Hotel Representative, Inc. v. International Conference Center, Inc.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Hotel Representative, Inc. v. International Conference Center, Inc.

53 A.D.2d 530, 384 N.Y.S.2d 181, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13129

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 8, 1976

StatusPublished

This text of 53 A.D.2d 530 (Hotel Representative, Inc. v. International Conference Center, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hotel Representative, Inc. v. International Conference Center, Inc., 53 A.D.2d 530, 384 N.Y.S.2d 181, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13129 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1976).

Pincite

Opinion

Order granting plaintiff-respondent’s motion for summary judgment, and judgment thereon, Supreme Court, New York County, entered, respectively, on July 22 and August 28, 1975, in favor of plaintiff-respondent against defendant-appellant Arlington Carpet Co., Inc., unanimously modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, as hereinafter set forth, and otherwise affirmed, with $60 costs and disbursements to plaintiff-respondent against defendant-appellant. Plaintiff Hotel Representative, Inc., is, as its name indicates, the agent for numerous European hotels. It entered into negotiations with defaulting defendant International Conference Center, Inc., in behalf of its client, defendant-appellant Arlington Carpet Co., Inc., for a vacation trip, sponsored as a promotional incentive, for 300 retail sellers of Arlington’s products. Being dissatisfied with International Conference’s credit performance, Hotel Representative insisted upon cash or its equivalent, or Arlington’s guarantee. The latter was furnished and is sued on. It is noted that, as disclosed principal, Arlington was under a primary obligation in addition to that under the guarantee. The claim of duress in the obtaining of the guarantee is not well founded for plaintiff’s insistence on direct payment was contractually based. Indeed, Arlington, disregarding plaintiff’s advice not to do so, paid International Conference directly, the money not being turned over to Hotel Representative. Plaintiff is entitled to the judgment obtained, and Arlington must look to International Conference for refund. Indeed, it has a pending cross claim against International Conference for this money. The cross claim, together with a separate Nassau County action by International Conference against Arlington based on the duress claim, heretofore consolidated with this action, are directed to be severed from this action and remanded for further proceedings. Concur— Stevens, P. J., Markewich, Birns, Silverman and Nunez, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order granting plaintiff-respondent’s motion for summary judgment, and judgment thereon, Supreme Court, New York County, entered, respectively, on July 22 and August 28, 1975, in favor of plaintiff-respondent against defendant-appellant Arlington Carpet Co., Inc., unanimously modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, as hereinafter set forth, and otherwise affirmed, with $60 costs and disbursements to plaintiff-respondent against defendant-appellant. Plaintiff Hotel Representative, Inc., is, as its name indicates, the agent for numerous European hotels. It entered into negotiations with defaulting defendant International Conference Center, Inc., in behalf of its client, defendant-appellant Arlington Carpet Co., Inc., for a vacation trip, sponsored as a promotional incentive, for 300 retail sellers of Arlington’s products. Being dissatisfied with International Conference’s credit performance, Hotel Representative insisted upon cash or its equivalent, or Arlington’s guarantee. The latter was furnished and is sued on. It is noted that, as disclosed principal, Arlington was under a primary obligation in addition to that under the guarantee. The claim of duress in the obtaining of the guarantee is not well founded for plaintiff’s insistence on direct payment was contractually based. Indeed, Arlington, disregarding plaintiff’s advice not to do so, paid International Conference directly, the money not being turned over to Hotel Representative. Plaintiff is entitled to the judgment obtained, and Arlington must look to International Conference for refund. Indeed, it has a pending cross claim against International Conference for this money. The cross claim, together with a separate Nassau County action by International Conference against Arlington based on the duress claim, heretofore consolidated with this action, are directed to be severed from this action and remanded for further proceedings. Concur— Stevens, P. J., Markewich, Birns, Silverman and Nunez, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

53 A.D.2d 530, 384 N.Y.S.2d 181, 1976 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13129, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hotel-representative-inc-v-international-conference-center-inc-nyappdiv-1976.