Horsting v. Commissioner

5 T.C.M. 421, 1946 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 182
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedMay 27, 1946
DocketDocket No. 3094.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 5 T.C.M. 421 (Horsting v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Horsting v. Commissioner, 5 T.C.M. 421, 1946 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 182 (tax 1946).

Opinion

William Francis Horsting v. Commissioner.
Horsting v. Commissioner
Docket No. 3094.
United States Tax Court
1946 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 182; 5 T.C.M. (CCH) 421; T.C.M. (RIA) 46123;
May 27, 1946
*182

Issue (2). 1 Petitioner filed income tax returns for 1940 and 1941. He alone signed the returns. The respondent determined deficiencies for both years and sent the notice thereof to petitioner alone. In this notice the respondent, among other adjustemnts, reduced the personal exemptions claimed by petitioner to that of a single person. He made no determination that the return was a joint return of husband and wife. The petitioner raises no question that the returns filed were not separate returns and alleges that petitioner erroneously reported and the respondent erroneously included in his taxable income income which under the community property laws of Texas belonged to his wife. Held, there is no issue raised by the pleadings as to whether the returns filed were other than the separate returns of petitioner and if the respondent desired to contend that the returns were joint returns he should have raised the issue by affirmative allegations in his answer. This he did not do. Held, further, even if it be assumed that the issue is properly raised, the facts show the returns were the separate returns of petitioner and not joint returns of petitioner and his wife. Held, further, petitioner *183 is entitled to exclude from the taxable income determined by the respondent any income which petitioner has shown belonged to his wife under the community property laws of Texas.

Issue (3). During 1940 and 1941, petitioner acted as agent for his wife in connection with her Texas oil properties. He traveled extensively during these years in purchasing and selling oil properties or undivided interests therein. He made 34 separate sales in 1940 and 15 in 1941. Held, petitioner and his wife were in business of buying and selling oil properties. Held, further, the properties held by petitioner and his wife were held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and were not capital assets.

Issues (4), (5) and (6). During the taxable years petitioner and his wife received proceeds from the sales of a part of their total holdings and also paid expenses and commissions attributable to such sales. Held, petitioner is not entitled to substitute for proof an assumption that because the total holdings represented both the separate property of the wife and community property in certain *184 proven proportions, the proceeds likewise represent both the separate property of the wife and community property in the same proportions. Held, further, that where petitioner has failed to clearly and indisputably trace and identify any of the proceeds as representing proceeds from the sale of his wife's separate property, the entire proceeds are, under Texas law, community property. Held, further, all expenses and commissions attributable to such sales should, in view of the previous holding, be allowed as community deductions.

Issue (8). Upon the evidence, held, petitioner has failed to prove that he and his wife paid any delay rentals in 1941.

Issue (9). In 1939, petitioner and his wife sold approximately 25 percent of their undivided interests in the Haldeman Subdivision to three syndicates and agreed that the syndicates would immediately become vested with the ownership of the same proportion of any undivided interest in this subdivision which petitioner and his wife might thereafter acquire. Petitioner and his wife were not obligated to acquire any additional interests. They did, however, acquire additional interests in 1940 and 1941. Held, that part of the costs attributable *185 to the interests thus acquired in 1940 and 1941 which immediately became the property of the syndicates is not deductible by petitioner and his wife in 1940 and 1941 as either expenses, losses or costs, but should be capitalized and added to the costs of the interests purchased in 1940 and 1941 which petitioner and his wife were entitled to retain.

Issue (10). Upon the evidence, held, petitioner and his wife are entitled to a deduction of a certain amount for each year as representing a reasonable allowance for compensation for personal services actually rendered by their son during those years.

Issue (13). Upon the evidence, held, petitioner has failed to prove in what year a certain debt became worthless.

Issue (14). During the taxable year 1941, petitioner and his wife sold approximately 10 percent of their undivided interests in the Haldeman Subdivision to two additional syndicates for a cash consideration and a return of 58 royalty acres previously sold by them. In view of our holding under Issue (3), held, the exception provided for in subsection (b) of section 112, I.R.C., to the general rule stated in subsection (a) of section 112 does not apply and the entire amount of *186 the gain realized on these sales should be recognized.

Issue (15). Upon the evidence, held, petitioner is entitled to a separate loss deduction in 1941 of the cost of certain leases which were his separate property and which, after the drilling of two dry holes on opposite sides of the property in 1941, petitioner abandoned by failure to pay the delay rental which became due in that year.

Issue (16). During 1941, petitioner and his wife sold certain undivided royalty interests to two individuals for a cash consideration. In connection with these sales petitioner and his wife transferred to these individuals as bonuses certain shares of syndicate units which had a cost basis to petitioner and his wife of $750. Held, this cost basis should be considered in determining the gain or loss from the sales of the undivided royalty interests.

Issue (18). Upon the evidence, held, petitioner has not shown that the failure to file the 1940 return within the time prescribed by law was due to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect. Held, further, the penalty provided in section 291, I.R.C.

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5 T.C.M. 421, 1946 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 182, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horsting-v-commissioner-tax-1946.