Hopton v. United States Gypsum Co.

46 F. Supp. 292, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2508
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Tennessee
DecidedJuly 31, 1942
DocketNo. 246
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 46 F. Supp. 292 (Hopton v. United States Gypsum Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hopton v. United States Gypsum Co., 46 F. Supp. 292, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2508 (M.D. Tenn. 1942).

Opinion

DAVIES, District Judge.

I. The defendant United States Gypsum Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of building materials and supplies on a nationwide scale throughout the entire United States. Among its properties are plants for the manufacture of gypsum plaster, which are located at Plasterco, Virginia, Sweetwater, Texas, Greenville, Mississippi, East Chicago, Indiana, and at other points in various states. For the purpose of selling its products the defendant has grouped the various states of the United States in territories, which operate under the supervision of a District Manager who in turn operates under a Division Manager at the home office of the company in Chicago. Tennessee is in the Southeastern Division, of which Frank Miller is the Division Manager, the District Manager being R. H. Branan, who is locáted at Birmingham, Alabama, and whose territory embraces several states including Middle and Eastern Tennessee.

The defendant employs and maintains resident salesmen throughout the United States, who operate within a limited territory and who are under the supervision of and report to a District Manager. From April, 1929, continuously until August, 1937, the defendant’s resident salesman in the Middle District of Tennessee was E. E. O’Harra, who resided at Nashville, Tennessee, from which point he worked .the territory assigned to him, which included Davidson County and 'other counties in Middle Tennessee. O’Harra’s employment was terminated in August, 1937, and he was succeeded by Dan McLean, who since that time has been the defendant’s salesman and who has continuously resided in Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee.

The defendant establishes dealers and distributors throughout the United States, including the Middle District of Tennessee, and sell its goods through its resident salesmen to these dealers and distributors. The resident salesmen also make direct sales to contractors and other consumers of their products.

Defendant also maintains specialty salesmen who travel throughout the United States, including the Middle District of Tennessee, at regular intervals, and who sell direct to contractors, consumers, and also to dealers.

All of these employees of the types heretofore mentioned devote their entire time to the defendant’s business and are paid regular salaries plus a bonus on sales, and are furnished automobiles paid for by the defendant and their traveling expenses and the upkeep of the automobiles are paid for by the defendants.

The defendant for a number of years and during the years 1939, 1940, and 1941, sold and delivered in Tennessee products amounting to approximately $300,000.00 per annum. All of these goods were shipped into Tennessee from the defendant’s various manufacturing plants upon orders received from Tennessee and obtained by its resident agent and its other employees in the manner hereinafter set out.

2. Defendant United States Gypsum Company has never qualified to do business in Tennessee by filing its charter and appointing a resident statutory agent within the state as provided by the laws of Tennessee. United States Gypsum Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Delaware, has been qualified to do business in Tennessee and has designated a resident agent in the state continuously since 1919. The Delaware corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Illinois corporation by the same name and its officers and directors are identical. The Delaware corporation is engaged in furnishing engineering service, which is one of the many departments of the Illinois corporation, and the subsidiary acts as an agent for the parent corporation in the performance of these services.

[294]*2943. During the course of the defendant’s continuous business in Tennessee from 1929 to date the defendant has on occasions and over a considerable period of time maintained a stock of goods in Tennessee on consignment and at one time for at least a period of one and a half years its District Office was located in Memphis, Tennessee, from which it transacted business in Tennessee, receiving orders from its salesmen, passing on credits, accepting and rejecting orders, collecting accounts and otherwise doing business within the State of Tennessee. The defendant furnishes its resident salesmen with a book of instructions and also with a list of its dealers and the names of customers and users of its products within the resident salesman’s territory, with credit ratings for each of them, and defendant’s resident agent was authorized to and in fact did continually make sales of the defendant’s products to such customers, the resident agent having the authority to and in fact closing the transaction where the sale came within the credit limits assigned to the customer. Each month the resident agent was furnished with a statement showing the status of the various accounts so that he might keep informed as to the outstanding credit and know the limit of his authority to make sales.

The written order form requiring all orders to be submitted to the District Manager for approval, according to the admission of the defendant’s own witness, was not used in at least eighty per cent of the sales and with respect to these sales, which ran into large volume, no such condition was signed by the purchaser nor was there any attempt on the part of the‘defendant to notify the purchaser of the acceptance of his order. The testimony shows without dispute that the orders taken by defendant’s salesman residing in the Middle District of Tennessee were uniformly shipped without formal acceptance and practically no orders were rejected. The resident agent further was instructed by the defendant and in fact did make regular collections on delinquent accounts, having authority to close such accounts by the taking of notes where these could be obtained.

When customers were in a hurry to obtain goods, the agent had authority to and in fact did send the orders to the mill direct, sometimes by telephone and telegraph, and the mill shipped the goods on the salesman’s order before the order was ever received at the District Office.

It was also part of the resident salesman’s duties and he in fact did investigate and adjust complaints, and while the agent had no general authority to make final adjustments such settlements were always concluded by the resident agent within a range of authority communicated to him in connection with each complaint.

As late as January, 1942, the defendant issued a bulletin to all of its resident salesmen, including McLean at Nashville, expressly confirming the salesmen’s authority with respect to the matters set out above and authorizing such procedure. .

4. Defendant also fixed sales quotas for each of its resident agents covering the defendant’s products sold by him within his district and the resident agent was expected to meet these quotas, and while he received a regular monthly salary his additional bonus compensation depended upon the amount of his sales within his territory.

Where defendant’s resident agent made a direct sale with a customer or other user of its products, it was- customary in most instances for the product to be supplied by the local dealer and the purchaser made his payments to the local dealer, although in numerous instances the sale was actually made by the defendant’s resident salesman.

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Related

Bonesteel v. Steelco Stainless Steel, Inc.
97 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ohio, 1950)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
46 F. Supp. 292, 1942 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2508, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hopton-v-united-states-gypsum-co-tnmd-1942.