Hot-Rock Haulers, LLC, d/b/a AJ Transport v. Craig Kegley

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: March 4, 2025
• Docket: 2022232
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED

Present: Judges Huff,* Causey and White Argued at Richmond, Virginia

HOT-ROCK HAULERS, LLC, d/b/a AJ TRANSPORT, ET AL. MEMORANDUM OPINION** BY v. Record No. 2022-23-2 JUDGE DORIS HENDERSON CAUSEY MARCH 4, 2025 CRAIG KEGLEY

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

John S. Stacy, II (C. Stephen Setliff; Setliff Law, P.C., on briefs), for appellants.

Christian Kline (Injured Workers Law Firm, on brief), for appellee.

In an appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Commission (“WCC”), Hot-Rock Haulers

LLC, doing business as AJ Transport, contests the Commission’s ruling that injuries sustained by

appellee Craig Kegley arose from his employment. On March 22, 2022, Kegley, a commercial

truck driver employed by Hot-Rock Haulers, while hauling a load for delivery was assaulted in the

course of his employment, sustaining injuries. Kegley made an initial claim for benefits with the

WCC, which was denied. The deputy commissioner found that while Kegley’s injuries were

sustained during his employment, the attack was personal and not recoverable as a workplace

injury. Kegley appealed. The full WCC reversed, finding that Kegley sustained his injuries

because of his employment. On appeal, Hot-Rock alleges the WCC erred, (1) in determining that

the incident and injury complained of arose in the course of Kegley’s employment because the

* Judge Huff participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on December 31, 2024. ** This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). altercation and resulting injuries were unrelated to Kegley’s employment, were personal to Kegley,

and cannot be fairly traced back to his employment as a contributing or proximate cause; and (2) in

determining that the “arising out of” prong of compensability was satisfied when it determined,

contrary to the deputy commissioner’s correct application of the law, that the subject incident rose

to the level of a “risk peculiar to the claimant’s employment as a truck driver” and “impersonal

circumstances directly attributable to the duties of his employment.” Finding no reversible error,

this Court affirms the decision of the WCC.

BACKGROUND

On March 22, 2022, Craig Kegley, while fulfilling his duties as a truck driver for Hot-Rock

Haulers, was operating a tractor trailer westbound on Route 58 near Suffolk, Virginia, when he

came upon a construction zone, which had momentarily closed the right lane of travel. With the

closure of the right lane, Kegley moved to the left lane until the right lane had reopened, at which

time, he moved back to the right lane. Further down the road, Kegley moved—again—from the

right lane to the left to avoid a cement truck parked in the right lane. As Kegley continued down the

highway, a vehicle in the left lane pulled up next to him. This vehicle had men hanging out the side

of it, motioning for Kegley to pull his tractor trailer over because, at some point in maneuvering

between lanes, Kegley had allegedly hit their vehicle. Kegley testified that the particular load he

was hauling made visibility limited. The men in the vehicle continued screaming at Kegley to pull

over, eventually pulling in front of Kegley and cutting him off. The men in the car stopped in front

of Kegley’s truck, forcing him to stop on the highway. After Kegley stopped the truck, he exited

the cab to begin assessing the accident and initiate incident protocols, per company policy. Kegley

testified that once he was out of his truck, he saw the occupants of the other vehicle exit their car,

wielding a pipe. Kegley testified that the driver of the vehicle attempted to hit him, but Kegley

walked away from the men, going back in his truck to continue with incident protocol. Kegley

-2- again exited the truck to continue incident protocols, at which time he was attacked and beaten by

three assailants from the other vehicle and left on the side of the highway. Kegley testified that he

believed these people attacked him because they thought he had hit their car.

Officer Childs of the Suffolk Police Department responded to the scene following the

assault. Childs testified in his report that Kegley was in shock and very disoriented, had blood on

his clothing, and was going in and out of consciousness. Kegley was transported to Norfolk

General Hospital for treatment. Officer Childs also noted in his report that, prior to his encounter

with Kegley, “911 dispatch had received a call from a male citizen who refused to cooperate with

dispatch stating that their vehicle was just struck by another vehicle matching the vehicle of

Kegley’s truck and they were following the vehicle.” Kegley subsequently filed a workers’

compensation claim, stemming from this incident and his injuries.

During his initial hearing with a deputy commissioner, Kegley testified that he was assaulted

by three men who claimed that he struck their vehicle with the tractor trailer he was driving. Even

finding Kegley credible, the deputy commissioner ruled for Hot-Rock, concluding that, “the proven

facts [we]re insufficient to establish a compensable accident.” Finding for Hot-Rock, the deputy

commissioner reasoned, “[t]he evidence demonstrate[d] that Kegley’s assailants attacked him

because of his operation of a motor vehicle that was associated with his employment . . . there [wa]s

no evidence that the assailants attacked Kegley because of his employment.” Essentially, the

commissioner found that Kegley was the victim of a road rage incident, that the attack he suffered

was too far removed from the scope of his employment, and that the attack was personal rather than

having any nexus with Hot-Rock. Kegley appealed this decision to the full Commission where it

was reversed and remanded, with the full Commission finding that the attack was not personal, but

rather directed at Kegley because of his employment. Upon remand and another appeal to the full

Commission, a final order was entered in Kegley’s favor. This appeal follows.

-3- ANALYSIS

A workers’ compensation injury is defined in Code § 65.2-101 as, “only injury by

accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.” “Whether an injury arises out of

the employment is a mixed question of law and fact and is reviewable by the appellate court.”

Plumb Rite Plumbing Service v. Barbour, 8 Va. App. 482, 483 (1989) (quoting Park Oil v.

Parham, 1 Va. App. 166, 168 (1985)).

“The Commission’s findings of fact ‘are conclusive and binding on appeal’ provided that

there is credible evidence to support those findings.” City of Charlottesville v. Sclafani, 300 Va.

212, 222-23 (2021) (first quoting Carrington v. Aquatic Co., 297 Va. 520, 522 (2019); and then

citing Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Kremposky, 227 Va. 265, 269 (1984)). “[B]ut when there is

‘no conflict in the evidence, the question of the sufficiency thereof is one of law,’ and the same is

true when there is no credible evidence to support the Commission’s factual findings.”

Kremposky, 227 Va. at 269 (first quoting City of Norfolk v. Bennett, 205 Va. 877, 880 (1965);

and then citing Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 207 (1962)).

“[W]e review the Commission’s determinations of law de novo.” Medical Mgmt. Int’l &

Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Jeffry, 75 Va. App. 679, 684 (2022) (citing Roske v. Culbertson

Co., 62 Va. App. 512, 517 (2013)). “The [C]ommission’s construction of the [Workers’

Compensation] Act is entitled to great weight on appeal.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting

Wiggins v. Fairfax Park Ltd. P’ship, 22 Va. App. 432, 441 (1996)). “Yet we are ‘not bound by

the [C]ommission’s legal analysis in this or prior cases.’” Id. at 685 (alteration in original)

(quoting Peacock v. Browning Ferris, Inc., 38 Va. App. 241, 248 (2002)).

In determining if a workplace injury arises out of employment, Virginia follows the

“actual risk” test, requiring that “the employment subject the employee to the particular danger

that brought about his or her injury.” Lipsey v. Case, 248 Va. 59, 61 (1994); see, e.g., Hill City

-4- Trucking, Inc. v. Christian, 238 Va. 735, 739 (1989); Park Oil Co., 1 Va. App. at 169.

“Consequently, an accident arises out of the employment when it is apparent to a rational mind,

under all attending circumstances, that a causal connection exists between the conditions under

which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.” Lipsey, 248 Va. at 61; see,

e.g., R & T Investments, Ltd. v. Johns, 228 Va. 249, 252 (1984); Marketing Profiles, Inc. v. Hill,

17 Va. App. 431, 434 (1993).

On appeal, Hot-Rock argues that the original commissioner was correct in their initial

finding that the injuries sustained by Kegley did not arise out of his employment but were caused

by a personal altercation between Kegley and his attackers. Citing to Carr v. City of Norfolk, 15

Va. App. 266, 269 (1992), and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Hazelwood, 249 Va. 369, 373

(1995), Hot-Rock also argues that if an attack is motivated purely by personal reasons, then an

employee cannot recover from resulting injuries by the Workers’ Compensation Act. To support

this argument, Hot-Rock distinguishes the present case from that which the Commission chiefly

relied on in their finding for Kegley—Smithfield Packing Co. v. Carlton, 29 Va. App. 176

(1999).

In Carlton, claimant was a tractor trailer operator who was injured by a motorcyclist who

was aggrieved by supposedly negligent conduct of the driver. The driver of the tractor trailer

was forced off the roadway by the motorcyclist, and upon exiting the tractor trailer to inspect the

accident—according to company protocol—the motorcyclist assaulted and injured the driver. 29

Va. App. at 179-80. The Commission awarded benefits to the driver as a result of his injuries,

finding that the accident arose from his employment and that the claim was not barred by willful

misconduct. Id. at 180. This Court held that the motorcyclist’s injurious attack was triggered by

the claimant’s driving, which resulted from impersonal circumstances directly attributable to his

employment duties, thus satisfying the “arising out of” prong of compensability. Id. at 181-82.

-5- Here, Hot-Rock argues the case at bar is distinguishable from Carlton because, (1) the

nature of the accident could have happened to anyone on the road, not necessarily a truck driver;

(2) Kegley struck the assailants’ vehicle whereas in Carlton, the assailant’s motorcycle was only

nearly struck, thus making the confrontation here more personal and serious; and (3) Carlton was

seeking benefits for injuries caused by equipment (truck rolling over his foot), where Kegley

seeks benefits for injuries caused by his assailants. We disagree and affirm the decision of the

WCC.

Here, the Commission correctly ruled that Carlton is controlling in the case at bar.

Factual findings by the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission which are supported by

credible evidence are conclusive and binding upon the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Southern

Iron Works, Inc. v. Wallace, 16 Va. App. 131, 134 (1993). “If there is evidence, or reasonable

inferences can be drawn from the evidence, to support the Commission’s findings, they will not

be disturbed on review, even though there is evidence in the record to support a contrary

finding.” Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int’l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279 (1986). Not only

was the attack on Kegley related to his employment because it was through his employment that

he was ever interacting with Hot-Rock, but also because the assault occurred (1) while driving

the tractor trailer within the scope of employment, (2) while he was completing an incident

report as required within the scope of his employment, and (3) because the assailants believed

that Kegley, as an employee of Hot-Rock, hit their vehicle.

In Carlton, the attack was triggered by the claimant’s driving of the tractor trailer, which

was characterized by the court as “impersonal circumstances directly attributable to the duties of

his employment and clearly satisfying the ‘arising out of’ prong of compensability.” 29

Va. App. at 181-82. Similarly, here, the attack was triggered by the claimant’s driving of the

tractor trailer in accordance with his employment with Hot-Rock. Kegley testified that he wasn’t

-6- even sure if he had hit the assailants’ vehicle because the nature of the load he was carrying in

the tractor trailer made visibility difficult. Kegley’s job is to drive the truck and move the goods

required by his employer, and in Virginia, “[a]n accident arises out of the employment if there is

a causal connection between the claimant’s injury and the conditions under which the employer

requires the work to be performed.” R & T Investments, Ltd., 228 Va. at 252. To successfully

recover for an assault a claimant must show “that the assault was directed against him as an

employee, or because of his employment.” Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Gough, 161 Va. 755, 760

(1934); see Reamer v. Nat’l Serv. Indus., 237 Va. 466, 470 (1989); Park Oil Co., 1 Va. App. at

170. “[A] showing that the probability of assault was augmented . . . because of the peculiar

character of the claimant’s job” supplies the requisite causal connection. R & T Investments,

Ltd., 228 Va. at 253 (citation omitted); Roberson v. Whetsell, 21 Va. App. 268, 271 (1995); see

Reamer, 237 Va. at 470 (“A physical assault may constitute an ‘accident’ . . . when it appears

that it was a result of an actual risk arising out of employment.”). Thus, the nature of the

accident that caused the assault was a circumstance born of Kegley’s employment, and the anger

directed at Kegley as he was beaten by the assailants was anger about the Hot-Rock tractor trailer

hitting their vehicle, not Kegley in any personal capacity.

In Carlton, the assailant was angry because he was almost run over by the truck the

claimant was driving, but there was no evidence that the assailant or claimant knew each other,

and additionally that the claimant was not the aggressor. 29 Va. App. at 180. Here, the

assailants were clearly upset about the truck hitting their vehicle—not Kegley in any personal

capacity—as evidenced by their 911 call where they reported that they had been hit by the tractor

trailer. There was no evidence in the record to indicate that Kegley or the assailants knew each

other, and thus nothing to suggest that the beating and incident rose from anything other than the

incident arising out of Kegley’s employment with Hot-Rock.

-7- From the record, there is “apparent to a rational mind, under all attending circumstances,

that a causal connection exists between the conditions under which the work is required to be

performed [Kegley’s operation of his tractor trailer] and the resulting injury [Kegley being

beaten by the men who were involved in the motor vehicle accident].” Lipsey, 248 Va. at 61.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation

Commission.

Affirmed.

-8-