Hope Chantel v. Nicholas Windle

2025 Ark. App. 534

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 534 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CV-25-25

Opinion Delivered November 5, 2025 HOPE CHANTEL APPEAL FROM GARLAND COUNTY APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 26DR-20-973] V.

HONORABLE THOMAS LYNN WILLIAMS, NICHOLAS WINDLE JUDGE APPELLEE

APPEAL DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Appellant Hope Chantel filed a pro se appeal from a Garland County Circuit Court

ex parte emergency custody order transferring custody of her two minor children to their

father, appellee Nicholas Windle. In this pro se appeal, Chantel makes twelve arguments

for reversal, contending the circuit court erred by (1) demonstrating judicial bias; (2) failing

to properly apply Arkansas residency requirements; (3) relying on prejudicial and unverified

evidence; (4) ignoring the best interest of the children; (5) issuing an emergency custody

order without strict proof of immediate danger; (6) stripping her parental rights without clear

and convincing evidence; (7) failing to address fraud and misrepresentation; (8) imposing

undue financial burdens on her; (9) violating her Due Process and Equal Protection rights

under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (10) enabling coercive control and financial

1 abuse with punitive rulings; (11) ignoring an ongoing Arkansas State Police investigation;

and (12) misapplying estoppel. However, we cannot reach the merits of this case for lack of

a final, appealable order. We must, therefore, dismiss this appeal without prejudice.

On November 24, 2020, Windle filed a complaint for divorce against Chantel.

Windle’s complaint established that the pair were married on April 13, 2012, and two

children were born from that marriage. Windle and Chantel lived together until on or about

November 1, 2020, when they separated.

On December 1, Windle filed an ex parte petition for an order of protection against

Chantel. The petition alleged Chantel was “mentally unstable and a danger to [Windle], the

minor children, and herself.” Windle attached an affidavit to his petition in which he

described Chantel’s threatening to kill him on multiple occasions, threatening to burn his

home down, and threatening to have him fired from his job. Windle asserted Chantel told

him, “The kids are going to see their mother in prison,” and “they won’t have either one of

us in their lives.” Finally, Windle suggested Chantel has an undiagnosed mental-health

disorder, stating Chantel admitted to visual hallucinations and seeing demons.

On December 2, an ex parte temporary order of protection was filed, granting

Windle’s request for a temporary order of protection. On December 23, a permanent order

of protection was filed. The order stated Windle presented sufficient evidence to show he

was in immediate fear of domestic abuse and granted the order of protection for one year,

expiring December 8, 2021. On December 28, Chantel filed her answer and counterclaim

for divorce.

2 On July 30, 2021, the decree of divorce was entered. The decree awarded Windel

primary custody of the minor children, with Chantel receiving alternating-weekend visitation

from Friday at 7:00 p.m. until Sunday at 4:00 p.m. The decree also ordered Chantel to pay

$344.64 in child support each month.

On April 13, 2023, Windle filed a verified motion for contempt. In his motion,

Windle asserted that on various occasions, Chantel had refused to return the children to

him and indicated she intended to continue this behavior “every single time” she had the

children. The motion further asserted Chantel had refused to contribute financially to costs

for the children and kept the children out of school.

On May 24, Chantel filed a motion for contempt against Windle; a motion to modify

custody or, in the alternative, to modify visitation and provisions related to the minor

children; and a motion for appointment of attorney ad litem. In Chantel’s motion, she

asserted Windle would take the children to the doctor or dentist and not inform her until

weeks later; Windle refused to keep her informed of activities at the children’s school; and

Windle allowed his oldest child, not born of their marriage, to speak negatively to Chantel

in front of the minor children. In her motion to modify custody, Chantel argued that since

the entry of the decree of divorce, there had been a material change in circumstances that

warranted a modification. Chantel asserted the material change in circumstances included

(1) Windle telling the male minor child that he does not have to listen to women because

they are beneath him; (2) Windle teaching the minor children that Black people are bad;

3 and (3) that Windle told her if she lived closer, he would be agreeable to joint custody, but

he went back on his word after she relocated to Garland County.

On June 5, Windle filed a motion to dismiss Chantel’s motion to modify custody. In

his motion to dismiss, Windle denied all of Chantel’s allegations. He further argued that

even if true, Chantel’s allegations did not amount to a material change of circumstances

sufficient to warrant modification of the existing custody and visitation schedule. On June

29, the court entered an order denying Windle’s motion to dismiss Chantel’s motion to

modify custody. On February 21, 2024, Chantel filed a motion to withdraw her motion to

modify custody. On February 22, the court entered an order granting Chantel’s motion to

withdraw and her motion to modify custody.

On June 4, 2024, a hearing was held on both parties’ motions for contempt. On June

25, an order effectuating the court’s ruling was entered. The order dismissed Chantel’s

motion for contempt with prejudice, found Chantel in contempt for her failure to return

the minor children to Windle on three separate occasions, and sentenced Chantel to

suspended concurrent sentences of ten days in the Garland County Detention Center for

each of the three occurrences. The order also awarded Windle a judgment for $419.60 as

reimbursement of Chantel’s one-half of the minor child’s unpaid and uncovered medical

expenses; found Chantel’s income had substantially changed and increased her monthly

child support to $562.00 a month; awarded Windle a judgment in the amount of $2,825.68

for Chantel’s unpaid child support for the thirteen months the case had been pending; and

awarded Windle attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $6,303.62.

4 On December 9, Windle filed a verified ex parte motion for emergency return of the

children, immediate suspension of visitation, and for contempt. Windle asserted that since

the entry of the last order, Chantel had engaged in a pattern of intentional and reckless

behavior, again refusing to return the children to Windle. Additionally, Windle asserted

Chantel refused to pay any amount of back child support, attorney’s fees, or the adjusted

child-support amount. That same day, the circuit court entered an emergency order

suspending and restricting all visitation between Chantel and the minor children and set the

matter for a hearing on December 19.

At the December 19 hearing, Chantel appeared pro se. The court ensured Chantel

was aware of her right to counsel and the role the court would and would not play during

the hearing if Chantel chose to proceed pro se. Chantel acknowledged the court’s concerns

and chose to proceed without counsel. Windle had the opportunity to testify to the contents

of his motion and Chantel’s contempt in regard to visitation and custody. Windle testified

that around Thanksgiving, the issues between him and Chantel reignited, with Chantel’s

continued refusal to return the children to Windle at the ordered time. Windle testified to

several text messages between him and Chantel in which he informed her that she was in

contempt of the court order; he said Chantel had an “I don’t care attitude.”

Windle further testified the Hot Springs Village Police Department had become

involved with retrieving the children after the court entered the ex parte order. Windle

provided Chantel’s address to the officers and met them there. Windle testified the officers

told him to park at the end of the street, and once contact with Chantel was established, he

5 could pick up the children. When Windle pulled into the driveway to get the children, he

could “hear her in the back of the police car screaming and banging on the windows and

them, of course, the kids came out and I got them calmed down and we went home.” Windle

testified to the other examples of Chantel’s contempt, including her refusal to pay the newly

amended child-support amount, Windle’s attorney’s fees, and other monetary obligations

that were previously ordered.

During cross-examination, Chantel asked Windle to provide the details of their

visitation schedule. During this line of questioning, the court informed Chantel that her

reading of the visitation schedule was incorrect. Several times during cross-examination,

Chantel was told to move on because she was asking questions outside the scope of direct

examination or veering into topics that were not relevant to the issue before the court.

Windle’s counsel then called Chantel to testify. Chantel was questioned about text

messages she exchanged with Windle on several occasions in which she refused to return the

children at the time ordered by the court. When asked about the time the Hot Springs

Police Department had to retrieve the children, she testified that although the officer’s report

stated she told officers she would not return the children to Windle, that was not true. She

further denied all allegations concerning her behavior from that night.

Chantel then testified in her own defense, stating she never refused to return the

children or argued with police, and she believed her behavior was in the best interest of the

children because she was afraid for them. Chantel stated she never intentionally violated

the court’s order. She further testified she is “not a combative person” and only wanted the

6 right to raise her children. She testified that Windle sets up scenarios to make her seem

disagreeable.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated there would be a final hearing on

visitation and contempt at a later date and reiterated the hearing was only to determine if

there were sufficient facts to suspend visitation between now and that final hearing. The

court expressed concern about Chantel’s ability to comply with court orders and found it

was in the best interest of the children to suspend Chantel’s visitation.

On January 2, 2025, the circuit court entered a temporary order extending the

suspension and restriction of Chantel’s visitation until a final hearing on the matter could

be held to determine the best interest of the minor children.

Before addressing the merits of Chantel’s claims on appeal, we must first analyze

whether Chantel appeals from a final order. Rule 2(a)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate

Procedure–Civil provides that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment or decree

entered by the circuit court. Final orders of custody are specifically appealable under Rule

2(d). Whether a custody order is final or temporary is not dependent on the style of the

order. Indeed, both the supreme court and this court have consistently held that custody

orders styled as temporary may be nonetheless final for purposes of appeal if the issue of

custody was decided on the merits and the parties have completed their proof. See Sandlin v.

Sandlin, 290 Ark. 366, 719 S.W.2d 433 (1986); Chancellor v. Chancellor, 282 Ark. 227, 667

S.W.2d 950 (1984); Jones v. Jones, 41 Ark. App. 146, 852 S.W.2d 325 (1993).

7 We conclude that the order appealed from in this case is not a final custody order.

That order provides that Chantel’s visitation is “suspended and restricted effective

immediately” while also setting a new hearing date of December 19. At the conclusion of

that hearing, the court stated, “At this point, I find in the best interest of the children that I

will continue my order in regard to suspending the visitation with the mother of these

children until such time that we have a final order of this case.” On January 2, 2025, a

temporary order from the December 19 hearing was filed, which continued the suspension

and restriction of Chantel’s visitation until the final hearing, which still has not taken place.

Taken together, the language of the emergency order, the circuit court’s remarks from the

bench, and the January 2 order demonstrate that the issue of custody has yet to be

determined on its merits, and the parties have not completed their proof on the issue.

Accordingly, the order appealed from is not final under Rule 2(d), and we must dismiss the

appeal without prejudice.

Appeal dismissed without prejudice.

THYER and WOOD, JJ., agree.

Hope Chantel, pro se appellant.

One brief only.