[Cite as Hopkins v. Goebel, 2023-Ohio-3040.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
TIMOTHY J. HOPKINS, : APPEAL NO. C-220617 TRIAL NO. A-2104001 Plaintiff-Appellee, : O P I N I O N. vs. :
CHARLES GOEBEL, :
and :
DIANE GOEBEL, :
Defendants-Appellants. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part and Appeal Dismissed in Part
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 30, 2023
George M. Parker, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Thomas E. Grossmann, for Defendants-Appellants. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BERGERON, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} One chapter of a protracted litigation battle between plaintiff-appellee
Timothy Hopkins and defendants-appellants Charles and Diane Goebel seemingly
drew to a close when the trial court dismissed the suit on venue grounds. Unwilling to
let sleeping dogs lie, however, the Goebels moved to sanction Mr. Hopkins, insisting
that he knew full well that he had filed in the wrong court. Following a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion. Undeterred, the Goebels then launched a second motion
for sanctions, alleging that counsel spun lies to the trial court during the prior hearing.
After the trial court denied this second motion, the Goebels appealed to this court,
seeking to challenge the ruling on both motions. But we find any appeal from the first
motion’s denial untimely, and we accordingly dismiss aspects of the appeal implicating
that entry. On the substance of the entry denying the second motion, we find no abuse
of discretion by the trial court and affirm its judgment.
I.
{¶2} In November 2021, Mr. Hopkins filed suit in Hamilton County against
the Goebels, alleging that they breached a settlement agreement the parties signed in
March 2021. This agreement resolved an earlier lawsuit against Mr. Hopkins initiated
by the Goebels in Warren County (the “first lawsuit”).
{¶3} The Goebels subsequently moved to dismiss for improper venue on the
basis that Warren County represented the “exclusive jurisdiction” over all actions
related to the settlement agreement (and invoked the jurisdictional priority rule based
on another case filed in Warren County). Finding improper venue in Hamilton
County, the trial court dismissed Mr. Hopkins’ complaint in May 2022.
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} Convinced that Mr. Hopkins and his counsel knew that they lacked
legitimate grounds to file suit in Hamilton County, the Goebels filed a motion to
sanction Mr. Hopkins in May 2022 for engaging in frivolous conduct. See Civ.R. 11;
R.C. 2323.51. The trial court scheduled a hearing on this first sanctions motion
pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(B)(2). During the hearing, Mr. Hopkins’ counsel informed
the trial court that while his client was being “served with a post-dismissal” of the first
lawsuit, “he was, essentially, harassed at his home in Indian Hill” by process servers,
thus creating a potential basis for filing suit in Hamilton County. (Emphasis added.)
The trial court denied the motion for sanctions by entry in August 2022.
{¶5} Dissatisfied, the Goebels filed a subsequent motion for sanctions on the
basis that Mr. Hopkins and his attorney made false representations to the trial court
at the hearing on the first motion. See R.C. 2323.51. In November 2022, the trial court
denied the second motion as well. The Goebels filed a notice of appeal that same
month.
II.
{¶6} In their sole assignment of error, the Goebels argue that the trial court
erred in concluding that Mr. Hopkins did not engage in frivolous conduct when he (1)
filed his suit in Hamilton County as opposed to Warren County (the subject of the first
motion) and (2) made false representations to the trial court at the hearing on the first
motion (the subject of the second motion). Before we consider these questions, Mr.
Hopkins raises a final appealable order issue with the Goebels’ appeal that we must
address at the outset.
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶7} In challenging jurisdiction, Mr. Hopkins emphasizes that, while the
Goebels filed their notice of appeal within 30 days of the second motion’s denial, the
notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the first motion’s denial. According to
Mr. Hopkins, since the denial of the first motion by the trial court constituted a final
appealable order, it would render the Goebels’ appeal untimely with respect to the trial
court’s decision on that motion. See App.R. 4(A)(1) (“[A] party who wishes to appeal
from an order that is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal * * * within 30
days of that entry.”).
{¶8} To be sure, the Goebels’ brief before this court raises arguments that
implicate the denial of both motions. Thus, we must determine whether the August
entry denying the first motion represents a final appealable judgment, obliging us to
consider R.C. 2505.02. See Peck v. Tokar, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0086, 2016-
Ohio-8112, ¶ 4 (“For a judgment to be final and appealable, it must satisfy the
requirements of R.C. 2505.02 * * *.”). Consistent with the statute, an order can be
final and appealable if it “affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or
upon a summary application in an action after judgment * * *[.]” R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).
{¶9} We note that “Ohio appellate courts have characterized motions for
sanctions for frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 as ‘special proceedings’ or
‘summary applications’ falling within the purview of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).” Zhong v.
Liang, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109027, 2020-Ohio-3724, ¶ 15; see Victoria’s Garden
v. Sheehy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-404, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3759, 4 (July 27,
1993), citing R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) (“The process for filing a post-judgment motion for
sanctions calls for a hearing, but does not call for a full-fledged trial on the claims for 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
frivolous behavior. This is the type of ‘summary application’ R.C. 2505.02 defines as
a final order.”); Troja v. Pleatman, 2016-Ohio-7683, 65 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.)
(“A decision granting a motion for sanctions is a final, appealable order as it affects a
substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an
action after judgment under R.C. 2505.02(B).”).
{¶10} Unable to dispute these principles, the Goebels instead characterize the
August entry as merely interlocutory because the court did not rule on their motion
for attorney’s fees pursuant to Civ.R. 11 or Civ.R. 3(D)(2). In other words, they claim
that the court still had work left to do. But this description is completely inaccurate—
the court denied the entirety of the sanctions motion in its August 2022 entry: “A
hearing was conducted pursuant to R.C. § 2323.51. * * * Having considered the motion
and the oral arguments of the parties * * * the Court finds that the motion is not well
taken and DENIES the same.” (Emphasis added.) Although the trial court only
mentioned R.C. 2323.51 by name (because the hearing occurred pursuant to it), it
denied all of the relief sought in the motion. See R.C. 2323.51(B)(2)(a) (“An award
may be made [for sanctions] * * *, but only after the court * * * [s]ets a date for a
hearing * * *.”). The Goebels fail to cite any authority requiring a trial court to
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[Cite as Hopkins v. Goebel, 2023-Ohio-3040.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
TIMOTHY J. HOPKINS, : APPEAL NO. C-220617 TRIAL NO. A-2104001 Plaintiff-Appellee, : O P I N I O N. vs. :
CHARLES GOEBEL, :
and :
DIANE GOEBEL, :
Defendants-Appellants. :
Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part and Appeal Dismissed in Part
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 30, 2023
George M. Parker, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Thomas E. Grossmann, for Defendants-Appellants. OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BERGERON, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} One chapter of a protracted litigation battle between plaintiff-appellee
Timothy Hopkins and defendants-appellants Charles and Diane Goebel seemingly
drew to a close when the trial court dismissed the suit on venue grounds. Unwilling to
let sleeping dogs lie, however, the Goebels moved to sanction Mr. Hopkins, insisting
that he knew full well that he had filed in the wrong court. Following a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion. Undeterred, the Goebels then launched a second motion
for sanctions, alleging that counsel spun lies to the trial court during the prior hearing.
After the trial court denied this second motion, the Goebels appealed to this court,
seeking to challenge the ruling on both motions. But we find any appeal from the first
motion’s denial untimely, and we accordingly dismiss aspects of the appeal implicating
that entry. On the substance of the entry denying the second motion, we find no abuse
of discretion by the trial court and affirm its judgment.
I.
{¶2} In November 2021, Mr. Hopkins filed suit in Hamilton County against
the Goebels, alleging that they breached a settlement agreement the parties signed in
March 2021. This agreement resolved an earlier lawsuit against Mr. Hopkins initiated
by the Goebels in Warren County (the “first lawsuit”).
{¶3} The Goebels subsequently moved to dismiss for improper venue on the
basis that Warren County represented the “exclusive jurisdiction” over all actions
related to the settlement agreement (and invoked the jurisdictional priority rule based
on another case filed in Warren County). Finding improper venue in Hamilton
County, the trial court dismissed Mr. Hopkins’ complaint in May 2022.
2 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶4} Convinced that Mr. Hopkins and his counsel knew that they lacked
legitimate grounds to file suit in Hamilton County, the Goebels filed a motion to
sanction Mr. Hopkins in May 2022 for engaging in frivolous conduct. See Civ.R. 11;
R.C. 2323.51. The trial court scheduled a hearing on this first sanctions motion
pursuant to R.C. 2323.51(B)(2). During the hearing, Mr. Hopkins’ counsel informed
the trial court that while his client was being “served with a post-dismissal” of the first
lawsuit, “he was, essentially, harassed at his home in Indian Hill” by process servers,
thus creating a potential basis for filing suit in Hamilton County. (Emphasis added.)
The trial court denied the motion for sanctions by entry in August 2022.
{¶5} Dissatisfied, the Goebels filed a subsequent motion for sanctions on the
basis that Mr. Hopkins and his attorney made false representations to the trial court
at the hearing on the first motion. See R.C. 2323.51. In November 2022, the trial court
denied the second motion as well. The Goebels filed a notice of appeal that same
month.
II.
{¶6} In their sole assignment of error, the Goebels argue that the trial court
erred in concluding that Mr. Hopkins did not engage in frivolous conduct when he (1)
filed his suit in Hamilton County as opposed to Warren County (the subject of the first
motion) and (2) made false representations to the trial court at the hearing on the first
motion (the subject of the second motion). Before we consider these questions, Mr.
Hopkins raises a final appealable order issue with the Goebels’ appeal that we must
address at the outset.
3 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶7} In challenging jurisdiction, Mr. Hopkins emphasizes that, while the
Goebels filed their notice of appeal within 30 days of the second motion’s denial, the
notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days of the first motion’s denial. According to
Mr. Hopkins, since the denial of the first motion by the trial court constituted a final
appealable order, it would render the Goebels’ appeal untimely with respect to the trial
court’s decision on that motion. See App.R. 4(A)(1) (“[A] party who wishes to appeal
from an order that is final upon its entry shall file the notice of appeal * * * within 30
days of that entry.”).
{¶8} To be sure, the Goebels’ brief before this court raises arguments that
implicate the denial of both motions. Thus, we must determine whether the August
entry denying the first motion represents a final appealable judgment, obliging us to
consider R.C. 2505.02. See Peck v. Tokar, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2016-G-0086, 2016-
Ohio-8112, ¶ 4 (“For a judgment to be final and appealable, it must satisfy the
requirements of R.C. 2505.02 * * *.”). Consistent with the statute, an order can be
final and appealable if it “affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or
upon a summary application in an action after judgment * * *[.]” R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).
{¶9} We note that “Ohio appellate courts have characterized motions for
sanctions for frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 as ‘special proceedings’ or
‘summary applications’ falling within the purview of R.C. 2505.02(B)(2).” Zhong v.
Liang, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109027, 2020-Ohio-3724, ¶ 15; see Victoria’s Garden
v. Sheehy, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-404, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 3759, 4 (July 27,
1993), citing R.C. 2505.02(B)(2) (“The process for filing a post-judgment motion for
sanctions calls for a hearing, but does not call for a full-fledged trial on the claims for 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
frivolous behavior. This is the type of ‘summary application’ R.C. 2505.02 defines as
a final order.”); Troja v. Pleatman, 2016-Ohio-7683, 65 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.)
(“A decision granting a motion for sanctions is a final, appealable order as it affects a
substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an
action after judgment under R.C. 2505.02(B).”).
{¶10} Unable to dispute these principles, the Goebels instead characterize the
August entry as merely interlocutory because the court did not rule on their motion
for attorney’s fees pursuant to Civ.R. 11 or Civ.R. 3(D)(2). In other words, they claim
that the court still had work left to do. But this description is completely inaccurate—
the court denied the entirety of the sanctions motion in its August 2022 entry: “A
hearing was conducted pursuant to R.C. § 2323.51. * * * Having considered the motion
and the oral arguments of the parties * * * the Court finds that the motion is not well
taken and DENIES the same.” (Emphasis added.) Although the trial court only
mentioned R.C. 2323.51 by name (because the hearing occurred pursuant to it), it
denied all of the relief sought in the motion. See R.C. 2323.51(B)(2)(a) (“An award
may be made [for sanctions] * * *, but only after the court * * * [s]ets a date for a
hearing * * *.”). The Goebels fail to cite any authority requiring a trial court to
specifically delineate each aspect of a motion in its entry denying it. Because the trial
court denied all aspects of the motion, we hold that the August entry was a final
appealable order under R.C. 2505.02.
{¶11} With that determination, the Goebels’ failure to file their notice of
appeal within the requisite time of the August 2022 entry under App.R. 4(A)(2) strips
us of jurisdiction to consider the merits of anything pertaining to the denial of the first
motion for sanctions. We therefore dismiss the Goebels’ appeal in part for a lack of
5 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
timeliness, and we cannot consider any arguments relating to the denial of the first
motion for sanctions.
B.
{¶12} We do, however, have appellate jurisdiction to consider the Goebels’
appeal to the extent that they challenge the denial of the second motion for sanctions
because they filed their notice of appeal within thirty days of that entry, consistent
with App.R. 4(A)(2). And we consider this question for an abuse of discretion: “We
review [a] trial court’s decision on a motion for sanctions under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Polk v. Spirit Homecare, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120088, 2012-
Ohio-4948, ¶ 4, citing State ex rel. Striker v. Cline, 130 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-
5350, 957 N.E.2d 19, ¶ 11.
{¶13} As evidence of frivolous conduct, the Goebels seize upon alleged factual
misrepresentations that occurred at the hearing on the first motion. R.C.
2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) (“ ‘Frivolous conduct’ means * * *: Conduct of an inmate or other
party to a civil action * * * that satisfies any of the following: * * * The conduct consists
of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”). In this respect, they offered
documentation that, after filing a second lawsuit against Mr. Hopkins—stemming
from his alleged breach of the settlement agreement—their process servers attempted
service multiple times upon him at his Mason residence in Warren County, rather than
in Hamilton County. They also provided an affidavit of their process server in which
the server claimed that he attempted to serve Mr. Hopkins in Warren County and
never sought to do so in Hamilton County.
6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶14} But the Goebels’ alleged proof does not demonstrate that Mr. Hopkins
made a false representation to the trial court. According to his counsel, the alleged
harassment in Hamilton County related to service of a dismissal of the first lawsuit;
whereas all of the Goebels’ “proof” of sanctionable conduct concerns a second lawsuit.
In light of this mixing of apples with oranges, the trial court acted well within its
discretion in denying the second motion for sanctions. See Polk at ¶ 6, quoting
Poindexter v. Grantham, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95825, 2011-Ohio-1576, ¶ 12
(“[A]ppellate courts will find an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when
it arbitrarily denies a request for sanctions. * * * ‘An arbitrary denial occurs when * *
* the record clearly evidences frivolous conduct * * *.’ ”).
{¶15} The Goebels further protest that the trial court should have held an
additional hearing on the second motion. But “R.C. 2323.51 does not mandate that a
hearing be conducted to determine whether a particular action involves frivolous
conduct, but does require that [a hearing must be held] if attorney’s fees are to be
ultimately awarded * * *.” Polk, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120088, 2012-Ohio-4948,
at ¶ 6. Since attorney’s fees were not ultimately awarded, the trial court did not need
to hold a hearing on the second motion.
{¶16} For all the reasons discussed above, we overrule all aspects of the
Goebels’ assignment of error over which we have jurisdiction.
* * *
{¶17} In light of the foregoing analysis, we dismiss the Goebels’ appeal in part,
overrule their assignment of error in part and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment accordingly.
BOCK and KINSLEY, JJ., concur. 7 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.