1 This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 2 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 3 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 4 deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 5 filing date. 6 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
7 JOHN N. HORNE,
8 Plaintiff-Appellant,
9 v. NO. 29,822
10 LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL SECURITY, 11 LLC, GEORGE PETER NANOS, and 12 KEVIN W. JONES,
13 Defendants-Appellees.
14 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LOS ALAMOS COUNTY 15 Stephen D. Pfeffer, District Judge
16 Timothy L. Butler 17 Santa Fe, NM
18 for Appellant
19 Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb PA 20 Jeffrey Lowry 21 Thomas A. Outler 22 Albuquerque, NM
23 for Appellees
24 MEMORANDUM OPINION
25 BUSTAMANTE, Judge. 1 Plaintiff John Horne prevailed in a binding arbitration against Los Alamos
2 National Security, LLC, (LANS) on a grievance he filed regarding discipline imposed
3 on him after an incident in which classified materials were not properly accounted for.
4 Neither Horne nor LANS moved to confirm, modify, or vacate the award.
5 Subsequently, Horne filed a lawsuit against LANS and two LANS employees. The
6 district court awarded summary judgment in favor of LANS, concluding that Horne’s
7 exclusive remedy was a timely motion to vacate or correct the arbitration award, and
8 that his claims had been waived. Because LANS has not shown whether the arbitrator
9 ruled on the scope of the arbitration agreement, and because this appears to be a
10 disputed issue of material fact, we reverse.
11 I. BACKGROUND
12 For the purposes of its motion to dismiss, LANS accepted the allegations in
13 Horne’s complaint as true. Horne began work at Los Alamos National Laboratory in
14 September 1983. He started as a machinist and eventually worked his way to the
15 explosive testings group. By fall of 2003 Horne was an “experimentalist” in the
16 explosive testings group, responsible for completing hydrodynamics tests. Horne’s
17 job frequently required him to access classified material.
18 Laboratory policy required that employees notify a classified matter custodian
19 (CMC) of the creation of physical media containing classified information (called
2 1 “CREM,” for Classified Removable Electronic Media) so that the CMC could enter
2 the CREM into an accountability system. Operating procedures called for employees
3 to obtain bar codes from the CMC, affix the bar codes to the CREM, and give the
4 CREM to the CMC for entry into the system. If the CMC was not available,
5 employees were to place the CREM in a secure depository and notify the CMC that
6 they had done so.
7 In the fall of 2003 Horne was assisting with a conference. During this
8 conference, ten classified zip disks were created for which Horne was responsible.
9 Horne had been given twelve bar codes to use to identify any CREM that were
10 created. Unbeknownst to Horne, the CMC had already entered each of the bar codes
11 into the accountability system. The CMC did not remove the two unused bar codes
12 from the system when he received the ten disks from Horne.
13 Subsequently, an audit showed that CREM associated with the two bar codes
14 were missing. The lab eventually determined that the discrepancy was due to the
15 CMC entering the two bar codes into the system that had never actually been
16 associated with CREM. Nevertheless, Horne was placed on two weeks of unpaid
17 leave and was issued a security infraction for failing to account for the CREM. Based
18 on these events, on January 24, 2005, Horne filed an internal administrative
19 complaint.
3 1 Over two years later, on May 9, 2007, Horne and LANS entered into a Formal
2 Hearing Agreement—essentially an agreement to arbitrate. The agreement specified
3 that a “formal hearing will resolve all matters raised in the complaint that have not
4 been previously resolved.” It further specified that “[t]he employee agrees that s/he
5 will not file any administrative or legal actions regarding the matters raised in the
6 complaint.” The agreement also provides that any hearings held
7 will be conducted under the authority of and in accordance with the 8 provisions of AM 111 [Laboratory’s Administrative Manual Policy] and 9 the rules of the organization providing the hearing officer, insofar as the 10 organization’s rules are consistent with AM 111. In the event of a 11 conflict between AM 111 and the rules of the organization, AM 111 will 12 take precedence.
13 AM 111 is LANS own complaint resolution policy.
14 Horne’s administrative complaint was attached to the agreement and indicated
15 that the remedies sought by Horne were “removal of letter of reprimand, repay[ment
16 of ten] days of compensation including benefits[,] reinstate[ment of] lost vacation
17 time[, and] reimbursement of any fees incurred.” Two boxes were checked on the
18 administrative complaint. The first was for “Salary decrease, withholding of a salary
19 increase, demotion, or suspension without pay.” The second was for “Retaliation for
20 using AM 111 or any other policy that protects employees from retaliation.” The
21 complaint included an attachment describing the adverse effects on Horne’s
22 employment:
4 1 This situation has had severe consequences in my personal life and has 2 caused irreparable harm to my reputation and to my ability to advance 3 in the career path that I had chosen to pursue. The association of my 4 good name to the unsubstantiated claims and unethical actions of Pete 5 Nanos, Kevin Jones, Mary Hockaday, Mike Irving, et al. has created a 6 hostile work environment for me as well as essentially destroying any 7 hope for future advancement. This shameless attempt to validate the 8 aforementioned acts and accusations through official sanction is not only 9 unethical but is in violation of AM111, AM112, and AM729.
10 On June 21, 2007, Horne signed and submitted a demand for arbitration under
11 the American Arbitration Association Employment Arbitration Rules Demand for
12 Arbitration (demand for arbitration). Horne asserts the demand for arbitration form
13 was prepared by LANS and presented to him for signature. The demand for
14 arbitration describes the nature of the dispute as:
15 Was the written reprimand with a ten-day suspension without pay issued 16 to Mr. Horne on December 16, 2004[,] done in compliance with 17 laboratory policies and procedures? Was Mr. Horne retaliated against 18 for having utilized the IG’s whistleblower hotline?
19 Also, the demand for arbitration describes the claim or relief sought as:
20 AM 111 (the laboratory’s internal grievance process): “A hearing officer 21 is limited to restoring any pay benefits, or rights lost as a result of the 22 action taken and may, in his or her discretion, award costs, expenses and 23 attorney[] fees in favor of the prevailing employee.
24 The arbitrator heard the dispute on December 11, 2007. Horne asserts that he
25 “sought to expand the scope of the hearing to deal completely with all of the issues
26 raised in his administrative grievance[,]” but that his request was denied. Horne also
5 1 notes that at the arbitration hearing, he “withdrew” his IG retaliation claim. Horne
2 asserts he “agreed the only issue to be tried was the policy and procedure violation,
3 objected to the improper narrow scope of the proceeding . . . and specifically reserved
4 his rights to bring other claims outside the scope of the arbitration.”
5 The arbitrator issued his decision on February 20, 2008, finding that the
6 “decisions to find an ‘infraction’ on the part of Mr. Horne, and to administer discipline
7 on that basis are wholly unreasonable.” The arbitrator ordered LANS to (1) pay all
8 wages and benefits lost by Horne; (2) reimburse Horne’s attorney fees; and (3)
9 “restore any loss of rights which Mr. Horne may have sustained as a result of the
10 unfounded ‘infraction’ and the adverse personnel action arising from the report of that
11 infraction.” The decision does not elaborate as to what those rights might be. Neither
12 Horne nor LANS attempted to vacate or to confirm the arbitrator’s judgment. Horne
13 took a voluntary reduction in force in December 2007. The record does not indicate
14 whether he did this before or after the hearing.
15 The only direct evidence of the arbitration proceedings in the record is the
16 interim decision and award of arbitrator. The decision does not reveal any explicit
17 finding by the arbitrator as to the scope of the arbitration. The decision does quote
18 AM111.16 as an apparent guide to what the arbitrator perceived as his task at least
19 with regard to remedies. AM 111.16 provides: “A hearing officer . . . is limited to
6 1 restoring any pay, benefits or rights lost as a result of the action taken and may, in his
2 or her discretion, award costs, expenses, and attorney[] fees in favor of the prevailing
3 party.” The decision does not include any factual findings or conclusions concerning
4 retaliation.
5 On December 12, 2008, about ten months after the date of the award, Horne
6 filed this lawsuit in district court. The eight-count complaint alleged retaliation under
7 the New Mexico Fraud Against Taxpayers Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 44-9-1 to -14 (2007),
8 breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
9 intentional infliction of emotional distress, constructive discharge, tortious
10 interference with existing contractual relations, civil conspiracy, and, in the
11 alternative, prima facie tort.
12 Rather than file an answer, LANS filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for
13 summary judgment. The only statement of undisputed material fact that LANS made
14 relevant to this appeal was that LANS and Horne had entered into an agreement to
15 arbitrate, which was attached. LANS argued that the claims were within the scope of
16 the arbitration agreement and that Horne had expressly waived his right to litigate
17 claims within the scope of the agreement.
18 The district court granted LANS’ motion. At the hearing, the district court
19 indicated that, under the holding of United Technology & Resources, Inc. v. Dar Al
7 1 Islam, 115 N.M. 1, 4, 846 P.2d 307, 310 (1993), it was Horne’s responsibility to move
2 to vacate or correct the award within ninety days. At the conclusion of the hearing the
3 district court noted that Horne’s failure to do so “amount[ed] to a waiver of the claims
4 brought forth in this action.” The written order actually dismissing the case appears
5 to adopt a slightly different theory, observing that “Horne entered into an arbitration
6 agreement that waived his right to seek judicial relief for the claims set forth in this
7 lawsuit.”
8 II. DISCUSSION
9 Horne argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
10 essentially three ways: (1) by determining his only means of contesting the scope of
11 the arbitration was to move to vacate or correct the award, (2) by concluding that the
12 scope of the arbitration agreement was broad, and (3) by upholding the arbitration
13 when the arbitration agreement was unconscionable. We address each argument in
14 turn.
15 Because LANS’ motion relies on matters outside the complaint, we treat it as
16 a motion for summary judgment. See Rule 1-012(B) NMRA. “Summary judgment
17 may be proper when the moving party establishes a prima facie case for summary
18 judgment.” Edward C. v. City of Albuquerque, 2010-NMSC-043, ¶ 43, 148 N.M. 646,
19 241 P.3d 1086. Because resolution on the merits is favored, a reviewing court
8 1 “view[s] the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and
2 draw[s] all reasonable inferences in support of a trial on the merits.” Handmaker v.
3 Henney, 1999-NMSC-043, ¶ 18, 128 N.M. 328, 992 P.2d 879. In contrast, “New
4 Mexico also has a ‘strong public policy encouraging dispute resolution through
5 arbitration and favoring finality and strictly limited court review of arbitration
6 awards.’” K.R. Swerdfeger Constr., Inc. v. UNM Bd. of Regents, 2006-NMCA-117,
7 ¶ 27, 140 N.M. 374, 142 P.3d 962 (quoting Spaw-Glass Constr. Servs., Inc. v. Vista
8 de Santa Fe, Inc., 114 N.M. 557, 558, 844 P.2d 807, 808 (1992)).
9 A. Scope and Waiver
10 1. Waiver and Section 44-7A-24
11 The ability of a district court to review an arbitral award is narrowly limited by
12 statute. NMSA 1978, Sections 44-7A-24 and -25 (2001), set forth the criteria under
13 which a district court may vacate, modify, or correct an award. Motions under these
14 statutes must be made within ninety days of when the movant receives the award. Id.
15 Unless a timely motion is made, the district court may not disturb an award. See
16 United Tech., 115 N.M. at 5, 846 P.2d at 311.
17 At the hearing, the district court indicated that it based its decision on United
18 Technology. United Technology involved a dispute between a developer and a builder
19 over payment for a construction project. Id. at 2, 846 P.2d at 308. Pursuant to the
9 1 construction contract, the matter was submitted to arbitration. Id. The arbitrator
2 awarded the disputed amount to the builder but denied the builder’s request for
3 attorney fees. Id. Neither party moved to confirm or vacate the award within the
4 ninety-day statutory period. See id. at 4, 846 P.2d at 310. Almost one year after the
5 award, the developer applied to the district court for confirmation. See id. at 2, 846
6 P.2d at 308. During the presentment hearing, the builder attempted to raise the issue
7 of attorney fees. See id. The district court confirmed the award, and our Supreme
8 Court affirmed, noting that only a timely motion to vacate, modify, or correct the
9 award would have allowed the district court to review the arbitrator’s decision not to
10 grant the fees. See id. at 5, 846 P.2d at 311. In reaching its decision, the Supreme
11 Court applied a rule from other jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform
12 Arbitration Act that a party to arbitration who did not assert a substantive defense
13 within the statutory period was barred from later asserting it. Id.
14 The instant case is distinguishable from United Technology. The district court
15 remarked at the hearing that it was persuaded by United Technology that Horne’s
16 failure to move to vacate or correct the award within the statutory period operated as
17 a waiver. However, unlike the claims in this case, the claim for attorney fees in
18 United Technology was actually decided by the arbitrator. Here, LANS has not
10 1 shown—or even attempted to demonstrate—that the arbitrator actually ruled on the
2 scope of the arbitration or on the claims Horne now pursues.
3 To the extent that the district court’s ruling was based on Horne’s failure to
4 move to vacate the award, it was in error. Because LANS has not produced evidence
5 that the arbitrator had previously ruled on the scope or the claims, LANS has not made
6 a prima facie case that it was entitled to summary judgment on these grounds. We do
7 not believe that Section 44-7A-24 bestows finality upon matters that were not decided
8 by the arbitrator. Instead, whether a participant is barred from pursuing claims he
9 could have pursued (but did not) at arbitration is a question of claim preclusion, a
10 defense that is not yet at issue in this case. Accordingly, summary judgment was not
11 appropriate on these grounds based on the limited facts presented.
12 2. Scope of the Arbitration Agreement
13 In awarding summary judgment to LANS, the district court concluded that
14 Horne had “waived his right to seek judicial relief for the claims set forth in this
15 lawsuit.” Implicit in this conclusion is that the claims in this lawsuit were within the
16 scope of the arbitration. The district court thus appears to have agreed with LANS
17 that the scope of the arbitration was broad enough to encompass the claims in this suit.
18 We address this issue because it appears that the arbitrator did not make any explicit
11 1 findings related to the scope of the agreement. To the extent the decision addresses
2 the issue of scope, it treats it as a narrow matter limited to the propriety of discipline.
3 Paragraph four of the arbitration agreement provides that “[t]he hearing officer
4 will have exclusive authority to resolve disputes relating to . . . applicability of this
5 Agreement.” Accordingly, even if the arbitrator did not address the scope of the
6 arbitration, the question of scope was still for the arbitrator to decide. However, the
7 parties chose to invoke the district court’s authority to resolve the question, and have
8 therefore waived arbitration. See Wood v. Millers Nat’l Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 525, 527-
9 28, 632 P.2d 1163, 1165-66 (1981) (holding that the right to arbitrate is waived when
10 a “party seeking to compel arbitration invokes the court’s discretionary power, prior
11 to demanding arbitration, on a question other than its demand for arbitration”). Thus,
12 to the extent that the arbitrator did not rule on the scope of the arbitration agreement
13 or the claims at issue here, it was properly before the district court.
14 We review the district court’s interpretation of the scope of the arbitration
15 agreement de novo. See Campos v. Homes by Joe Boyden, L.L.C., 2006-NMCA-086,
16 ¶ 7, 140 N.M. 122, 140 P.3d 543. “Interpretation of broad arbitration provisions
17 requires the court to focus on the subject matter of the underlying agreement and the
18 subject matter of the dispute.” Id. ¶ 9. “[T]he subject matter of the underlying
12 1 agreement determines the scope of the arbitration provision.” Santa Fe Techs., Inc.
2 v. Argus Networks, Inc., 2002-NMCA-030, ¶ 56, 131 N.M. 772, 42 P.3d 1221.
3 The issue arises most frequently in motions to compel arbitration. In Santa Fe
4 Technologies, two corporations, Argus and Santa Fe Technologies (SFT), entered into
5 a contract for a possible merger in preparation to bid on a federal project. Id. ¶ 4. The
6 contract contained a clause requiring arbitration of “any breach, default, dispute,
7 controversy, or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement.” Id. ¶ 5 (internal
8 quotation marks omitted). Argus eventually decided it would prefer to work with a
9 different partner and terminated its deal with SFT. Id. ¶ 9. Argus purchased a third
10 company and won the bid for the federal project with that company. Id. ¶ 10. SFT
11 sued, alleging tortious interference with a contract and usurpation of a business
12 opportunity. Id. ¶ 11. Argus moved to compel arbitration, but the district court
13 refused, and we affirmed noting that “[o]ur case law requires a closer connection
14 between the subject matter of the agreement and the subject matter of the dispute.”
15 Id. ¶ 56. Although the arbitration clause was broad, it was still limited by the scope
16 of the contract. See id. ¶¶ 55-57. Since the contract discussed methods of closing the
17 potential merger and did not discuss the bid on the federal project, the arbitration
18 clause did not apply. Id. ¶ 55.
13 1 In Campos, this Court again looked to the underlying subject matter to
2 determine the scope of the agreement. Buyers had purchased a house, allegedly based
3 on false representations of seller that adjacent land would not be developed. See
4 Campos, 2006-NMCA-086, ¶ 2. As part of the purchase, buyers were enrolled in a
5 home warranty program. Id. ¶ 3. The program had a broad arbitration clause that,
6 among other things, required arbitration of claims of negligent or intentional
7 misrepresentation. Id. ¶ 4. When buyers sued, sellers moved to compel arbitration.
8 See id. ¶ 2. The district court denied the motion to compel arbitration. Id. We
9 affirmed, holding that the arbitration clause was directed to the subject matter of the
10 warranty in which it was contained. See id. ¶¶ 2, 10. Since the warranty addressed
11 structural defects, not the condition of adjoining land, the claim about
12 misrepresentation of the adjoining land during the sale was not required to be
13 arbitrated. See id. ¶ 13.
14 Following Santa Fe Technologies and Campos, we examine the subject matter
15 of the agreement to determine the scope of the arbitration. The agreement was limited
16 to the resolution of “all matters raised in the complaint.” The complaint was attached
17 to the agreement. We discern the following subject matter in the complaint. The
18 complaint explicitly refers to “[r]etaliation for using AM 111 or any other policy that
19 protects employees from retaliation, including AM 101, AM 711, AM 729, AM 730,
14 1 and AM 731.” An attachment the complaint, also mentions hostile work environment
2 and Horne’s difficulty in continuing on in his chosen career as an Experimentalist,
3 singling out the behavior of Nanos and Jones. In contrast, as quoted above, the
4 demand for arbitration only referenced the propriety of the employee discipline
5 imposed and the matter of retaliation “for having utilized the IG’s whistleblower
6 hotline[.]”
7 LANS made no showing as to the actual scope of the arbitration beyond the
8 administrative complaint. LANS’ theory clearly is one of claim preclusion; that is,
9 having submitted to arbitration any portion of his employment claims Horne is
10 precluded from asserting any other claims in any other forum. That may be the end
11 result of the inquiry. But the matter cannot be determined on the agreement and
12 administrative complaint alone, and not in the face of (1) Horne’s assertions that he
13 tried to expand the scope and was not allowed to after LANS objected, (2) the
14 language of the demand for arbitration, (3) the lack of any finding by the arbitrator as
15 to scope, and (4) the lack of any reference to retaliation in the arbitrator’s decision.
16 This last factor lends credence to Horne’s assertion that he withdrew his retaliation
17 claim and was allowed to do so by LANS and the arbitrator.
18 In sum, LANS failed to make a prima facie case entitling it to summary
19 judgment. We will not sort out the issue of scope on the limited record available to
15 1 us. On remand it might be of some value to provide the district court some access to
2 the actual proceedings before the arbitrator.
16 1 B. Unconscionability
2 Horne’s remaining argument is that the district court erred in failing to find the
3 agreement to arbitrate unconscionable. Specifically, he contends that it was
4 unconscionable for him to have to choose between arbitration and filing a lawsuit
5 before he had access to relevant documents possessed by LANS. He claims that
6 “LANS successfully manipulated [him] into making an election of remedies, [which]
7 significantly limit[ed] LANS[’] legal liability.” Horne acknowledges that arbitration
8 “in the abstract” is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.
9 As Horne has not related the facts of his case to the tests for procedural or
10 substantive unconscionability, we must attempt to parse his argument ourselves. We
11 generally agree with LANS that Horne appears to make two arguments. First, we
12 understand Horne to argue that the agreement was procedurally unconscionable
13 because LANS did not provide Horne with discovery until after Horne chose between
14 arbitration and litigation. Second, we understand Horne to argue that the arbitration
15 agreement itself was substantively unconscionable, although we can identify no
16 particular basis for this claim.
17 At the outset, we note that it is not at all clear that Horne can complain of
18 unconscionability more than ninety days after entry of the arbitration award. The
19 argument that an agreement to arbitrate is unconscionable is essentially the argument
17 1 that there was no agreement to arbitrate. Section 44-7A-24 provides that an award
2 may be vacated if there was no agreement to arbitrate. Section 44-7A-24(a)(5). In
3 Alexander v. Calton & Assocs., Inc., 2005-NMCA-034, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 293, 110 P.3d
4 509, we noted that under Section 44-7A-24, “a party may continue to argue that there
5 is no agreement to arbitrate even after the arbitration is completed, so long as he
6 preserves his objections before the hearing begins.” This dicta from Alexander
7 strongly suggests that Horne’s unconscionability argument should fail both for lack
8 of preservation and because he did not attempt to vacate the ruling within ninety days.
9 We nevertheless briefly address the merits. A contract to arbitrate is
10 unenforceable if it is found to be unconscionable. See, e.g., Cordova v. World Fin.
11 Corp. of N.M., 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 34, 146 N.M. 256, 208 P.3d 901. A contract may
12 be substantively unconscionable or procedurally unconscionable. Fiser v. Dell
13 Computer Corp., 2008-NMSC-046, ¶ 20, 144 N.M. 464, 188 P.3d 1215. Substantive
14 unconscionability refers to the legality and fairness of the contract terms themselves,
15 focusing on whether the terms “are commercially reasonable and fair, the purpose and
16 effect of the terms, the one-sidedness of the terms, and other similar public policy
17 concerns.” Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 22. Procedural unconscionability deals with
18 the “factual circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, including the
19 relative bargaining strength, sophistication of the parties, and the extent to which
18 1 either party felt free to accept or decline terms demanded by the other.” Id. ¶ 23. We
2 review whether a contract is unconscionable as a matter of law. Id. ¶ 11.
3 The arbitration agreement in this case is not substantively unconscionable. In
4 Cordova, our Supreme Court concluded that the arbitration agreement was
5 unconscionable because it was “unfairly and unreasonably one-sided” and reserved
6 the right to litigate exclusively for one side while forcing the other side to arbitrate.
7 Id. ¶¶ 26-27, 32. Unlike the agreement in Cordova, the agreement here does not favor
8 one side over another. Horne was allowed to choose between arbitration and
9 litigation. The arbitration agreement that he agreed to treats each side equally. Horne
10 wrote the complaint that defines the scope of the arbitration. Furthermore, unlike
11 Fiser, where the arbitration agreement was held to be substantively unconscionable
12 for violating public policy, 2008-NMSC-046, ¶ 21, no public policy has been violated
13 here. We find nothing in the circumstances of this case to suggest that the agreement
14 to arbitrate here was anything but fair.
15 In addition, the circumstances surrounding the formation of the arbitration
16 agreement were not procedurally unconscionable. Procedural inequality exists where
17 the inequality in bargaining power is so exaggerated as to render one party’s choice
18 essentially nonexistent. Guthmann v. La Vida Llena, 103 N.M. 506, 510, 709 P.2d
19 675, 679 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 31.
19 1 Horne acknowledges that he had the choice of arbitration, litigation, or using a “single
2 manager decision maker.” Horne has not shown that bargaining power was so
3 unequal as to preclude him from choosing litigation. Nor has he made any argument
4 directed to relative bargaining strength, sophistication of the parties, or his freedom
5 to choose litigation. Horne’s primary argument is that, at the time he elected
6 arbitration, he did not have access to the information he later obtained through
7 discovery, and therefore could not intelligently formulate a complaint. But we have
8 routinely enforced arbitration agreements entered into not only before discovery was
9 available, but before a conflict ever arose. See, e.g., United Tech., 115 N.M. at 2, 5,
10 846 P.2d at 308, 311. Furthermore, had Horne chosen litigation, he would not have
11 had access to discovery until after he filed his complaint. See Rule 1-026(A) NMRA
12 (“Parties may obtain discovery . . . .” (emphasis added)). As in any litigation, Horne
13 was aware of the facts from his own experience, which were sufficient to allow him
14 to initiate proceedings that would entitle him to obtain additional evidence.
15 To the extent that Horne argues that the agreement was procedurally
16 unconscionable because LANS prepared the demand for arbitration that initiated the
17 arbitration, we disagree. Horne signed the demand for arbitration over a month after
18 he signed the agreement to arbitrate. Horne was free to attempt to modify the form
19 before signing it. Most importantly, however, Horne had already agreed that the
20 1 arbitrator would decide the scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Accordingly, Horne
2 had an avenue in which to raise any arguments that the scope was broader than the
3 demand that he filed. As we have noted, Horne appears to have done so, although the
4 statements he has made are perhaps contradictory on this point.
5 III. CONCLUSION
6 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order granting summary judgment and
7 remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
8 IT IS SO ORDERED.
9 10 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge
11 WE CONCUR:
12 13 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge
14 15 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge