RAPER, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court, in which GUTHRIE, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined. GUTHRIE, C. J., filed a separate concurring opinion. ROSE, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which McCLINTOCK, J., joined.
The appellant-defendant was tried before a jury on a charge of grand larceny. He was found guilty and sentenced. Amongst the instructions given by the trial judge before the jury’s retirement to deliberate was the following:
“In order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto. The jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to your individual judgments. Each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations a juror should not hesitate to [344]*344reexamine his or her own views and change his or her opinion if convinced that it is erroneous. No juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the right or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his or her fellow juror, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. However, in the course of your deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to examine his or her own views and change his or her opinion if convinced that it is erroneous.”
After the jury retired and had been out for about six hours, they sent a note to the trial judge, “We cannot reach a verdict due to lack of evidence.” While the transcript of trial proceedings does not show exactly what occurred immediately following receipt of the note nor the presence of all trial counsel, in an appendix to the State’s brief, appears the affidavit of Ms. Nena R. Stafford,1 stating that she was present during the entire trial, that regular trial counsel for the defendant, following closing argument, asked her to stand by and appear as counsel for defendant during jury deliberation and their decision, because he was returning to Rawlins, that she was present in chambers when the court was advised of the jury problem and present when the court discussed the matter with them. This will be examined later in this opinion, with other circumstances in that connection.
The trial judge then gave the following instruction to the jury:
“Ladies and gentlemen, it is our understanding that you are having difficulty reaching an agreement. As you know, this is an important case to the defendant and the State. This trial has been expensive even though short. If you fail or are unable to agree, of course, there will be the necessity of choosing another jury, twelve people, no more intelligent than you are, no more impartial, or no more competent. They have [sic] the same responsibility, under the same oath, who [sic] would hear the evidence with the same attention with an equal desire to arrive at the truth.
“You have already been instructed that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto. The jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to your individual judgments. Each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations a juror should not hesitate to re-examine his or her own views and change his or her opinion if convinced that it is erroneous. However, no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his or her fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. The Court requests you to deliberate further in an atmosphere of mutual deference and respect, giving due consideration to the views of your fellow jurors in the knowledge that your verdict must reflect the views of all.
“Your attention is specifically called to all of the other instructions given to you in this case, including those relating to [345]*345the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the requirement that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the instruction I have just given you is to he considered with all other instructions in this case.
“You have commented that to this point you feel there is a lack of evidence. There is evidence. Please reconsider the evidence in this case. We stand in recess.”
No objection to this instruction appears in the record to have been made before given nor at any time before the jury returned its verdict.
The appellant assigns several errors in the following order and language:
1.“Whether supplemental instructions given by a trial judge, pursuant to notification by a jury that it is unable to reach a verdict because of a lack of evidence, constitute a deprivation of the accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial by jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution when such instructions :
a. “are not given with the original jury instructions but are instead given after the jury has entered into deliberation;
b. “are not reduced to writing in violation of Rules 312 of the W.R.Cr.P. and 51 3 of the W.R.C.P.; and
c. “are given to the jury in the absence of the accused’s counsel in violation of Wyo.Stat., 7-9.2 4
2. “Whether a comment by a trial judge to a jury that ‘[tjhere is evidence,’ incorporated into the Court’s supplemental instruction to the jury, constitutes a prejudicial invasion of the province of the jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.
3. “Whether the failure to make a timely objection to prejudicial and erroneous supplemental jury instruction will bar appellate review, where the instructions [346]*346have impaired the accused’s rights to a fair and impartial trial.”
No error relating to the guilt or innocence of the defendant is assigned.
The 1968 Approved Draft of the American Bar Association of Standards Relating to Trial by Jury provides at page 145, as follows:
“5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury-
“(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs the jury:
“(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto;
“(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment;
“(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors;
“(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
“(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
“(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
“(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.”
That standard, which we approve, does not require any particular language but identifies the significant points to be covered. The instruction given by the trial judge along with all other instructions in the case, at the close of all the evidence, is consistent with that high standard ;5 in fact, his instruction used the very language of the standard.6
This court has approved such a type of instruction being given along with other instructions delivered at the close of the evidence. Alcala v. State, Wyo.1971, 487 P.2d 448, 461, cert.den. 405 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 1259, 31 L.Ed.2d 466, reh.den. 406 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 1613, 31 L.Ed.2d 823; Elmer v. State, Wyo. 1969, 463 P.2d 14, 21, cert.den. 400 U.S. 845, 91 S.Ct. 90, 27 L.Ed.2d 82. The defendant does not complain about the instruction being given along with all other instructions. His claimed [347]*347error is that after it appeared that the jury-might be deadlocked, the trial judge not only repeated the essence, if not the exact text, of his initial instruction but included the following language:
“ * * * As you know, this is an important case to the defendant and the State. This trial has been expensive even though short. If you fail or are unable to agree, of course, there will be the necessity of choosing another jury, twelve people, no more intelligent than you are, no more impartial, or no more competent. They have [sic] the same responsibility, under the same oath, who [sic] would hear the evidence with the same attention with an equal desire to arrive at the truth.
“ * * * The Court requests you to deliberate further in an atmosphere of mutual deference and respect, giving due consideration to the views of your fellow jurors in the knowledge that your verdict must reflect the views of all.”
The first quoted portion of the additional language is what are substantially the same words as included in an instruction given in Alcala, supra, and approved by this court. It should be noted that Standard 5.4(b) provides that not only may the trial judge send the jury back for further deliberations but “may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a).” (Emphasis added.)7 Defendant complains that the timing and additional language are coercive. We accept the legal proposition that an instruction given at a time when it appears a jury may be deadlocked, referred to as an Allen type,8 must not have a coercive impact upon the jury-
Communications from a judge to a jury are coercive when they possess the substantial propensity for prying minority [348]*348jurors loose from beliefs they honestly have, constitute an undue intrusion into the jury’s province and dilute the requirement of unanimity. United States v. Thomas, 1971, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 449 F.2d 1177. In that case the jury was told by the trial judge that the court had a substantial backlog and “to spend another day before another jury retrying this case just doesn’t make sense to me.” That language was by the court considered coercive. In Goff v. United States, 10 Cir. 1971, 446 F.2d 623, it was held to be reversible error, as coercive, to admonish the jury that if it could not reach a verdict within the next hour or so, the court would have to declare a mistrial and set the case down for hearing again. A court cannot set a time fuse on the period of jury deliberation.
We do not have the same situation here as in Jenkins v. United States, 1965, 380 U.S. 445, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957, upon which defendant relies, where slightly more than two hours after the jury retired to deliberate, the jury sent a note to the trial judge advising that it had been unable to agree upon a verdict “ ‘on both counts because of insufficient evidence.’ ” The judge thereupon recalled the jury to the courtroom and in the course of his response, stated that, “You have got to reach a decision in this case.” The Supreme Court of the United States decided that under that direction of the trial judge, the jurors were coerced into surrendering views conscientiously held.
The trial judge here with good judgment gave balance to his supplemental instruction dispatching the jury back to their quarters for further deliberations. He never for a moment let them forget that, “your verdict must reflect the views of all.” His statement about the expense of the trial and trial by another jury no more intelligent, impartial, competent or in greater quest of the truth, was no more than a reminder of a fact of litigation and only an extension of what he had said in his first instruction and was not coercive. The defendant has plucked out this latter language and attempts to condemn it.
Instructions must be considered as a whole and not according to isolated phrases and paragraphs. State v. Jackson, 1955, 75 Wyo. 13, 291 P.2d 798; Loy v. State, 1919, 26 Wyo. 381, 185 P. 796; Flanders v. State, 1916, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 P. 39, reh. den. 156 P. 1121; State v. McClanahan, 1973, 212 Kan. 208, 510 P.2d 153; State v. Radabaugh, 1970, 93 Idaho 727, 471 P.2d 582; Franano v. United States, 8 Cir. 1962, 310 F.2d 533, cert. den. 373 U.S. 940, 83 S.Ct. 1545, 10 L.Ed.2d 694. In United States v. Wheeler, 10 Cir. 1971, 444 F.2d 385, it was said, “In determining the propriety of a supplemental instruction given the jury, the instructions have to be considered as a whole and the supplemental instruction examined in the light of the other instructions previously given.”
A statement in an instruction to a deadlocked jury that the jury sitting is as competent as another is not coercive language in a supplemental instruction. Kelley v. State, 1971, 51 Wis.2d 641, 187 N.W. 2d 810. The trial judge’s statement in Fulwood v. United States, 1966, 125 U.S.App. D.C. 183, 369 F.2d 960, cert. den. 387 U.S. 934, 87 S.Ct. 2058, 18 L.Ed.2d 996, that some jury sometime would have the duty to decide the case was held not to be coercive. The words, “this case must at some time be decided,” as part of a supplemental instruction otherwise neutral and non-coercive, were approved in State v. Maupin, 1975, 42 Ohio St.2d 473, 330 N.E.2d 708.
We find no error in the manner, words and timing used in reminding the jury of its role. We fail to see how the part of the instruction we have discussed to this point was prejudicial to the defendant.
The next issue we must consider is whether the comment of the judge with respect to the evidence was prejudicial and [349]*349an invasion of the province of the jury. Just what did he say:
“You have commented to this point you feel there is a lack of evidence. There is evidence. Please reconsider the evidence in this case. * * * ”
Section 1-132, W.S.1957, provides specifically that if a jury disagree, it “must be sent out again for further deliberation.” Section 1-129, W.S.1957, provides that the jury may be discharged “after the jurors have been kept together until it satisfactorily appears that there is no probability of their agreeing.” Section 1-128, W.S.1957, provides that after the jurors have retired “if there be a disagreement between them as to any part of the testimony, * * * the court may give its recollection as to the testimony on the points in dispute.” The exact language in the jury note sent to the trial judge states, “We cannot reach a verdict * * Those words indicate and express disagreement. The court had instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. Apparently, there was not unanimity or there would have been a verdict of guilty or not guilty returned. A deadlock situation was registered.
As we read his instruction, he did no more than send them to reconsider the testimony, which is evidence. He could have refreshed the memory of the jurors under the statute but the statute is not mandatory. The court may decline to refresh the collective memory of the jury and his not doing so is not ground for reversal except in a case where it is clear that an injustice had been done. State v. Riggle, 1956, 76 Wyo. 1, 57, 298 P.2d 349, 371, reh. den. 300 P.2d 567, cert. den. 352 U.S. 981, 77 S.Ct. 384, 1 L.Ed.2d 366. There was evidence — as we examine the record, we find 121 pages of testimony. The court merely asked the jury to reconsider that testimony, neither slanting his comment for or against guilt. It should be noted that the trial judge, in repeating his initial instruction, stated that each juror should give the evidence “impartial consideration.” It is inconceivable how that may be considered prejudicial. If the trial judge may refresh the jury’s memory, he certainly may make the less nocuous observation that there is evidence.
We find nothing in Rule 31, W.R.Cr.P., or Rule 51, W.R.C.P.,9 which requires instructions given to a jury after its retirement under circumstances such as in this case to be reduced to writing and sent to the jury .room. The rules refer only to those instructions given, “Before the argument of the case to the jury is begun.” The giving of oral instructions, even if contrary to a rule or statute is not reversible error if the instructions are proper and do not injure the accused, especially where taken down by the court reporter or reduced to writing for the record after they are given. The main purpose in reducing instructions to writing is to give the defendant the exact language of the court in order that he may appropriately object and avail himself of any error but failure to do so may not be made a weapon of error. State v. Carroll, 1937, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542. We hold that there is no requirement that instructions given by the court, following a report by the jury that it is in disagreement, be reduced to writing and sent to the jury room; such instructions given, however, must appear in the record.
We now must consider whether the instruction was given in the absence of the defendant’s counsel. The only troublesome problem in that regard is the deficient condition of the record. We take judicial notice of the fact that C. L. Bates, defendant’s trial attorney, is now deceased. See Wyoming Bar Proceedings, Report of the Necrology Committee, Wyoming State Bar, XI Land and Water Law Review 333. The trial judge failed to dictate into the record the circumstances of how the note [350]*350from the jury was delivered to him, what counsel were present and what transpired up to the point the court reporter picked up the record when the trial judge further instructed the jury in response to the note. The court reporter even at that point failed to record who was present when the court convened for the purpose of addressing the jury in response to its note.
Counsel for the defendant on appeal disclaims any knowledge of what took place during this blank space in the record. The county attorney was present at the time of oral argument to this court and confirmed the facts related in Ms. Stafford’s affidavit set out in footnote 1 of this opinion. Any absence of counsel was not objected to in the trial court and not raised in Mr. Bates’ motion for a new trial. We could probably infer that counsel was present but that is no way to approach the question when a regular procedure for implementing the record is provided by rule.
We wonder why the Attorney General failed to correct the record in the manner provided by Rule 75(d), W.R.C.P.:
“If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the district court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated therein, the parties, by stipulation, or the district court, either before or after the record is transmitted to the supreme court, or the supreme court, on proper suggestion or of its own initiative, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected, and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. All other questions as to the form and content of the record shall be presented to the supreme court.”
No question is raised by appellant that defendant was not present at all stages of the trial proceedings, so we need not consider that matter. Because of the inadequacy of the record and the improper method of its implementation, we are assuming, arguendo, that defendant was not represented by counsel at the time the supplemental instruction was given to the jury and that there was technical error. That a defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel at all stages of the proceeding is without question.
Following trial, Mr; Bates filed a motion for new trial, challenging the court’s supplemental instruction.10 The county and prosecuting attorney did not question that the objections to the instruction were tardy nor did the trial judge on his own motion declare any objections to the instruction untimely, but apparently sensing some irregularity, he considered them on their merits and wrote a five-page opinion in defense of his supplemental instruction. We hold that the State has waived any objection to the failure of counsel to object to the instruction, either before or immediately after it was given. Under the circumstances here, the objection was preserved by the motion for new trial.
[351]*351The trial judge was given an opportunity to rule on the propriety of his instruction, brought to his attention before appeal to this court, so the question is properly raised on appeal. Connor v. State, Wyo.1975, 537 P.2d 715. Since that is the case, we cannot see how defendant was prejudiced by the absence of counsel, even if true that defendant was unrepresented during the questioned period. In that light, we have considered the merits of the arguments with respect to the instruction on the basis that it is a question that may be presented on appeal. By our ruling in this case, we are not in anywise setting aside the usual requirement of Rule 51, W.R.C.P., that, “No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.” The rule is supported by substantial case law. Moore v. State, Wyo.1975, 542 P.2d 109, and cases there cited; LaFleur v. State, Wyo.1975, 533 P.2d 309. We are simply saying that in this case it has been waived by the State and the trial court was given an opportunity to consider the objection and act upon it.
Rule 49(a), W.R.Cr.P., provides: “Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” For an error to be regarded as harmful, there must be a reasonable possibility that in the absence of the error, the yerdict might have been more favorable' to the defendant. Reeder v. State, Wyo.1973, 515 P.2d 969. We can think of no way in which the defendant was or could have been prejudiced by absence of counsel and the defendant has shown none, other than losing an opportunity to enter an objection to the instruction at the fiime given. That was cured by waiver 'of the county and prosecuting attorney and the fact that the trial judge entertained the objection on a motion for new trial and treated it as timely. The trial court could have granted the defendant a new trial “if required in the interests of justice.” Rule 34, W.R.Cr.P. We agree that the interests of justice in this case did not and do not require a new trial.
There was no prejudicial error.
Affirmed.