Hoskins v. Werlich

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Illinois
DecidedSeptember 9, 2021
Docket3:19-cv-01130
StatusUnknown

This text of Hoskins v. Werlich (Hoskins v. Werlich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hoskins v. Werlich, (S.D. Ill. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SHANE HOSKINS, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) vs. ) Case No. 19-CV-1130-SMY ) ERIC WILLIAMS, ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge: Petitioner Shane Hoskins filed the instant habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the constitutionality of his confinement.1 Citing United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) and other decisions, Hoskins argues that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unconstitutional and that he is entitled to relief. Now pending before the Court is Respondent Eric Williams’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12). Hoskins filed a response in opposition (Doc. 14). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. Background Hoskins was convicted on December 8, 2004 of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), distribution of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and tampering with a witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). United States v. Hoskins, 9:04-cr-035 (D. Mont.), Doc. 180. He was sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment followed by supervised release for life. Id. Docs.

1 Petitioner filed this case while he was incarcerated at FCI Greenville. He has since been released from prison and resides in Anaconda, Montana. 229 and 236; United States v. Hoskins, 364 F.Supp.2d 1214 (D. Mont. 2005). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Hoskins, 164 Fed.Appx. 602 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1172 (2006). His motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was denied on November 20, 2008, United States v. Hoskins, 2008 WL 11452353 (D. Mont. 2008). On June 23, 2016, Hoskins filed an application for an order authorizing a district court to

consider a second or successive motion under § 2255. United States v. Hoskins, 16-72049 (9th Circ. 2016). He argued for relief pursuant to Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2016) and Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied his application. United States v. Hoskins, 16-72049 (9th Circ. 2016), Doc. 2. In his § 2241 Petition in this case (Doc. 1), Hoskins argues that § 2241 is the correct vehicle for pursuing his claim under § 2255(e)’s savings clause and the test articulated in In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998). Discussion Generally, petitions for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 may not be employed

to raise claims of legal error in conviction or sentencing; they may only challenge the execution of a sentence. See Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, aside from the direct appeal process, a prisoner who has been convicted in federal court is ordinarily limited to challenging his conviction and sentence by bringing a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court which sentenced him. See Kramer v. Olson, 347 F.3d 214, 217 (7th Cir. 2003). Additionally, he may not file a “second or successive” § 2255 motion unless a panel of the appropriate court of appeals certifies that such motion contains either 1) newly discovered evidence “sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense,” or 2) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Under very limited circumstances, a prisoner may challenge his federal conviction or sentence under § 2241. Specifically, § 2255(e) contains a “savings clause” (also referred to as the “safety-valve” clause, see Reynolds v. United States, Case No. 18-cv-691 (M.D. Pa., Doc. 5, April

4, 2018)) which authorizes a federal prisoner to file a § 2241 petition where the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). See United States v. Prevatte, 300 F.3d 792, 798-99 (7th Cir. 2002). The fact that Hoskins was barred from bringing a successive § 2255 petition does not render it an inadequate remedy. Davenport, 147 at 609-10 (§ 2255 limitation on filing successive motions does not render it an inadequate remedy for a prisoner who had filed a prior § 2255 motion). Rather, under § 2241, a petitioner must demonstrate the inability of a § 2255 motion to cure the defect in the conviction, because of a structural problem inherent in § 2255. See Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015). “A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly

termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.” Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. Following Davenport and its progeny, the Seventh Circuit has articulated a three-part test for determining whether § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective so as to trigger the savings clause: • The federal prisoner must seek relief based on a decision of statutory interpretation (as opposed to a decision of constitutional interpretation, which the inmate could raise in a second or successive § 2255 motion);

• The statutory rule of law in question must apply retroactively to cases on collateral review and could not have been invoked in a first § 2255 motion; and • A failure to afford the prisoner collateral relief would amount to an error “grave enough” to constitute “a miscarriage of justice.”

Worman v. Entzel, 953 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2020) (emphasis in original) (citing Montana v. Cross, 829 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2016); Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019)). Hoskin’s Petition fails to satisfy the first condition – Davis is not a decision of statutory interpretation; it considered a constitutional issue which could be raised in a successive § 2255 motion. Id.

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