Horne v. Moody

146 S.W.2d 505
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 21, 1940
DocketNo. 10659.
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 146 S.W.2d 505 (Horne v. Moody) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Horne v. Moody, 146 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Ct. App. 1940).

Opinion

' NORVELL, Justice.

This is an action of trespass to try title brought by A. A. Horne against W. L. Moody, Jr., seeking a recovery of title and possession of Surveys Nos. 1008 and 1009, Jim Hogg County, Texas. Horne established a prima facie case which Moody attempted to rebut by showing that the lands in controversy were within the boundaries of prior grants of the State of Tamaulipas, namely, Las Viboritas, jurisdiction of Mi-er, Francisco Montalbo original grantee, and El Sordo, jurisdiction of' Guerrero, Luis Vela original grantee.

On the trial it was conceded that Moody had title to the land in controversy, provided the same was within the boundaries of the prior Mexican grants. The questions presented are with reference to the true location of the north and west boundaries of the Viboritas and the north and east boundaries of the Sordo.

Trial was to the court without a jury. Judgment was rendered for Moody. Findings of fact and conclusions of law were *507 filed. Horne brings the case here upon assignments attacking such findings and conclusions.

The following plat shows the approximate location of the surveys and grants in controversy:

*508 We first consider Survey No. 1008. It is appellant’s contention that the true north line of the Viboritas is that shown upon the map as the Lara Survey. That contention is sustained by us, and we therefore hold that Survey 1008 is outside the boundaries of the Viboritas, and the trial court was in error in denying appellant judgment therefor.

The Viboritas was granted to Francisco Montalbo, a citizen of Mier, by the State of Tamaulipas in 1831. A survey of the grant was made during that year by a State surveyor named Lara. The field notes were introduced in evidence upon the trial, and a surveyor, C. A. Douglas, whose qualifications were admitted by both parties, testified that these original field notes could be followed, and that he had made a re-survey of the grant, following in the footsteps of Lara, and located the grant upon the ground. This re-survey by Douglas has been examined by us and, in our opinion, correctly locates the north line of the Viboritas.

The appellee does not question the accuracy of the Douglas re-survey, but contends that the north boundary line of the Viboritas has been established as an extension of the north boundary line of Survey 162 to the east, and the west boundary line has been established as coinciding with the east boundary line of Survey 162. It is urged that these boundary lines are binding upon the parties to this suit, under the doctrine of “stare decisis,” and it appears that the trial court rendered its judgment on this theory.

In 1913, the heirs of A. Allen, deceased, as the owners of Survey No. 162, brought two suits, one against Harry Edds, owner • of Survey No. 208, and the other against J. J. Draper and others, as owners of Survey No. 207. These cases were consolidated and tried together. An appeal was taken from the judgment of the district court to this Court. See Allen v. Draper, 204 S.W. 792. Writ of error was granted and final judgment rendered by the Supreme Court, upon the. recommendation of the Commission of Appeals. See 254 S.W. 783.

The field notes of the Allen Survey (No. 162) call for the northwest corner of the Viboritas as well as the west boundary line thereof.

The Allen heirs based their suit upon the theory that the true northwest corner of the Viboritas and true northeast corner of Section 162 was located at a point where a line running north from a point known as Chaparros Prietos (clump of black brush) would intersect a line running west from a point marked with two large stones supposed to be the northeast corner of Viboritas, and that there was a conflict between Survey 162 and Surveys 207 and 208. The 'defendants, or at least some of them, controverted this theory in their pleading and asserted that plaintiffs were attempting to “pull and place said Survey (162) further west than as originally located and thereby lapping the same over, upon and causing the same to conflict” with Surveys 207 and 208, when there was in fact no conflict.

It does not appear that any of the parties to this litigation attempted to locate the northwest corner, or the west line of the Viboritas by using the original Lara field notes to the grant. A surveyor named Hayes Dix testified that Chaparros Prietos had been pointed out by his father as the southwest corner of the Viboritas, and was reputed to be the corner of the grant, although the Chaparros Prietos is not mentioned in the Lara field notes. It also appears that the two large stones taken as the northeast corner were probably established as such by J. E. Martin, who surveyed the grant for a patent as the result of certain court proceedings had in Starr County, which were probably void due to a lack of jurisdiction of the Starr County District Court.

At the conclusion of the testimony both sides admitted that there were no issues of fact to go to the jury, and that the “only issues or issue in the case was one purely of law to be decided by the court.”

The holdings of the trial court, this Court and the Supreme Court in the case are sufficiently set out in the opinions reported in 204 S.W. 792, and 254 S.W. 783.

The contention of appellee is that in the former case the trial court must have necessarily determined the northwest corner and west boundary line of the Viboritas,. in order to determine the correct location of Survey 162, and the consequent finding of a conflict between Section 162 and Sections 207 and 208; that this finding was approved hy this Court and left undis *509 turbed and possibly approved by the Supreme Court. His counter-proposition reads as follows: “The trial court had no alternative but to locate the north and west boundary lines of Las Viboritas Grant, and the north and east boundary lines of El Sordo Grant, as he did locate them, because the judgments of the trial court, the Court of Civil Appeals and the Supreme Court, in the case of Allen et al. (204 S.W. 792, and 254 S.W. 783) in so locating such boundary lines were and are binding on the courts in the pending cause under the doctrine of stare decisis.”

There is no contention that the doctrine of res judicata has application here, but it seems to be appellee’s contention that the principle of stare decisis, in effect, accomplishes the same result in cases involving boundaries, even though there is no identity of parties or subject matter in the two cases. We do not understand that the doctrine of stare decisis as applied to boundary cases in this State has the broad application urged by appellee.

In the case of Turner v. Smith, 122 Tex. 338, 61 S.W.2d 792, the Supreme Court had before it the question of the proper construction of Block 194, G. C. and S. F. Ry. Co. Surveys, Pecos County, Texas, and after an exhaustive discussion of the various contentions involved held as a matter of law that the surveys in Block No. 194 should be constructed eastward by course and distance alone, without giving effect to calls for adjoinder on the south with Block 178, T. C. Ry. Co.’s Survey. In Federal Royalty Co. v. State, 128 Tex.

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Bluebook (online)
146 S.W.2d 505, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horne-v-moody-texapp-1940.