Hopkins v. Coplan, et al.

2005 DNH 038

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: March 16, 2005
• Docket: CV-04-030-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Hopkins v . Coplan, et a l . CV-04-030-SM 03/16/05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Kenneth Hopkins, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 04-30-SM Opinion N o . 2005 DNH 038 Jane Coplan; Philip Stanley; Viola Lunderville; Marilee Nihan; and Correctional Officers Turcotte, Edsall Tibeault, Desmond, and LaFlamme, Defendants,

O R D E R

Kenneth Hopkins, an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison

(“NHSP”), brings this action against various correctional

officers and prison administrators, seeking damages for alleged

violations of his constitutionally protected rights. He claims

that because he once assisted prison administrative authorities

in their investigation into corrupt corrections officers, he has

been subjected to harassment and retaliatory conduct by other

corrections officers. According to Hopkins, that harassment

culminated in a brutal assault upon him by three fellow inmates -

an assault Hopkins says was orchestrated by corrections officers.

As a result of that attack, Hopkins suffered severe injuries,

including permanent neurological damage. By prior order, the court adopted, in part, the Report and

Recommendation issued by the Magistrate Judge and concluded that

Hopkins’ complaint sets forth the following viable claims:

1. A section 1983 retaliation claim, as well as state tort claims for assault and battery against defendant Turcotte;

2. Section 1983 claims against defendants Lunderville, Nihan, Coplan, Stanley, LaFlamme, Desmond, and Tibeault, based on failure to take reasonable steps to ensure Hopkins’ safety;

3. A section 1983 claim against defendant Edsall based on intentional indifference to a serious medical need.

Defendants move for summary judgment, saying that many of

Hopkins’ claims are barred by the pertinent statute of

limitations and asserting that, as to all claims, he failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies. For the reasons set forth

below, the court concludes that Hopkins has not exhausted

available administrative remedies and, therefore, defendants’

motion for summary judgment is necessarily granted, but without

prejudice to Hopkins’ ability to refile his claims once he has

completed the prison’s administrative grievance process.

2 Discussion

42 U.S.C. § 1997e, as amended by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), provides that:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The Supreme Court has held that section

1997(e) requires an inmate to exhaust all available

administrative processes before filing a federal suit relating to

the conditions of his or her confinement, even if some or all of

the relief the inmate seeks is not available through the

administrative process. Booth v . Churner, 532 U.S. 7 3 1 , 734

(2001) (“The question is whether an inmate seeking only money

damages must complete a prison administrative process that could

provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, but no

money. We hold that he must.”).

More recently, the Supreme Court expressly held that which

was implicit in Booth: that the phrase “with respect to prison

conditions,” as used in the PLRA’s exhaustion provision,

3 incorporates within its scope not just conditions generally

affecting the inmate population, but also discrete incidents

affecting only a single individual.

[T]he PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.

Porter v . Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Consequently, the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies when the following three

criteria are met: (1) the lawsuit was filed by a “prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility”;

(2) he or she filed that lawsuit after the effective date of the

PLRA (i.e., April 2 6 , 1996); and (3) the lawsuit is “with respect

to prison conditions,” as that phrase has been interpreted by the

Supreme Court.

Here, the first two conditions are plainly met: Hopkins is

an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison and he filed this

action in January of 2004, well after the PLRA’s effective date.

The only remaining question is whether Hopkins’ assertion that

defendants violated his constitutionally protected rights - by

4 retaliating against him for having been a confidential informant,

by demonstrating deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs, and by failing to take reasonable measures to insure his

safety - are complaints “with respect to prison conditions.”

They are. See Porter v . Nussle, supra.

Accordingly, before Hopkins may pursue his state and federal

claims against defendants, he must first exhaust available

administrative remedies relating to those claims.

Notwithstanding Hopkins’ assertion that he has done s o , material

filed by defendants reveal that he is incorrect. See, e.g.,

Affidavit of John C . Vinson. While records maintained by the

prison reveal that Hopkins did file several inmate requests slips

and/or grievances on matters related to the loss or destruction

of various items of personal property, those records are devoid

of any evidence that he filed request slips or grievances on

topics related to the claims at issue in this case (e.g.,

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs,

indifference to his safety needs, assault, e t c . ) . Although

Hopkins might well have informally discussed some of those issues

with various corrections officers, the PLRA plainly requires that

5 he do more; he must comply with prison regulations governing

inmate grievances and he must exhaust available administrative

remedies before pursuing his claims in federal court. He has not

yet done s o .

Notwithstanding his failure to strictly comply with the

exhaustion requirements of the PLRA, Hopkins asserts that he has

sufficiently notified prison authorities of the nature of his

claims to be deemed to have “substantially” complied with the

PLRA’s exhaustion requirements. In support of that argument,

Hopkins points to the fact that, in the wake of the assault upon

him, he was found guilty of having committed a disciplinary

infraction - engaging in a fight. Hopkins appealed that finding,

pointing out, among other things, that he was the victim of a

brutal attack and did not willingly engage in a fight. That

written, three-page appeal, says Hopkins, should be viewed as the

functional equivalent of his having submitted (and pursued to all

available levels of appeal) a grievance.

Such conduct, however, falls measurably short of what is

required by the PLRA. The issue in Hopkins’ disciplinary hearing

6 was whether he assaulted another inmate. That Hopkins’ defense

to the charge involved claims that he was the victim of a brutal

assault by other inmates (rather than a willing participant in

mutual combat), or claims that he was denied a fair opportunity

to present witnesses and evidence at his disciplinary hearing, is

largely irrelevant to PLRA compliance with respect to the very

different claims at issue in this case.

Even if an inmate’s appeal of a disciplinary finding could,

under appropriate circumstances, be deemed an adequate substitute

for strict compliance with the prison’s administrative grievance

procedures, it cannot serve as such in this case. The appeal

Hopkins filed (copies of which he says he sent to both the Warden

and the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections) does not

describe the underlying facts giving rise to the claims he seeks

to advance here, nor does it identify by name the defendants to

this action. That appeal deals only with some of the general

circumstances surrounding the assault, and it focuses primarily

on the alleged procedural deficiencies in the disciplinary

hearing that was conducted in the wake of that assault.

Moreover, Hopkins’ appeal does not even mention his claim that he

7 did not receive prompt and appropriate medical care for the

injuries he sustained in that attack.

Perhaps if Hopkins’ appeal had set forth in detail the

factual background to the claims he seeks to advance in this

forum, specifically identifying the relevant parties and their

allegedly wrongful conduct, the court might treat that appeal as

the functional equivalent of an exhausted grievance (since

Hopkins says he provided copies to corrections officers, the

warden, and the commissioner). Under those circumstances, one

might well be justified in excusing Hopkins from strictly

complying with the prison’s grievance procedures. See, e.g.,

Johnson v . Testman, 380 F.3d 6 9 1 , 697 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding

that an inmate might satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements

by raising his claims in the context of an appeal of a

disciplinary proceeding, but concluding that, “[i]n order to

exhaust, . . . inmates must provide enough information about the

conduct of which they complain to allow prison officials to take

appropriate responsive measures.”). After all, under those

circumstances, one might reasonably conclude that all relevant

prison authorities were aware of Hopkins’ core claims, considered

8 them, and rejected them. If that were the case, requiring

Hopkins’ to restate the same claims to the same parties would

seem pointless.

But, those are not the facts presented in this case. Here,

the court cannot conclude that Hopkins has, de facto, complied

with the prison’s administrative grievance process. Nor can the

court conclude that it would be futile for Hopkins to exhaust

available administrative remedies, or (at least on the record as

it presently stands) that there are any “special circumstances”

which would justify Hopkins’ failure to exhaust. See, e.g.,

Giano v . Goord, 380 F.3d 6 7 0 , 675 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing

situations in which “special circumstances” might excuse an

inmate’s failure to exhaust, or estop defendants from asserting

the exhaustion defense).

Conclusion

If the allegations in Hopkins’ complaint are true, then he

has ample reason to complain. Nevertheless, the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, as interpreted by the United States

Supreme Court, provides that he must avail himself of (and

9 exhaust) available prison administrative remedies before he may

bring his claims in federal court. Alternatively, there is

precedent (albeit from another circuit) suggesting that he might

show that complying with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement would

be futile, that he has already done the functional equivalent of

exhaust available administrative remedies, that special

circumstances exist to justify his failure to exhaust, or that

defendants are estopped to assert his lack of exhaustion as an

affirmative defense. See generally Hemphill v . New York, 380

F.3d 6 8 0 , 686 (2d Cir. 2004 (collecting cases). In response to

defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however, he failed to

carry that burden.

For the foregoing reasons, the court holds that Hopkins has

failed to comply with the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA.

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment (document

n o . 38) is necessarily granted, but without prejudice to refiling

after Hopkins has exhausted all available prison administrative

remedies.

10 Parenthetically, the court notes that should prison

officials reject Hopkins’ subsequent efforts to exhaust, on

grounds that they are time-barred, and if Hopkins then refiles

this civil action, the parties should be prepared to address the

circumstances under which an inmate’s failure to file a timely

grievance precludes a subsequent civil suit, as well as the

appropriate legal standard the court must apply in determining

whether the failure to exhaust might properly be excused. See

generally Giano, 380 F.3d at 676-77 (discussing the various

approaches adopted by different circuit courts of appeals).

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of

defendants and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe Chief Judge

March 1 6 , 2005

cc: Mary E . Schwarzer, Esq. Michael J. Sheehan, Esq.