Hornemann v. Leal

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: February 12, 2024
• Docket: 1:23-cv-01615
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 DIETER HORNEMANN, Case No. 1:23-cv-01615-JLT-CDB

9 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO (1) DISMISS COMPLAINT WITHOUT 10 v. LEAVE TO AMEND, (2) DENY MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, AND (3) 11 TARA LEAL, et al., DENY APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT 12 Defendants. (Docs. 1 – 3) 13 14-DAY DEADLINE 14 15 16 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 17 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff filed his complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on November 18 16, 2023. (Docs. 1, 2). The matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Local Rule 302 19 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). 20 I. Screening Requirement 21 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who seek to proceed in 22 forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this screening provision, the Court must dismiss 23 a complaint or a portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon 24 which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 25 such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B). Moreover, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 12(h)(3), the Court must dismiss an action it the Court determines that it lacks subject matter 27 jurisdiction. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “a short and plain 1 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief [.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 2 This means that the complaint must state its claims simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry 3 v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the 4 defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which the claims rest. See 5 Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 6 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke 7 v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 8 1984). The Court may dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless 9 legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. The 10 central question is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable 11 legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 12 F.2d at 1227. 13 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the complaint must contain more than 14 “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Bell 15 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted). 16 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 17 statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 18 upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 19 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 20 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 21 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 22 the Court must accept the allegations as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 23 In reviewing a pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings in the light 24 most favorable to the plaintiff and resolve all doubts in plaintiff’s favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 25 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (“where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, 26 [courts should] should construe the pleadings liberally and . . . afford the petitioner the benefit of 27 any doubt.”); see U.S. v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 992-93 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is an entrenched 1 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (citations and internal quotations omitted). However, 2 while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 3 555. 4 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations 5 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of 6 the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 7 Plaintiff brings claims against Tara Leal (“Leal”), Julia Barrera (“Barrera”), and Marina 8 Mercado (“Mercado”), as employees of the Clerk’s Office of the California Superior Court, 9 County of Kern County (“Kern Clerk’s Office”), as well as against the Kern Clerk’s Office. (Doc. 10 1 at 2). Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a complaint petition prior to July 31, 2023 (presumably 11 to one or more of the Defendants associated with the Kern Clerk’s Office) but that Defendant 12 Mercado “withheld” from Plaintiff the fact that “the petition had been confirmed.” Id. at 3. It 13 was only later after Plaintiff called Mercado multiple times over the course of “many days” that 14 Mercado told Plaintiff that the petition had been confirmed. Id. 15 However, at the same time that Mercado told Plaintiff that his petition had been 16 confirmed, Plaintiff received an order from the judge in the case saying that Plaintiff only had 60 17 days from the date of a confirmation of a petition to file service of process. Id. Plaintiff again 18 called the clerk’s office and spoke to a different deputy clerk who informed Plaintiff that he only 19 had a fraction of time left to complete service of process. It appears that because of this delay, 20 Plaintiff was able to complete service of process only on the eve of the terminal date provided. Id. 21 Plaintiff further claims that the clerk ignored his entry for a default judgment. Id. 22 Plaintiff also alleges a second occurrence where he filed a petition against “Hibbard” on 23 October 6, 2023, and specifically told the clerk that the statute of limitations for his claim would 24 expire on October 9. Id. at 3-4. However, four days later, the clerk’s office rejected his petition. 25 Id. at 4. Plaintiff asserts that he complied with the instructions and that the statute of limitations 26 lapsed due to Defendant Barrera’s actions. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that he delivered the petition 27 to the clerk’s office on October 6, but the petition was only confirmed on October 27, 2023, 1 Hibbard petition, but an unnamed clerk wanted to stamp with the date October 17, 2023. Id. 2 When Plaintiff told the clerk that October 17 was beyond the date of the statute of limitations, the 3 clerk “rudely” told Plaintiff that he would have to accept the October 17 date, or the Hibbard 4 petition would not be filed. Id. 5 Plaintiff also complains of a third petition that he filed on October 6, 2023, against 6 “Shryock etc.” The Shryock petition apparently was never submitted and needed more 7 corrections. Plaintiff suspects that the clerk of the court lied to him. Id. at 4. 8 Plaintiff further asserts that every time he submitted paperwork, it was returned by the 9 clerk’s office because he “didn’t cross his t’s nor dot his I’s.” Id. He alleges that when he went to 10 the clerk’s office on October 27, 2023, to return his corrected filing, he encountered two licensed 11 attorneys who did not appear to have the same issues that he had as a self-represented litigant. Id. 12 at 5. Plaintiff alleges that licensed attorneys are being treated differently than self-represented 13 persons. Id. 14 Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff appears to assert causes of action pursuant to 28 15 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242. Id. at 6. He requests an award for “50000.00 for each 16 petition and 2000.0 medical expenses, and punitive damages” because of his denial of equal 17 protection under the law and preventing him from filing his petitions in a timely manner. Id. 18 The Court notes that all defendants in this action are sued in their official capacities. (Doc. 19 1 p. 2). 20 III. Discussion 21 A. Defendants are Immune From Suit in Federal Court 22 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against a 23 nonconsenting state. Munoz v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., -- F.4th --, 2024 WL 89380, at 24 *2 (9th Cir. Jan. 9, 2024). “This prohibition applies when the “state or the ‘arm of a state’ is a 25 defendant.”” Id. (quoting Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422 (9th Cir. 1991)). 26 Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well as those where the state 27 itself is named as a defendant. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 96 F.3d 420, 421 1 The Court of Appels has squarely held that the Superior Court of the State of California 2 has sovereign immunity as an arm of the state and, thus, is immune from suit in federal court 3 under the Eleventh Amendment. Munoz, 2024 WL 89380, at *2. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims 4 against Defendant Kern Clerk’s Office fails as a matter of law. 5 In Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson (595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021)), the Supreme Court held 6 that state-court judges and state-court clerks are immune from suit in federal court under the 7 Eleventh Amendment. The Court reasoned that these individuals are immune because they “do 8 not enforce state laws as executive officials might” and because any errors they make in 9 connection with their official duties can be remedied through “some form of appeal.” Munoz, 10 2024 WL 89380, at *2 (quoting Jackson). For these same reasons, it is likely Defendants Leal, 11 Barrera, and Mercado, as employees of the Kern Clerk’s Office, enjoy immunity under the 12 Eleventh Amendment to the same extent as the clerk’s office. See Aholelei v. Dept. of Public 13 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money 14 damages in a federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official 15 capacities”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants 16 Leal, Barrera, and Mercado, also fail as a matter of law under the Eleventh Amendment. 17 To the extent that Plaintiff brings claims against the individual defendants for allegedly 18 preventing him from filing his “three petitions in a timely manner,” dismissal also is warranted 19 because Defendants Leal, Barrera, and Mercado separately are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial 20 immunity. “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil rights 21 violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process.” Mullis v. U.S. 22 Bankr. Ct. for the Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). In Mullis, a debtor brought 23 a civil rights action against bankruptcy court clerks. Id. The plaintiff alleged that the bankruptcy 24 court clerks accepted and filed his bankruptcy petition, but then allegedly violated his 25 constitutional rights by refusing to accept and file his amended petition. Id. The Court of Appeals 26 held that the clerks’ refusal to accept and file an amended petition was an integral part of the 27 judicial process. Id. 1 petition had been confirmed (Doc. 1 at 3), rejected a different petition (which caused it to be 2 refiled after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations), and rejected a third petition 3 because he needed to make corrections. Id. at 4. As in Mullis, the conduct Plaintiff alleges 4 Defendants engaged in was part-and-parcel with their core duties as deputy clerks, which is “an 5 integral part of the judicial process.” See, e.g., Stribling v. Matherly, No. 2:18-cv-01086-CKD-P, 6 2018 WL 6042782, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2018) (court clerk was entitled to absolute quasi- 7 judicial immunity for allegedly returning a plaintiff’s filing because it did not comply with the e- 8 filing requirements); Juarez v. Clerk, U.S. Fed. Ct., San Jose, No. C 08-5691 RMW (PR), 2009 9 WL 385796, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2009) (court clerk was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial 10 immunity for allegedly failing to send plaintiff court opinion denying his previously filed federal 11 case); Palacios v. Fresno Cnty. Superior Ct., No. 1:08-cv-0158-OWW-DLB, 2008 WL 314337, 12 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2008) (court clerk was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for 13 allegedly providing plaintiff with misinformation). Relevant here, a court clerk sued for refusing 14 to file a document is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity so long as the acts complained of are 15 within the Court’s jurisdiction. See Hill v. Sacramento Cnty. Ct. Clerk, No. 2:20-cv-01477-KJM- 16 DMC-P, 2020 WL 6446103, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020) (citing Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1390). 17 Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Leal, Barrera, and Mercado, also fail as a matter of 18 law because Defendants enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity. 19 B. Leave to Amend Would Be Futile 20 The Court of Appeals has “repeatedly held that ‘a district court should grant leave to 21 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 22 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 23 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). 24 “The decision of whether to grant leave to amend nevertheless remains within the discretion of 25 the district court,” which may deny leave to amend if allowing amendment would unduly 26 prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the party seeking amendment 27 has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). 1 | and the employee-Defendants are barred as a matter of law based on Eleventh Amendment 2 | immunity and quasi-judicial immunity. These defects cannot be cured through the assertion of 3 | additional facts; therefore, amendment would be futile. Jd. Accordingly, leave to amend should 4 | be denied. 5 | IV. Order and Recommendation 6 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 7 1. The complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend for failure to state a 8 claim; 9 2. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default judgment (Doc. 3) be DENIED as moot; 10 3. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be DENIED as moot; 11 4. The Clerk of the Court be DIRECTED to CLOSE this action. 12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the District Judge assigned to this 13 | action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 304. Within 14 days of 14 | service of these findings and recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 15 | Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 16 | Recommendations.” The District Judge will review the Magistrate Judge’s findings and 17 | recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 18 | objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 19 | Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th 20 | Cir. 1991)). 21 | SOORDERED. ** | Dated: _February 9, 2024 | Wr bo 23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27 28