Horner v. Keene

52 N.E. 492, 177 Ill. 390
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 21, 1898
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 52 N.E. 492 (Horner v. Keene) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Horner v. Keene, 52 N.E. 492, 177 Ill. 390 (Ill. 1898).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Craig

delivered the opinion of the court:

First—The principal question for determination in this case is, is the defendant Francis B. Keene, the owner of lot 1 in the subdivision of lot 9, block 6, of fractional section 15, addition to Chicago, entitled to a perpetual right of way with teams and wagons, equally with complainant Hannah Horner, the owner of lot 3, over the private alley appurtenant to lot 1 and in the rear thereof, leading to Jackson street, by virtue of the grant in the deed from Thomas B. Bryan to Rossiter and the successive deeds from Rossiter to David Keene?

The evidence shows that John W. Waughop, the then owner of the whole of original lot 9, conveyed the north 26 feet of the east 141 feet of the lot to Robert W. Patterson, and on August 1, 1853, Waughop conveyed the south 50 feet of the east 141 feet to Thomas B. Bryan. These premises include lot 3, all of lot 2 except the north foot of it, and all of lots 4 and 5. Bryan and Patterson then owned the whole of the east 141 feet of lot 9, with a frontage of 76 feet on Wabash avenue. Bryan built a brick house on the corner 25 feet, on what is sub-lot 3. Bryan and Patterson effected an exchange of lots. December 23,1853, Patterson conveyed to Bryan the east 120.80 feet of the north 26 feet, being lot 1; also the north one foot of lot 2, and the north 26 feet of lot 4. Byran testifies:

“I do recall that in the transactions with Dr. Patterson I mentioned to him that he could get his coal in through the alley. I recall that fact, and I never shall forget a certain remark he made in respect to it; but it was a religious remark about ‘Narrow is the way,’ etc.” This evidence shows Patterson, to whom lot 2 was conveyed, expected to have, and had, the right of way with teams in the alley as an incident to his ownership of his lot. In Cihak v. Klekr, 117 Ill. 643, this court held that where the owner of two tenements, or of an entire estate, has so arranged and adapted them that one tenement or one portion of the estate derives a benefit and advantage from the other, of a permanent, open and visible character, and he sells a portion of the property, the purchaser will take the tenement or portion sold, with all the benefits and burdens which so appear at the time of the sale to belong to it; that it is not' necessary, in such case, that the easement claimed by the grantee must be really necessary for the enjoyment of the estate granted, but it is sufficient if it is highly convenient and beneficial therefor. See, also, Newell v. Sass, 142 Ill. 104.

It appears from the evidence that woodsheds were built about this time in the rear of the Patterson lot (lot 2) and in the rear of lot 3, with the rear wall of the sheds on the east line of the alley in controversy, with an opening or slide-door in the sheds for the purpose of getting in wood or coal from the alley. Bryan, by the deed from Waughop dated August 1, 1853, and the deed from Patterson dated December, 1853, for lot 1, owned lot 1, and also lots 3 and 4 and the stable lot, together with the 6 by 10 strip, and, owning the same, had the right of passage over the 6 by 10 strip and the right to use lot 4 as an alley for teaming purposes. Bryan, in his deed to William Bross dated February 10, 1855, conveyed lot 3, the north 19 feet of lot 4, (the stable lot,) and also the joint use of the 6 by 10 strip and right of way over the alley to Jackson street. The several conveyances from Bross to Ebenezer Higgins and from Ebenezer Higgins to Van H. Higgins, describe the property and rights of way substantially the same as in the deed from Van H. Higgins to Henry Horner. The deed conveys lot 3, also the stable lot, also the use of right of way over the 6-foot strip, and “also the perpetual rig'ht of way over the said private alley, it being a strip of ground about 10.8 feet wide, running from the south line of said stable lot to Jackson street.” After these conveyances Bryan still owned lot 1, 25 by 100 feet, east of the stable lot, and- a lot 20 feet wide west of the private alley. In April, 1855, Bryan sold lot 1, 25 by 100 feet, east of the stable, to Luther Rossiter, which was described as follows: “The north 25 feet of the east 100 feet of said lot 9, together with the perpetual right of way over a strip of ground adjoining said part of lot on the south-west corner thereof, being 6 feet in width, and extending westwardly of an even width of 6 feet to a private alley of 10.80 feet in width running to Jackson street, together, also, with the perpetual right of way over said last named alley running north and south to Jackson street.” In the successive deeds of Bryan to Rossiter, Rossiter to Cutler, Cutler to Stead and Moore, Stead and Moore to Potter Palmer, Palmer to Joseph P. Clarkson, and Clarkson to David Keene, there was in the grant substantially the same language of right of way over the alley to Jackson street.

Where an easement is granted or reserved in express terms by deed, the question then ordinarily is, what is the proper construction of the language of the deed? (Sheppard’s Touchstone, 88.) Prom the language used in the deed from Bryan to Rossiter it was evidently the intention of the grantor to grant a perpetual right of way from said lot 1 to Jackson street for all the ordinary and usual purposes and uses of an alley. The grant did not limit the right of way to foot passage. This right of way was to be enjoyed with others having" a similar right in the same alley and in the same strip of land. The deed from Bryan to Bross of lot 3 and the stable lot granted the joint use of the 6 by 10 strip and right of way over the alley, and not the exclusive use. This deed was not in conflict with the joint use of the strip and alley to the respective grantees of lot 1. A reasonable right of way was to be enjoyed by the owners of lots abutting on this alley. Neither of the rights of way was exclusive of the other, but the complainant Hannah Horner, and the owner of lot 1, and the owners of the other lots abutting on the alley, and their tenants, are entitled to use the said allejr for all reasonable and necessary purposes, including the reasonable use of said alley with teams.

If the deed from Bryan to Bross was intended to grant the exclusive use of the alley to Bross and his grantees when Bryan sold lot 1 to Rossiter, it is not reasonable to presume he would have granted a perpetual right of way over the same alley; but if the intention was to establish a right of way over lot 4 for the benefit of all subsequent owners, a reason can be found for each deed containing substantially the same grant of rig'ht of way. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the owners of lot 1 and the stable lot have a joint use of light and air and right of way over the 6 by 10 strip, and also a joint use of light and air in the excavation of the said 6 by 10 strip, and that the owner of lot 1 is entitled to a perpetual right of way appurtenant to said lot 1 over the private alley in the rear of said lot 1, leading from the 6 by 10 strip to Jackson street, for any and all purposes reasonably necessary or convenient to his premises, including the reasonable use of said private alley with teams, and that complainant, the owner of lot 3, is also possessed of and entitled to a like right of way appurtenant to her said lots over the said alley to Jackson street.

It is contended by plaintiffs in error, there being no terminus of the alley upon lot 1, that therefore the easement was in gross. A right of way will never be presumed to be in gross where it can fairly be construed as appurtenant.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
52 N.E. 492, 177 Ill. 390, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horner-v-keene-ill-1898.