Hoover v. Dendinger

29 So. 2d 384, 1947 La. App. LEXIS 636
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 10, 1947
DocketNo. 2882.
StatusPublished

This text of 29 So. 2d 384 (Hoover v. Dendinger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hoover v. Dendinger, 29 So. 2d 384, 1947 La. App. LEXIS 636 (La. Ct. App. 1947).

Opinion

On or about April 26, 1945, while in the course and scope of his employment on a logging operation, plaintiff sustained injuries consisting of fracture of his right lower leg and a crushed ankle and heel. He filed this suit, seeking compensation at the maximum rate of $20 per week for a period not exceeding 400 weeks. He alleges that his employers were Dendinger, Inc., Livingston Sawmill Company and Theodore Dendinger. He also alleges that his weekly wage was the sum of $38.50. He made his alleged employers defendants to the suit.

In answer to the suit defendants Livingston Sawmill Company and Theodore Dendinger denied that plaintiff was their employee. In answer, Dendinger, Inc., admitted that plaintiff was its employee, that plaintiff had received injuries while in the course and scope of his employment, but denied that the nature thereof was such as to render him permanently and totally disabled. It avers that it paid plaintiff compensation up to November 17, 1945, at which time it discontinued payment of compensation for the reason that plaintiff had recovered from his injury and was physically able to return to work. It denied that the weekly wage of plaintiff was $38.50, but averred that the average weekly wage of plaintiff was $27.67, and that he was paid 65 per cent. thereof as compensation for the full term of his incapacity and further alleged that there is no further sum due him, either by way of compensation or medical expenses, it having paid all medical expense incurred in the treatment of plaintiff up to his discharge by the doctor as being physically fit to return to work. *Page 385

Upon these issues, the case was tried. In his written reasons for judgment, the trial judge found that the plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled within the meaning of the compensation law, Act No. 20 of 1914, and was thus entitled to compensation for a period of 400 weeks. He fixed the rate of compensation at the rate of $17.98, it being 65 per cent. of $27.67, the average earnings per week of plaintiff while in the employ of defendant Dendinger, Inc. He further found that defendant had paid the sum of $273.45 as medical expenses and that plaintiff had further expended the sum of $22.70, for which he had not been reimbursed, which amount he allowed plaintiff to recover. He concludes his reasons for judgment in the following language: "* * *, there will be judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, Dendinger, Inc., in the full sum of 65% of $27.67, or $17.98 for a period not to exceed 400 weeks, less compensation payments previously made to November 17, 1945, with 5% interest thereon from November 17, 1945, until paid and all costs." He then orders that there be further judgment in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $22.70; and further fixes the fees of Dr. Thames at $40 and that of Dr. McClendon as $50, as experts, as costs. The judgment as rendered and signed by him is in accordance with his reasons for judgment, except the judgment fails to recognize the weekly payments previously made by defendant to plaintiff as compensation to and including November 17, 1945. He further ordered that plaintiff's suit be dismissed as to Livingston Sawmill Company and Theodore Dendinger.

From this judgment Dendinger, Inc., has appealed. The plaintiff has answered the appeal contending that the award of compensation should be at the rate of $20 per week, and that that part of the judgment dismissing his demand against Livingston Sawmill Company and Theodore Dendinger is erroneous and should be reversed and set aside and there should be judgment in his favor and against the original defendants in solido.

[1] The first question which presents itself to us is the latter part of plaintiff's answer to the appeal. The plaintiff and the Livingston Sawmill Company and Theodore Dendinger are coappellees. It is now well established that a judgment cannot be amended by one appellee against the other appellee. If plaintiff was dissatisfied with the judgment dismissing his suit against the Livingston Sawmill Company and Theodore Dendinger, it was his duty to take an appeal. An answer to the appeal taken by Dendinger, Inc., is not sufficient. Therefore, the ruling of the trial judge absolving the defendants Livingston Sawmill Company and Leonard Dendinger from liability is not a question before us.

Since the accident and injury are conceded, the next question is the result of the injury; that is, whether plaintiff was totally and permanently injured or whether he had fully recovered on November 15, 1945, when defendant ceased the payment of compensation.

Plaintiff is an uneducated man, having gone through a part of the fourth grade, past 58 years, a man of family of five, without any capacity to perform any work except hard manual labor. As to how the accident happened, he states: "I was hooking tongs behind a caterpillar. It rools (rolls) on wheels, and I hooked the two tongs to pull them out and this pole rolled behind me and had me fastened before I knew it. Soon as I found it fastened, I flagged the cab driver and stopped him and told some men to get me loose." "Q. What injury did you receive? A. Broke my leg and run my foot out from under it. The leaders are all drawed from the strain." He further testified that immediately after the accident, he was taken to Hotel Dieu at New Orleans for treatment and remained there for a period of three weeks and three days under the care of Dr. S. Geismar, during which time the doctor set his leg, and thereafter the doctor sent him to his home. In the interim between his discharge from the hospital and November 15, 1945, he visited the doctor's office three or four times. He denies that on November 15, 1945, the last visit to Dr. Geismar, that Dr. Geismar discharged him as being able to return to work, and recommended that he return to work. He states that at that last visit the only thing the doctor recommended was that he discontinue the use of crutches, otherwise he would have a bad *Page 386 foot. On the date of trial, he states that his foot continuously hurt him; the leaders go to sleep on him and if the foot is slightly bruised, the foot swells; he is unable to stand or bear his full weight on the foot; he is unable to do any kind of manual labor such as the dragging of tongs in the swamp on logging operations. He is unable to rest comfortably, that it pains him in his leg all the way down to his foot and that he cannot rest at night. He has to take sedatives or medicine to relieve such pains. Since his discharge by Dr. Geismar and compensation payments have ceased, he has been under treatment by Dr. Feder and has also consulted Dr. Thames and Dr. McClendon.

Dr. McClendon examined the plaintiff, the time and place of the examination not being disclosed by the record. It is shown that he X-rayed plaintiff's leg, ankle and foot, and that the X-ray showed fractures of the tibia and fibula with good alignment and good union. As to the foot, it was negative, showing no evidence of old fracture. On examination of the muscles and condition of the foot, he found the foot swollen some. After being informed as to the manner plaintiff received his injury, he was asked the question: "What is the resulting injury to the ligaments and muscles in those types of fractures and breaks?" He answered: "There is always some injury to the muscles and the ligaments are always strained and stretched." The following questions and answers are pertinent to this case:

"Q. Dr. McClendon, a person of his age, will you testify as what results inactivity of the muscles due to the recovery period in the fracture causes? A.

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Bluebook (online)
29 So. 2d 384, 1947 La. App. LEXIS 636, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hoover-v-dendinger-lactapp-1947.