Horst v. Robinson

CourtCourt of Appeals of North Carolina
DecidedJune 4, 2025
Docket24-1026
StatusUnpublished

This text of Horst v. Robinson (Horst v. Robinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Horst v. Robinson, (N.C. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA24-1026

Filed 4 June 2025

Wake County, No. 24CV004000-910

GWENDOLYN HORST, Plaintiff,

v.

PEYTON ROBINSON, HUNTER ROWE REAL ESTATE, INC., HUNTER ROWE SYSTEMS, LLC, RELEVATE REAL ESTATE, INC., and RELEVATE SYSTEMS, INC. (f/k/a RELEVATE SYSTEMS, LLC (f/k/a HUNTER ROWE SYSTEMS), Defendants.

Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 27 June 2024 by Judge Paul Ridgeway

in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 May 2025.

Howard Stallings Law Firm, by Brooke E. Webber and Matthew T. Langston, for plaintiff-appellant.

Cranfill Sumner LLP, by Steven A. Bader, Georgia H. Malik, Ryan D. Bolick, and Ceradini Law, PLLC by Matthew P. Ceradini, for defendants-appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal arises from a real estate dispute between a realtor and client.

Plaintiff Gwendolyn Horst and her real estate agent/company (“Defendants”) entered

into an exclusive buyer agency agreement which contained an arbitration clause.

Later, Plaintiff sued Defendants for: (1) negligent misrepresentation, (2) unfair and HORST V. ROBINSON

Opinion of the Court

deceptive trade practices, (3) breach of fiduciary duty, and (4) breach of contract.

Based on the arbitration clause in the buyer agency agreement, Defendants

moved to compel arbitration. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff

appeals. Defendants ask our Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s appeal as interlocutory.

“An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which

does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order

to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357. 362

(1950). Here, Plaintiff concedes that her appeal is interlocutory but argues that her

appeal warrants immediate review because it affects a substantial right. See Sharpe

v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 162 (1999) (explaining that an interlocutory order may be

immediately appealed if it affects a “substantial right”).

Our Court has held that “an order compelling arbitration affects no substantial

right that would warrant immediate appellate review[.]” C. Terry Hunt Industries,

Inc. v. Klausner Lumber Two, LLC, 255 N.C. App. 8, 12 (2017). However, Plaintiff

contends that her interlocutory appeal nonetheless affects a substantial right.

Specifically, Plaintiff contests whether she consensually entered into the arbitration

agreement. And she argues this question affects a substantial right which warrants

immediate review. We disagree.

It is well settled that an interlocutory order affects a substantial right if the order deprives the appealing party of a substantial right which will be lost if the order is not reviewed before a final judgment is entered. Essentially a two-part test has developed—the right itself must be

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substantial and the deprivation of that right must potentially work injury if not corrected before appeal from final judgment.

Sharpe, 351 N.C. at 162 (cleaned up).

Plaintiff’s proposed substantial right does not satisfy the two-part test under

Sharpe. Despite Plaintiff’s contentions, she is not precluded from presenting her

argument regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement following completion of

the arbitration proceedings. Following arbitration, Plaintiff may appeal the

arbitrator’s decision and argue that she did not consensually enter into the

arbitration agreement. Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, N.C.G.S. § 1-

569, et seq., a party may move to vacate an arbitration award under certain

circumstances, including the following:

There was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection under G.S. 1-569.15(c) no later than the beginning of an arbitration hearing[.]

N.C.G.S. § 1-569.23(a)(5) (2023). Thus, despite being compelled to arbitrate her

claims, Plaintiff does not forfeit her right to contest whether she validly entered into

the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss this

interlocutory appeal. We also deny Plaintiff’s petition for writ of certiorari.

DISMISSED.

Panel consisting of Chief Judge DILLON and Judges ARROWOOD and

HAMPSON.

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Report per Rule 30(e).

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Related

Sharpe v. Worland
522 S.E.2d 577 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1999)
Veazey v. City of Durham
57 S.E.2d 377 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1950)
C. Terry Hunt Indus., Inc. v. Klausner Lumber Two, LLC
803 S.E.2d 679 (Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 2017)

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Horst v. Robinson, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horst-v-robinson-ncctapp-2025.