09/08/2026
DA 25-0764
Case Number: DA 25-0764
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 214N
BRYAN HOSKIN and CARRIE HOSKIN,
Plaintiffs, Counter-Defendants, and Appellants,
v.
TIMOTHY WALL,
Defendant, Counterclaimant, and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-2023-780 Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Bryan Hoskin and Carrie Hoskin, Self-Represented, Frenchtown, Montana
For Appellee:
Quentin M. Rhoades, Rhoades & Erickson PLLC, Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 5, 2026 Decided: September 8, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Appellants Bryan and Carrie Hoskin (the Hoskins) appeal from the Order Granting Defendant Wall’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Count VII of Wall’s Supplemental Counterclaims issued October 23, 2024, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of July 2, 2025, and the Judgment entered October 3, 2025, issued by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. We affirm. General Background
¶3 The Hoskins purchased Lot 1 in the Houle Creek Subdivision in 2018. The Hoskins later brought this litigation against Timothy Wall, owner of Lot 2 of the Houle Creek Subdivision, asserting claims for quiet title, declaratory relief (scope of easement), tortious interference with easement rights, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages. Prior to a bench trial, the District Court resolved certain interlocutory issues—including a limited recognition of an implied easement by necessity for Spike Lane—with scope of the easement reserved for trial. A bench trial was held on June 17, 2025. The Hoskins, representing themselves pro se, called Wall as a witness during their case-in-chief but, after discovery objections and exclusions, presented no other witnesses or admissible evidence. After the Hoskins rested, Wall moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Hoskins’
3
claims.1 The District Court granted the motion and dismissed Counts I-V with prejudice and proceeded with trial on Wall’s remaining counterclaims. Following the bench trial, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order in which it dismissed Hoskins’ Amended Complaint with prejudice and ordered judgment be entered in favor of Wall on all of his counterclaims. On October 3, 2025, the District Court entered Judgment permanently enjoining the Hoskins from conducting maintenance activities on Wall’s property, requiring the Hoskins to remove their spite/nuisance fence, and awarding Wall $132,662.59 together with post-judgment interest at the rate of 10.5 percent.
¶4 At best, the Hoskins’ appeal briefing is inartful and confusing. As an example, they set forth the issue on appeal to be: “District Court Case DV-32-2023-0000780qt , to Include Dockets of Record , Exhibits / Evidence Presented[.]” The Hoskins make a variety of general complaints about fairness, the court’s discretion, and evidentiary rulings and generally aver that the District Court erred in dismissing their Amended Complaint and granting judgment against them.
¶5 As noted by Wall, a motion asserted as one for judgment as a matter of law during a bench trial is properly treated on appeal as a judgment on partial findings under M. R. Civ. P. 52(c). See McCann v. McCann, 2018 MT 207, ¶¶ 11-13, 16-17, 392 Mont. 385,
1 At the time, the motion for directed verdict was made asserting Hoskins failed to present sufficient evidence to prove any of their claims. Wall’s counsel cited M. R. Civ. P. 50 in support of his motion. Rule 50 addresses judgment as a matter of law during a jury trial, whereas Rule 52(c) provides the corollary when seeking directed verdict during a bench trial. Counsel’s inadvertent reference to Rule 50 did not alter the substance of Wall’s motion for directed verdict— insufficiency of the evidence on each claim. It is clear from the District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that the court understood the basis of the directed verdict motion and applied the proper Rule 52(c) standard. On appeal, Wall cites the correct Rule 52(c).
4
425 P.3d 682. When evaluating a motion for judgment on partial findings brought after the plaintiff has rested during a bench trial—where the court is the trier of fact—the court evaluates and weighs the evidence, makes credibility determinations, and resolves the claims on the basis of the preponderance of the evidence. McCann, ¶ 12. On appeal, we review conclusions of law for correctness and findings of fact for clear error. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if not supported by substantial evidence, if the court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction the lower court made a mistake. McCann, ¶ 13.
¶6 We review discretionary rulings regarding trial administration, evidentiary rulings, and attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. McCann, ¶ 14 (if legal authority exists to award attorney fees, the grant or denial of fees is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Blanton v. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs., 2011 MT 110, ¶ 22, 360 Mont. 396, 255 P.3d 1229 (trial administration reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. Reams, 2020 MT 326, ¶ 9, 402 Mont. 366, 477 P.3d 1118 (review of whether expert witness is allowed to testify is an evidentiary issue reviewed for abuse of discretion). Claim 1: Quiet Title
¶7 The Hoskins alleged they hold title to Lot 1 free and clear of any easements or claims by Wall and sought a judicial declaration quieting title and identifying the true location of the drain field and drain field pipeline. The Hoskins contend the District Court erred by dismissing Count I because it misapplied prior interlocutory rulings, ignored recorded subdivision conditions and the Hoskins’ documentary submissions (including their
5
water-rights certificate and subdivision materials), and improperly excluded or failed to credit evidence that would have supported their title claim.
¶8 Wall asserts the Hoskins failed to present admissible evidence proving superior title or any legal basis to quiet title against him and that he relied on recorded instruments— including the final plat approved and recorded August 15, 2003—and the trial record showing the Hoskins’ admissions and conduct inconsistent with a quiet-title remedy.
¶9 The District Court found the Hoskins “did not offer any evidence in support of this claim at trial” and dismissed Count I with prejudice. The court also took judicial notice of the recorded final plat for Houle Creek Subdivision and relied on the recorded documents in resolving title-related issues.
¶10 The trial transcript and admitted exhibits show the Hoskins did not introduce deeds, title abstracts, chain-of-title evidence, expert title testimony, or other admissible proof establishing superior title or a defect in Wall’s recorded interests. The District Court appropriately took judicial notice of the recorded final subdivision plat and the Hoskins did not present competent evidence to rebut or qualify the recorded instruments. The Hoskins’ post-trial filings and references to subdivision conditions do not substitute for admissible trial evidence proving title elements at bench trial. Consistent with M. R. Civ. P. 52(c), the District Court properly entered judgment when the Hoskins failed to carry their burden. The court’s factual finding that no evidence was offered is supported by the transcript and is not clearly erroneous.
6
Claim 2: Declaratory Judgment (Scope of Easement by Necessity)
¶11 The Hoskins sought a declaratory judgment to determine the validity, existence, and scope of easements, asserting an implied easement by necessity to use Spike Lane and seeking a judicial declaration of permissible uses—including maintenance and access related to the shared well and drain field. On appeal the Hoskins argue the District Court erred by refusing to construe the recorded plat and subdivision conditions as supporting a broader easement scope, by failing to order a final plat review or survey, and by declining to credit their documentary submissions (preliminary plat, DEQ/DPHHS correspondence, water-rights certificate) as evidence of the easement’s scope.
¶12 At trial, Wall acknowledged the court’s prior partial summary-judgment ruling recognizing only a limited implied easement by necessity for Spike Lane but opposed any broader easement scope sought by the Hoskins. Wall argues the Hoskins failed to present evidence at trial about the uses of Lot 1 at the time of severance, the parties’ reasonable contemplation, or expected future uses—the factors Montana law requires courts to consider when defining an easement by necessity. See Yellowstone River, LLC v. Meriwether Land Fund I, LLC, 2011 MT 263, ¶ 30, 362 Mont. 273, 264 P.3d 1065 (explaining for an easement by necessity to arise, there must be unity of ownership, severance, and strict necessity and intent for continued use after the severance).
¶13 The District Court reiterated its earlier order granting Hoskins partial summary judgment recognizing an implied easement by necessity for Spike Lane but reserved the issue of scope and permissible uses for trial. Ultimately, the District Court concluded the Hoskins presented no evidence at trial concerning the scope and permissible uses and
7
therefore failed to prove the scope by clear and convincing evidence and dismissed Count II with prejudice. The court emphasized that defining an easement by necessity requires “extreme caution” and consideration of the actual uses at severance and reasonable expectations of the parties.
¶14 The trial record contains no testimony or documentary proof about the actual uses of Lot 1 at the time of severance, the parties’ reasonable contemplation at conveyance, or anticipated future uses—the specific factual predicates required when defining an easement by necessity. Yellowstone River, ¶ 30. The Hoskins did not call witnesses who could testify to historical uses, did not introduce deeds or conveyances showing the circumstances of severance, and did not present expert testimony or other evidence to satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard. References in their appeal briefing to subdivision conditions, preliminary plat legends, or DEQ/DPHHS correspondence are not a substitute for admissible trial evidence proving the elements reserved for trial. The District Court therefore correctly concluded the Hoskins failed to prove the scope of any implied easement by necessity. Claim 3: Tortious Interference
¶15 The Hoskins alleged Wall tortiously interfered with their easement rights and property interests by actions including shutting off water, obstructing access, and otherwise interfering with their use of Spike Lane and the well system. They contend the District Court erred by dismissing Count III because the prior temporary restraining order (TRO), the well inspection, and the evidence of repeated shut-offs and harassment established
8
intentional interference. They also assert the court improperly discounted their affidavits, the Western Farms inspection report, and other documentary submissions.
¶16 Wall argues the Hoskins failed to present admissible evidence of an intentional and improper interference with a legally protected right. Wall points to the Hoskins’ admissions (e.g., Bryan’s admission he mowed on Lot 2, he knew he was on Wall’s property while mowing, and he knew he had no permission to be on Wall’s property mowing) and to the absence of proof of the asserted easement scope or of causation and damages required for tortious interference.
¶17 The District Court found the Hoskins “did not offer any evidence in support of this claim at trial” and dismissed Count III with prejudice.
¶18 The trial transcript and admitted exhibits do not contain competent evidence establishing the elements of tortious interference: there is no admissible proof of a specific contractual or property right that Wall intentionally and improperly interfered with (beyond the Hoskins’ asserted but unproven easement scope), no evidence of causation linking Wall’s conduct to a legally cognizable loss, and no proof of damages tied to an actionable interference. The Hoskins relied on post-filing reports such as the Western Farms report and affidavits that were not introduced at trial in a manner that satisfied evidentiary rules or that were not developed through witness testimony subject to cross-examination. The District Court therefore properly dismissed Count III when the Hoskins failed to carry their burden at trial.
9
Claim 4: Injunctive Relief
¶19 The Hoskins sought injunctive relief to prevent Wall from interfering with their asserted property rights, including rights in the well system and the private road easement. They argued the record (TRO history, inspection reports, DEQ/DPHHS correspondence, and their affidavits) demonstrated irreparable harm and justified injunctive relief. The Hoskins assert the District Court erred by denying equitable relief because the court failed to credit the TRO and inspection evidence and misapplied equitable principles.
¶20 Wall argued injunctive relief was not warranted because the Hoskins had not proven the underlying rights that would justify an injunction and because the Hoskins’ own conduct (including admitted trespass and other harassment) undermined equitable relief.
¶21 The District Court concluded the Hoskins did not prevail on their claims concerning the well and road easement and therefore denied injunctive relief and dismissed Count IV with prejudice. The court also found the TROs issued earlier were injunctions that were later dissolved and that Wall was entitled to fees for defending against them.
¶22 Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy dependent on success on the underlying claims. Because the Hoskins failed to prove title, failed to prove the scope of any easement by necessity, and failed to present evidence of tortious interference or damages, they could not establish the necessary equitable basis for injunctive relief. The TRO and inspection history do not, standing alone, establish entitlement to a permanent injunction when the underlying legal rights remain unproven at trial. The District Court therefore correctly denied equitable relief; its decision rests on factual findings and correct application of equitable principles and is not an abuse of discretion.
10
Claim 5: Compensatory Damages
¶23 The Hoskins sought compensatory damages for harms they attribute to Wall’s conduct—losses from water shut-offs, repair costs, replacement water, medical and emotional harms, lost wages, and other economic and non-economic losses. On appeal, they argue the District Court erred by dismissing Count V because the court ignored their affidavits, receipts, and post-trial filings documenting damages and the physical and financial consequences of water shut-offs and alleged harassment.
¶24 Wall argued that “compensatory damages” is a remedy, not an independent cause of action, and that the Hoskins had not pleaded or proved any underlying tort or contract claim entitling them to damages. Wall also disputed the admissibility and sufficiency of the Hoskins’ damage evidence.
¶25 The District Court observed that compensatory damages is not a recognized standalone cause of action under Montana law and that the Hoskins offered no evidence of damages at trial. As such, the District Court dismissed Count V with prejudice.
¶26 The trial record contains no admissible, quantified evidence of compensable loss to the Hoskins tied to a recognized cause of action: the Hoskins did not present witnesses to quantify damages at trial; did not introduce invoices, repair estimates, or contemporaneous receipts through live testimony; and did not prove an underlying tort or breach that would support compensatory damages. Post-trial filings and affidavits are not a substitute for admissible trial evidence subject to cross-examination. The District Court therefore correctly dismissed Count V as both legally deficient and factually unsupported.
11
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings and the Hoskins’ Appellate Contentions
¶27 The Hoskins contend the District Court improperly excluded witnesses and exhibits, misapplied discovery rules, and exercised discretion unfairly. The record shows the court excluded a DPHHS witness after Wall objected that the Hoskins had not disclosed the witness as an expert and had earlier answered discovery that they had “[n]o expert witnesses”; the Hoskins withdrew another county planning witness after a similar objection. The court sustained objections to certain reports (e.g., Frenchtown Fire Department reports) for lack of foundation. Under M. R. Evid. 103(a) an appellant must show preservation and prejudice to obtain reversal of discretionary evidentiary rulings. The Hoskins did not make offers of proof or otherwise develop a record showing prejudice. The District Court’s rulings were within its discretion and are supported by the trial transcript. Wall’s Counterclaims
¶28 The District Court entered detailed findings in Wall’s favor on his counterclaims— trespass, wrongful injunction/attorney’s fees, abuse of process, nuisance, and removal of a spite fence. Those findings are supported by the record: Bryan’s admission that he mowed grass on Lot 2 despite knowing it was Wall’s property; Sergeant King’s report and testimony describing threats and the circumstances of law-enforcement response; and photographic exhibits of the fence and cut grass. The District Court weighed credibility, considered exhibits, and entered specific findings; under the applicable standards those findings are entitled to deference.
12
Appellants’ Burden and Briefing Deficiencies
¶29 The Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure require the appellant to present a concise, cohesive argument, which “contains the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and pages of the record relied on.” M. R. App. P. 12(1)(g); In re Marriage of McMahon, 2002 MT 198, ¶ 6, 311 Mont. 175, 53 P.3d 1266. This Court will not consider unsupported issues or arguments. In re Custody of Krause, 2001 MT 37, ¶ 32, 304 Mont. 202, 19 P.3d 811. Furthermore, it is not this Court’s obligation to research a party’s position or to develop legal analysis to support it. State v. Hicks, 2006 MT 71, ¶ 22, 331 Mont. 471, 133 P.3d 206.
¶30 While the Hoskins’ opening brief presents factual grievances and asserts procedural unfairness, it is deficient in the critical respects required for appellate relief: it does not identify the legal elements of each claim with record citations showing how the District Court’s findings were clearly erroneous; it does not present preserved, developed arguments demonstrating abuse of discretion or legal error; and it does not supply a record of preserved offers of proof for excluded evidence. Conclusion
¶31 The District Court conducted a bench trial, admitted exhibits, made credibility determinations, and entered detailed findings and conclusions. For each claim the Hoskins pleaded, the record shows they failed to present admissible evidence proving the essential elements at trial. The District Court therefore properly entered judgment on partial findings consistent with M. R. Civ. P. 52(c). The court’s findings in favor of Wall on his
13
counterclaims are supported by substantial evidence and are not clearly erroneous. The District Court’s evidentiary and discovery rulings were within its discretion and the Hoskins have not shown prejudice or preserved reversible error. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
¶32 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ JIM RICE