Hoots v. Pennsylvania

539 F. Supp. 335, 4 Educ. L. Rep. 730, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17798
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided May 12, 1982·No. Civ. A. 71-538·Published·Cited by 5 cases

Opinion

OPINION

WEBER, Chief Judge.

Presently before this court are several student assignment plans which represent another step in the ongoing process of desegregating the school system now known as Woodland Hills School District.

The history of this case is extensively outlined in the prior opinions of this court as well as those of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; and need not be repeated here. See: Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 334 F.Supp. 820 (W.D.Pa.1972) (“Hoots I”); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 359 F.Supp. 807 (W.D.Pa.1973) (“Hoots II”); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 495 F.2d 1095 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884, 95 S.Ct. 150, 42 L.Ed.2d 124 (1974) (“Hoots III”); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1978) (“Hoots IV”); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 639 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1981) (“Hoots V”); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 510 F.Supp. 615 (W.D.Pa.1981) (“Hoots VI”); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (W.D.Pa. 71-538, April 16, 1981) (“Hoots VII”); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (W.D.Pa. 71-538, April 28, 1981) (“Hoots VIII”); Hoots v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1982) (“Hoots IX”).

The New School District, now known as Woodland Hills School District, was created by order of this court, dated April 28,1981, which merged five formerly independent school districts into one. On July 23, 1981, the court ordered the school board to desegregate the secondary student population through the establishment of three high schools and three middle schools, beginning September 1981, and to take further actions to complete desegregation of the entire student population by the beginning of the 1982-83 school year. The actual assignment plan for secondary students was submitted by the Board in August 1981 and on August 13, 1981, this court permitted that plan to go into effect for only the 1981-82 school year.

Under the terms of the July 23, 1981 order, the School Board was to submit a plan for full desegregation, including elementary schools, to the court by December 15, 1981. The Board later requested an extension of time, which was granted, and the plan was filed on January 29, 1982. Plaintiffs also submitted a plan on February 8, 1982. The court held hearings on both these plans beginning March 2, 1982.

At the conclusion of these hearings, in a conference of counsel, the court indicated to the parties that, as presented, the court considered the Board’s plan to be unacceptable and gave them until April 15, 1982 to present an alternative plan. The court further indicated that it was not ready at that time to adopt the plaintiff’s plan, despite the obvious inadequacies of the plan submitted by Woodland Hills.

*338 Both the School District and the plaintiffs have now submitted alternative plans. Plaintiffs’ plan consists of five alternatives to its original plan, which differ in the student assignment patterns and building utilization in the eastern section of the new district. The common elements of all of plaintiffs’ alternative plans were the use of the Scott building as a Middle School, the altering of the current Wilkins Middle School into an elementary center and the closing of the Eastmont Elementary School. Hearings on these plans began on April 23, 1982. Upon consideration of all the testimony presented to this court in March and April of this year, together with the vast amount of testimony and number of documents presented to the court over the years, we now stand ready to adopt a student assignment plan which will effectively desegregate the Woodland Hills School District.

In making a plan one postulate must always be kept in mind. Nothing in any plan considered by the court in any way interferes with or impedes the ability of the School Board and its employees to offer a high quality of education to all of its students in all of the schools in the District. We frequently heard the objection that the Board was considering quality of education in its proposals, and this they should do without question. The inferior quality of education rendered previously in component parts of this District to the predominantly black schools in the black residential areas through a neglect that was less than benign, points up the premise that it was the lack of quality education for these students that was the precipitating factor in this lawsuit. The statements about quality education in this case have never shown specifically how quality education is impaired by any desegregation plan considered.

In making our determination, we are mindful of the remedial standards that must be maintained in any school desegregation case. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklinburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), the Su preme Court enumerated guidelines which are the governing standards in an effective desegregation remedy. The remedy must eliminate invidious racial distinctions. Swann, supra at 18, 91 S.Ct. at 1277. Specific affirmative efforts must be made to produce an integrated body of school personnel. Id. at 19-20, 91 S.Ct. at 1277-78. The plan must deal with school construction and abandonment in such a way that does not perpetuate or re-establish segregated schools. Id. at 20-21, 91 S.Ct. at 1278. And finally, the plan must achieve the “greatest possible degree of actual desegregation.” Id. at 31, 91 S.Ct. at 1283. See also, Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750 (3d Cir. 1978). With these general principles in mind, we will discuss the individual plans currently before the court.

At the outset, we note that the initial duty to eliminate a racially segregated school system lies with the school authorities themselves. The Board of Directors of Woodland Hills School District has the burden and responsibility to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to eliminate segregation. Swann, supra, 402 U.S. at 13-14, 91 S.Ct. at 1274-75, Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1694, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). This court has repeatedly stated and made every effort to allow the School Board to run its own affairs. The Board has been given every opportunity to come up with an acceptable student assignment plan, including several extensions of time. When it appeared that the plan submitted by the Board would not meet constitutional standards, they were given another opportunity to revise their plan to include those changes the court indicated were necessary.

The revised plan, however, continues to fall short of constitutional standards.

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Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 539 F. Supp. 335, 4 Educ. L. Rep. 730, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17798 (W.D. Pa. 1982).

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