Horbock v. Barnhart

210 F. Supp. 2d 125, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13588, 2002 WL 1603165
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJuly 11, 2002
Docket3:93-r-00009
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 210 F. Supp. 2d 125 (Horbock v. Barnhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Horbock v. Barnhart, 210 F. Supp. 2d 125, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13588, 2002 WL 1603165 (D. Conn. 2002).

Opinion

OPINION

GOETTEL, District Judge.

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under § 216 and § 223 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416, 423. Plaintiff has moved for an order reversing the decision of the Commissioner or, in the alternative, remanding the case for rehearing [Doc. #8], and defendant has moved for an order affirming the decision of the Commissioner [Doc. # 10]. For the reasons set forth below, we grant the plaintiffs motion.

DISCUSSION

I. Procedural History

On June 13, 1999, plaintiff filed an application for DIB claiming that she had been *126 unable to work since June 9, 1998, due to carpal tunnel syndrome, arthritis, and drug and alcohol abuse. (Tr. 93-95, 103-112). 1 Her application was denied initially (Tr. 53-58), and plaintiff sought reconsideration. (Tr. 66). On reconsideration, the initial denial was sustained. (Tr. 67-70). Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 71-72). A hearing was held on October 30, 2000, at which plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified, as did a vocational expert. (Tr. 27-52). The ALJ, in a decision dated February 9, 2001, concluded that, although plaintiff could not perform her former employment, there were a significant number of sedentary jobs 2 in the national economy that she could perform, thus, dictating a finding of “not disabled.” (Tr. 13-21). Plaintiff then requested that the Appeals Council review the AL J’s decision (Tr. 7-9), which it declined to do (Tr. 5-6), making the ALJ’s decision the final agency determination and, thus, subject to judicial review.

We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir.1995).

The sole argument raised by plaintiff in this appeal is that the ALJ ignored the vocational expert’s testimony that, in light of the limitations imposed by plaintiffs treating orthopedic surgeon, there are no jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, and, accordingly, she is disabled. (Pl.’s Mem. at 8).

II. “Disability” Under the Social Security Act

In order to establish an entitlement to disability benefits under the Social Security Act, plaintiff must prove that she is “disabled” within the meaning of the Act. A plaintiff may be considered disabled only if she cannot perform any substantial gainful work because of a medical or mental condition which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do her previous work, but, additionally, considering her age, education, and work experience, she cannot engage in any other kind of substantial gainful employment, which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area where she lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for her, or whether she would be hired if she applied for work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). “Work which exists in the national economy” means work *127 which exists in significant numbers either in the region where she lives or in several regions in the country. Id.

The Social Security Regulations set forth a sequential five-step process for evaluating disability claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Neither side challenges the ALJ’s findings with respect to the first four steps of this process. Rather, this appeal focuses solely on the fifth step, in which the Commissioner has the burden of proving that there are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform, consistent with her residual functional capacity (“RFC”), 3 age, education and work experience. 4 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); see Curry v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir.2000); Bapp v. Bowen, 802 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir.1986); Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 231 (2d Cir.1980).

III. Facts

Plaintiff was born on January 12, 1954. She attained a General Equivalency Degree (GED) in 1975 and attended the Stone School of Business in New Haven, Connecticut, where she received secretarial training. (Tr. 31-32). From 1982 to 1998, she worked as a secretary and receptionist for AT & T Communications. During her last two years at AT & T, she worked strictly as a receptionist. (Tr. 32-33). Since the date of the alleged onset of her disability, June 9, 1998, plaintiff has worked for only a two-week period in 1999 as a waitress. (Tr. 32). Otherwise, she has not engaged in any gainful employment since June 1998.

Plaintiff alleges that she became disabled on June 9, 1998, due to disorders of her back, carpal tunnel syndrome, drug and alcohol abuse, and depression. She states that she cannot work because of pain in her back and her hands. (Tr. 33). She has suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome since 1991, for which she has had surgery on both hands and later surgery on her right thumb, although she claims that her operations only caused her condition to worsen. (Tr. 35, 42). She states that she has widespread osteoarthritis and that she has also been diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. 5 (Tr. 35). Further, *128 she testified that she suffers from depression, which causes her to feel exhausted all of the time. (Tr. 36).

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Bluebook (online)
210 F. Supp. 2d 125, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13588, 2002 WL 1603165, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horbock-v-barnhart-ctd-2002.