Horner & McCann v. Hower

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Horner & McCann v. Hower

39 Pa. 126, 1861 Pa. LEXIS 172

CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedMay 6, 1861

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 39 Pa. 126 (Horner & McCann v. Hower) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Horner & McCann v. Hower, 39 Pa. 126, 1861 Pa. LEXIS 172 (Pa. 1861).

Pincite

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered,

by Strong, J.

The court below summarily ordered the judgment of Horner & McCann to be satisfied and discharged of record. That a Court of Common Pleas has power to open a judgment upon its record, or to direct an issue to determine whether or not it has been paid, is beyond question-; but whether it can strike from the docket a judgment regularly entered, or compel it to be satisfied, is quite another question. We have not been shown any statute by which such a power is conferred, nor are we aware that any such statute exists. There are, however, Acts of Assembly which, by strong implication, deny that in ordinary cases a court can direct a judgment to be marked satisfied. Thus by the Act of 14th April 1851 (P. L. 612), it was enacted that the courts in the city and county of Philadelphia might, on being satisfied that judgments of more than ten years’ standing had been paid, order satisfaction to be entered. This act was unnecessary, if there exists in courts the power exercised by the Common Pleas in the case now before us. Besides, it is noticeable that it is applicable only to judgments which have been rendered more than ten years. It is a fair deduction from this, that a similar power over judgments of shorter standing was neither supposed to exist, nor intended to be given. The satisfaction of a judgment is something more than control of a record. It not only annihilates the judgment, but it extinguishes both the evidence of a debt and the debt itself. We do not think it clear that our courts possess the power to do this -summarily. They may order an issue to try whether a judgment has been actually paid. If the result be to establish that it has, the defendant may enforce the entry of satisfaction under the Act of 13th April 1791. Such an issue should have been [129]*129oi’dered in this case, and we find ourselves constrained to send it back that such a course may be pursued. The evidence brought up would render such a course proper, even if the power of the court to order satisfaction were undoubted.

The order of the court directing the judgment to be satisfied and discharged of record is reversed, and the record is remitted.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

The opinion of the court was delivered,

by Strong, J.

The court below summarily ordered the judgment of Horner & McCann to be satisfied and discharged of record. That a Court of Common Pleas has power to open a judgment upon its record, or to direct an issue to determine whether or not it has been paid, is beyond question-; but whether it can strike from the docket a judgment regularly entered, or compel it to be satisfied, is quite another question. We have not been shown any statute by which such a power is conferred, nor are we aware that any such statute exists. There are, however, Acts of Assembly which, by strong implication, deny that in ordinary cases a court can direct a judgment to be marked satisfied. Thus by the Act of 14th April 1851 (P. L. 612), it was enacted that the courts in the city and county of Philadelphia might, on being satisfied that judgments of more than ten years’ standing had been paid, order satisfaction to be entered. This act was unnecessary, if there exists in courts the power exercised by the Common Pleas in the case now before us. Besides, it is noticeable that it is applicable only to judgments which have been rendered more than ten years. It is a fair deduction from this, that a similar power over judgments of shorter standing was neither supposed to exist, nor intended to be given. The satisfaction of a judgment is something more than control of a record. It not only annihilates the judgment, but it extinguishes both the evidence of a debt and the debt itself. We do not think it clear that our courts possess the power to do this -summarily. They may order an issue to try whether a judgment has been actually paid. If the result be to establish that it has, the defendant may enforce the entry of satisfaction under the Act of 13th April 1791. Such an issue should have been [129]*129oi’dered in this case, and we find ourselves constrained to send it back that such a course may be pursued. The evidence brought up would render such a course proper, even if the power of the court to order satisfaction were undoubted.

The order of the court directing the judgment to be satisfied and discharged of record is reversed, and the record is remitted.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

39 Pa. 126, 1861 Pa. LEXIS 172, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horner-mccann-v-hower-pa-1861.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack