Hoskins v. Amazon.com

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: October 24, 2024
• Docket: N23A-06-004 CEB
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

MATTHEW HOSKINS, ) ) Claimant Below-Appellant ) and Cross-Appellee, ) ) v. ) ) C.A. No. N23A-06-004 CEB AMAZON.COM, ) ) Employer Below-Appellee ) and Cross-Appellant. )

Submitted: August 30, 2024 Decided: October 24, 2024

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES

This is hopefully the last pleading to be resolved in this matter. After a ruling

that saw the Court affirm a decision of the Industrial Accident Board (“IAB” or

“Board”) in favor of the Amazon.com (“Employer”), Matthew Hoskins (“Claimant”)

has moved the Court for an award of attorney’s fees. For the following reasons, the

motion will be denied.

1. The underlying merits of the IAB’s ruling are set out in this Court’s

Opinion in Hoskins v. Amazon.com. 1 In essence, Claimant was injured in a

workplace accident and received worker’s compensation for a total

disability. In this dispute, he sought additional compensation to pay for

1 2024 WL 3509282 (Del. Super. July 23, 2024). back surgery that he said was necessitated by the injury. Employer

convinced the IAB that the need for surgery was not caused by the

workplace injury but rather a pre-existing condition that Claimant failed to

disclose to his treating physicians. Thus, Claimant’s credibility was a

singular focus of the proceedings below.

2. Award of attorney fees on appeal to Superior Court are governed by 19

Del. C. §2350(f), which allows the Superior Court, “at its discretion” to

award Claimant attorney fees “where claimant’s position in the hearing

before the Board is affirmed on appeal.”2 The Claimant’s position before

the Board was that he was entitled to additional compensation for a back

surgery. The IAB held he was not, which was affirmed on appeal.

3. The basis for Claimant’s belief in an entitlement to attorney fees comes

from a wrinkle in the proceedings. In addition to Claimant’s petition for

additional compensation, the Employer filed a Petition for Review, seeking

to end Claimant’s entitlement to any further compensation at all. But the

Employer’s medical expert testimony, whose opinion was central to

making the case against any further compensation, was disallowed by the

2 10 Del. C. §2350(f). “The Superior Court has discretion to award an attorney's fee in an appeal from the [Industrial Accident] Board to the Superior Court.” Murtha v. Cont'l Opticians, Inc., 729 A.2d 312, 315 (Del. Super. 1997) (citing 10 Del. C. §2350(f)).

2 Board on procedural grounds, due to some late disclosures before expert

depositions were taken. Thus, the IAB denied the Employer’s Petition for

Review, essentially because the Employer’s testimony in support had been

excluded from the hearing. That ruling was cross-appealed by the

Employer, but the Superior Court did not rule on the cross-appeal,

mistakenly believing it had not been briefed.3 Whether Superior Court

ruled upon Employer’s petition or not, however, the result would have been

either 1) a ruling in support of the Board’s procedural rules excluding the

expert testimony or 2) reversal of the Board’s ruling and a remand to

consider the expert’s testimony on the Employer’s Petition for Review.

Neither ruling would have been a direct repudiation of Employer’s Petition

for Review and neither ruling would have been a “win” for the Claimant.

4. Because the Board excluded the Employer’s evidence, it did not have a

basis upon which to rule on the merits of the Employer’s Petition for

Review and Employer’s Petition was denied, essentially, by default. Had

the Board considered the expert testimony and ruled on the merits of

3 The cross appeal Opening Brief was a separate pleading filed within the Answering Brief on the direct appeal. See D.I. 16 (Opening Br.), Trans. ID 72169547 (Feb. 26, 2024). The Court was not aware of this until the Opinion was published, but in light of the fact that the relief sought – review on the merits of the Petition for Review – could only occur on a remand to the IAB, the Employer elected not to pursue the matter further, as a renewed Petition for Review by the Board was already available. 3 Employer’s Petition, perhaps a different result obtains. But in the world

of what really happened, and not the world of what might have been, the

Board did not reach the merits on Employer’s claim because the Claimant

successfully kept the evidence out. That may have been an effective

litigation strategy, but it kept the IAB from ruling on the merits and in the

Court’s view, did not make the Claimant a prevailing party entitled to an

award of attorney fees.

In the Court’s exercise of its discretion, the Claimant’s motion for attorney

fees will be DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

/s/ Charles E. Butler Charles E. Butler, Resident Judge