Horowitz v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 1, 2023
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01097
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Meryl I Horowitz, No. CV-22-01097-PHX-MTL

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 13 Defendant. 14 15 At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Meryl Horowitz’s application for a period of 16 disability and disability insurance benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). 17 (A.R. 486-87.) Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court seeking judicial review of that 18 denial (Doc. 17). The Court has reviewed the briefs (Docs. 17, 19) and the Administrative 19 Record (Doc. 10, “A.R.”), and now affirms the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) 20 decision. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 Plaintiff filed an Application for Disability Insurance Benefits on August 3, 2012, 23 for a period of disability beginning on January 1, 2011. (A.R. 128-34.) Her claim was 24 initially denied on February 5, 2013, and again upon reconsideration on October 29, 2013. 25 (Id. at 75-79, 81-86.) The District Court remanded Plaintiff’s claim twice. (Id. at 545-60, 26 584-90.) After the second remand, on August 3, 2021, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ 27 for a hearing regarding her claim, which the ALJ denied on August 20, 2021. (Id. at 495- 28 516, 466-94.) On May 6, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review 1 and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the agency’s final decision. (Id. at 460-65.) Plaintiff now 2 seeks judicial review with this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 3 The Court has reviewed the medical evidence and will discuss the pertinent 4 evidence in addressing the issue raised by Plaintiff. Upon considering the medical evidence 5 and opinions, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following impairments: cervical 6 spondylosis, lumbar spondylosis with left-sided radiculopathy, degenerative joint disease 7 of the hips, chronic pain syndrome, and obesity. (A.R. at 473.) 8 The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have any impairments or combination of 9 impairments that met or equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. 10 Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 475.) Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual 11 functional capacity (“RFC”). The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform 12 “sedentary work” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) with certain limitations. Here, the 13 ALJ determined that Plaintiff can (1) lift/carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds 14 occasionally; (2) sit for about six hours, with a brief position change of one to five minutes 15 every 30 to 45 minutes; (3) stand/walk for about four hours during an eight hour work day, 16 with a 5 to 10 minute sitting break every 30 minutes of standing; (4) occasionally push and 17 pull with the lower extremities; (5) occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and climb 18 ramps and stairs, but never crawl or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (6) frequently hold 19 her head static and look up, down, and side to side; (7) work in an environment without 20 moderate exposure to hazards, like dangerous, moving machinery and unprotected heights. 21 (Id. at 477.) Based on this RFC, the ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing past relevant 22 bookkeeping work as defined at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (Id. at 486.) The ALJ therefore 23 concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged disability onset date through the 24 date of the decision. (Id.) 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 27 those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503,

28  Residual functional capacity refers to the most a claimant can still do in a work setting despite his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). 1 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 2 determination only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 3 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence 4 that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion considering the 5 whole record. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court 6 must consider the record as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific 7 quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. Generally, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to 8 more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s 9 conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) 10 (citations omitted). The substantial evidence threshold “defers to the presiding ALJ, who 11 has seen the hearing up close.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1157 (2019); see also 12 Thomas v. CalPortland, 993 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting substantial evidence 13 “is an extremely deferential standard”). 14 To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 15 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, but 16 the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 17 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is presently 18 engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant 19 is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the 20 claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. 21 § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. At step 22 three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments 23 meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. 24 Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be 25 disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines whether the 26 claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). 27 If so, the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the 28 fifth and final step, where the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other 1 work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work 2 experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting her symptom testimony without 5 providing clear and convincing reasons. (Doc. 17.) An ALJ employs a two-step process in 6 evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th 7 Cir. 2014). First, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has presented objective medical 8 evidence of an impairment “which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or 9 symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007). Then, 10 provided there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must evaluate the claimant’s 11 statements in context of the objective medical evidence and other evidence in the record. 12 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2)-(3). At this step, “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s 13 testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering specific, clear and 14 convincing reasons for doing so.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014-15 (internal quotation marks 15 omitted). This requirement prevents an ALJ from “arbitrarily discredit[ing]” the claimant’s 16 subjective symptom testimony. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958. 17 Despite the “clear and convincing standard [being] the most demanding required in 18 Social Security cases,” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1015 (internal quotation marks and citation 19 omitted), the ALJ need not “believe every allegation of disabling pain.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 20 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Instead, when assessing the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ 21 may consider “inconsistencies either in [the] claimant’s testimony or between his testimony 22 and his conduct, claimant’s daily activities, claimant’s work record, and testimony from 23 physicians and third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of 24 which [the] claimant complains.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (internal quotation marks 25 and citation omitted). Should a district court find that the ALJ’s specific, clear, and 26 convincing reasons are supported by substantial evidence, the court must not second guess 27 the ALJ’s judgment and should affirm the ALJ’s decision. See Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. 28 In evaluating Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ determined that step one was satisfied 1 as Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause 2 the alleged symptoms.” (A.R. 479.) However, at step two, the ALJ rejected Plaintiff’s 3 symptom testimony because her “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and 4 limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence 5 and other evidence in the record.” (Id.) The ALJ provided three reasons for rejecting 6 Plaintiff’s symptom testimony: (1) the testimony was inconsistent with the objective 7 medical record; (2) the evidence contained inconsistent statements by Plaintiff; and (3) the 8 testimony was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s daily activities. (Id. at 482-83.) Substantial 9 evidence supports these reasons. 10 The ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s allegations of back, neck, and hand pain several times 11 (Id. at 482.) The ALJ noted the record showed multiple findings of normal range of motion 12 and function in Plaintiff’s lumbar spine, hands, and neck, including that her cervical spine 13 was nontender (Id.) Regarding Plaintiff’s allegations that she had difficulty walking, the 14 ALJ cited to medical records indicating that she had normal gait and could stand, mount, 15 and dismount herself without difficulty. (Id.) The ALJ also emphasized that providers 16 noted Plaintiff’s normal strength, sensation, and regular reflexes. (Id.) Additionally, a 17 physician deemed Plaintiff’s use of assistive devices unnecessary and the record includes 18 minimal mention of Plaintiff’s use of such devices. (Id.) And while Plaintiff complained 19 about her inability to concentrate, the ALJ noted that her providers regularly documented 20 her normal cognition and alertness. (Id.) The Court finds this specificity satisfies the 21 standard set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A). See Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 22 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 Moreover, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s inconsistencies in her testimony. Plaintiff did 24 not complain of pain when seen for other issues and denied having musculoskeletal 25 symptoms. (A.R. 482-83.) Plaintiff also previously reported that she could walk and had 26 been doing “okay” with medicine. (Id. at 483); see Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1090 27 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that a claimant’s inconsistent testimony is relevant to the 28 testimony’s credibility). 1 Finally, the ALJ pointed to several activities which undermined Plaintiff’s 2|| allegations of the debilitating degree of her physical and mental symptoms. As the ALJ noted: “[Plaintiff’s] reports indicate that she was caring for her husband, took trips to 4|| Europe, went on cruises, picked up family members, and drove significant distances.” || (A.R. 483.) Based on these and other discrepancies between Plaintiff’s reported symptoms 6 || and the record, it was reasonable for the ALJ to conclude that “her impairments had lesser || impacts on her activities of daily living than she alleged.” See Fair, 885 F.2d at 603; see 8 || also Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that 9|| claimant’s activities may suggest that their claims about the severity of the limitations were 10 || exaggerated). 11 Because the ALJ offered specific conclusions on why Plaintiff’s testimony was not credible, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff's symptom testimony. “Our cases do not 13} require ALJs to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the claimant’s testimony, nor do they □□ require ALJs to draft dissertations when denying benefits.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 15 || 1277 (9th Cir. 2020). The ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff’s pain and the Court finds no || error. 17 IV. CONCLUSION 18 Accordingly, 19 IT IS ORDERED affirming the August 20, 2021 decision by the Administrative 20 || Law Judge and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment || consistent with this Order and close this case. 23 Dated this 1st day of September, 2023. 24 WMichak T. Shure 76 Michael T. Liburdi 27 United States District Judge 28

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