company had accepted it, was a ratification by the Company of the settlement made with Avery on the 21st of April, 1856.

The note thereby became his property, if not previously his. The Company could not compel him to surrender it; certainly’ [338]*338not without restoring him to the position he was in when the settlement was made.

Proof, uncontradicted and unexplained, that “the Company used the note which Avery gave for the balance of the account that “they paid it to the Globe Insurance Company, in payment of a debt which they owed to the Globe Company,” imports that such transfer was made in a manner authorized by law and the charter and by-laws of the Company. The amount of the note so transferred is $4,361. If a previous resolution of the Board of Directors was essential to a legal and valid transfer of it, the passage of such a resolution authorizing the transfer must be presumed upon such evidence as is above stated.. If the Board of Directors passed such a resolution, then, inasmuch as it appears that some of the Directors knew for what the note was given at the time it was- made, and considering the evidence tending to show that all of them probably knew the nature and particulars of the settlement made with Avery, the act of the Company in transferring the note is such a ratification of such settlement that these defendants- cannot succeed on the mere ground that it was a. nullity as between Avery and the Company. As the case is now presented, that is their only defense; and if that defense is not established, they have no defense.

It must be borne in mind- that no- evidence wa§ given tending to show that any person has preferred any claim against the defendants as makers of the note in question, and that their whole and only defense is that the note in suit “ was taken from* the International Insurance Company by the unauthorized act of one of the officers thereof, who converted the same to his own use, and that the property therein has never passed to* the plaintiff or to any other person.”

The evidence given not only fails to establish the alleged fact on which the defense is rested, but, on the contrary, it proves am ownership of the note by Avery on the 21st of April, 185-6, prima facie valid.

A suit, instituted by the Receiver of the International Insurance Company, on the 31st of October, 1856, (the time this suit was brought,) to recover the possession of this note from Avery, (if he had then held it,) on the ground that it belonged to the Company, could not be maintained on the evidence given

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Dabney v. Stevens
10 Abb. Pr. 39 (The Superior Court of New York City, 1870)
Younker ex rel. Ralston v. Martin
18 Iowa 143 (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1864)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
5 Bosw. 326, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/houghton-v-dodge-nysuperctnyc-1859.