Horton v. D. I. Operating Co.

448 P.2d 36, 84 Nev. 694, 1968 Nev. LEXIS 435
CourtNevada Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 9, 1968
DocketNo. 5538
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 448 P.2d 36 (Horton v. D. I. Operating Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Horton v. D. I. Operating Co., 448 P.2d 36, 84 Nev. 694, 1968 Nev. LEXIS 435 (Neb. 1968).

Opinion

[695]*695OPINION

By the Court,

Mowbray, J.:

Ernest J. Horton brought a civil action against Boyd Scott, alleging assault. The D. I. Operating Co., Scott’s employer, was named as a codefendant. The case, which was tried before a jury, resulted in verdicts in favor of both defendants. Horton filed two motions for a new trial, one of which was timely. The trial judge denied both motions, and thus this appeal.

The first motion was predicated upon (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the jury, (2) misconduct of the jury, and (3) the court’s failure to instruct the jury properly.

1. Appellant urges that the conduct of the bailiff caused the irregularities in the jury proceedings. The case went to the jury at 2:45 p.m. The bailiff inquired of the jury at approximately 10:30 p.m. whether the jury had reached a verdict. Upon being advised they had not, the bailiff stated that he would make arrangements for the jury to retire to their quarters for an overnight stay. Shortly thereafter, a verdict was reached.

[696]*696While the bailiff’s remarks were improper, there is nothing in the record to show they coerced the jury into arriving at a verdict. As the court said in Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 136 N.E.2d 582, 585 (Ill.App. 1956): “It appears from the testimony of the bailiffs in charge of the jury that in response to questions from the jury as to how long they were to stay, a bailiff told them they were to stay until they reached a verdict, and later, around 10 o’clock, a bailiff jokingly said, ‘I’m going up to get the cots.’ A few minutes after 10:30 a bailiff went to the jury room to dismiss the jury and was informed that they had reached a decision. Defendants concede that the conduct of the bailiffs was free from any improper motive, but contend that it coerced the jury into returning a verdict to their prejudice. The jury was polled the following morning and none repudiated his verdict. The statements complained of should not have been made by the bailiffs, but we find nothing to support the claim of coercion of the jury and prejudice to the defendants.”

Bailiffs are officers of the court and serve the court by acting under and pursuant to the direction of the trial judge. Any inquiries to the jury, such as in this case, should be made only if directed by the judge.

2. As his basis for the misconduct of the jury, appellant complains that the jury separated during their deliberations and that they were not kept together as required in NRS 16.120.1

[697]*697At one point during the jury’s deliberations, the foreman and one of the jurors discussed the instructions given by the court. This discussion took place in a hall separating the two rooms which were used for the convenience and comfort of the ladies and gentlemen of the jury. The conversation was audible to the other jurors. It did not occur outside the jurors’ quarters, and there is nothing in the record to show it improperly influenced the verdict of the jury.

3. Appellant next urges that the trial court failed to instruct the jury properly regarding the liability of Respondent D. I. Operating Co. Appellant’s request for four additional instructions2 was denied. This assignment of error has imposed a burden on this court which is not easily overcome. Appellant did not designate the transcript of the evidence as part of his record on appeal. Consequently, we do not know what, if anything, Respondent D. I. Operating Co. did or failed to do in controlling its employees. Further, appellant has failed to designate as part of the record on appeal the instructions that the trial judge did give, and as a result we are not advised as to the theory of liability in which the jury was instructed. No effort was made to utilize the provisions of NRCP 76.3

[698]*698For these reasons, we are completely unable to decide whether the trial judge failed to instruct the jury properly.

Appellant’s second motion for a new trial, based upon newly discovered evidence, was filed 44 days4 after service of the entry of judgment. Appellant seeks to avoid the 10-day rule by proceeding under NRCP 60(b). This question was settled in Child v. George Miller, Inc., 74 Nev. 223, 225, 327 P.2d 342, 343 (1958), when this court said:

“Newly discovered evidence is a ground for a motion for new trial under Rule 59(a), but is not a ground for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). In this respect our rule differs from the corresponding Federal Rule 60(b), 28 U.S.C.A., which allows relief from judgment upon the ground of newly discovered evidence, not discovered in time to move for a new trial. This departure from the federal rules was intentionally made in order to preserve the practice theretofore established under the Civil Practice Act. See Advisory Committee notes to NRCP 60(b).”

The orders of the trial judge denying appellant’s motions for a new trial must be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Thompson, C. J., Collins and Zenoff, JJ., and Wilkes, D. J., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Shearin v. Fletcher/Mayo/Associates, Inc.
687 S.W.2d 198 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1984)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
448 P.2d 36, 84 Nev. 694, 1968 Nev. LEXIS 435, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horton-v-d-i-operating-co-nev-1968.