Hooten v. State

492 So. 2d 948
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedMay 7, 1986
Docket55563
StatusPublished
Cited by58 cases

This text of 492 So. 2d 948 (Hooten v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hooten v. State, 492 So. 2d 948 (Mich. 1986).

Opinion

492 So.2d 948 (1986)

James L. HOOTEN
v.
STATE of Mississippi.

No. 55563.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 7, 1986.
Rehearing Denied August 27, 1986.

Merrida P. Coxwell, Jr., Stanfield, Carmody, Coxwell & Creel, Jackson, for appellant.

Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Leyser Q. Morris, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Before PATTERSON, C.J., and DAN M. LEE and SULLIVAN, JJ.

PATTERSON, Chief Justice, for the Court:

This is an appeal from James L. Hooten's second conviction of murder by a jury in September, 1983. We reversed and remanded Hooten's first conviction in Hooten v. State, 427 So.2d 1388 (Miss. 1983).

The facts surrounding the murder of Reuben Wood are reported in our previous opinion cited above, and need not be restated here. For purposes of this appeal, we focus on the fact that a legal writing pad was found near Reuben Wood's body when he was discovered on the morning of November 4, 1977.

The State sought to place Hooten at the scene of the crime by proving the legal pad found next to the body had Hooten's handwriting on it. To support their theory the State produced a special agent with the FBI assigned to the document section of the federal laboratory. He came to the conclusion the legal pad contained Hooten's handwriting.

To rebut this testimony, defense counsel called Marie B. Hill to testify as an expert in handwriting analysis. After a thorough voir dire on her qualifications, the trial court determined she lacked the educational background to testify in an expert capacity. Defense counsel proffered her testimony, and the record reveals Mrs. Hill came to the opposite conclusion. As a result of this exclusion, the State's evidence establishing Hooten's presence at Reuben Wood's trailer was uncontradicted.

We are of the opinion the refusal of the trial court to allow Mrs. Hill to testify as an expert was error.

This issue has heretofore been decided by this Court. In Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012 (Miss. 1986), we reiterated our well established rules regarding expert witnesses, and stated, "It is not necessary that one offering to testify as an expert be infallible or possess the highest degree of skill; it is sufficient if that person possesses peculiar knowledge or information regarding the relevant subject matter which is not likely to be possessed by a layman. (Cites omitted.)" 484 So.2d at 1015.

In this case, as in the Henry case, Mrs. Hill's testimony was the only challenge to the State's expert placing Hooten at the scene of the crime. Her practical experience in the examination of questioned documents, and frequent court appearances to testify in similar cases places her clearly *949 within the ambit of our rules regarding experts. We emphasize that in situations such as this, attacks on the expert's qualifications and methods are better directed toward the weight of the testimony than its admissibility. Henry v. State, supra.

REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.

WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.

HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, dissenting:

I would sustain the petition for rehearing, withdraw the original opinion in this case, and affirm.

The original opinion, relying on Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012 (Miss. 1986), held that it was error for the circuit court to exclude Marie B. Hill as a handwriting expert qualified to express an opinion on whether or not certain handwriting was the defendant's.

In my view the original opinion did not address the precise issue with which we as an appellate court are concerned. The question is not whether the circuit court "committed error," as we then stated, but whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit this witness to testify as an expert on the authenticity of handwriting.

Since the determination of whether or not a particular witness possesses the necessary qualifications to qualify as an expert is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and as I hope to demonstrate there was no abuse of discretion in this case, I would affirm this case.

THE BASICS

Let us begin with some basics. First, what is an expert?

In Capital Transportation Co. v. Segrest, 254 Miss. 168, 181 So.2d 111, 120 (1965), we stated:

[I]t is generally sufficient if a witness possesses knowledge peculiar to the matter involved not likely to be possessed by the ordinary layman.

In Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Hollingshead, 236 So.2d 393, 396 (Miss. 1970), we stated:

Generally to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience.

And, in Ludlow Corp. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 317 So.2d 47, 50 (Miss. 1975), we added to the requirement that such witness by his special knowledge be able "to give the jury assistance and guidance in solving some problem which jurors are not able to solve because of their own inadequate knowledge." See: Early-Gary, Inc. v. Walters, 294 So.2d 181, 185 (Miss. 1974); and Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So.2d 358, 366 (Miss. 1985), where we noted Rule 702 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence is consistent with our established rule regarding the qualifications of an expert. This Rule states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

We have also held that the determination of whether a witness has obtained the required degree of specialized knowledge within a particular field to qualify as an expert is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Benoit Gin Co., 248 So.2d 426 (Miss. 1971); Early-Gary, Inc. v. Walters, supra; Gulf Ins. Co. v. Provine, 321 So.2d 311 (Miss. 1975); Parmes v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 440 So.2d 261 (Miss. 1983); Byrd v. F-S Prestress, Inc., 464 So.2d 63 (Miss. 1985); Hollingsworth v. Bovaird Supply Co., 465 So.2d 311 (Miss. 1985). In Hardy *950 v. Brantley, supra, we gave the following caveat:

Suffice it to say that the trial judge should seek to assure that the proffered witness really is an expert in the area in which his opinion testimony is offered. [Emphasis added]

471 So.2d at 366.

MEANING OF DISCRETION

Although there have been countless times when this Court has used the word "discretion" in one context or another, I have been unable to find any case in which we have attempted to give its meaning.

Reflecting a moment, when we say a court has discretionary authority to say yes or no to a particular question, we must acknowledge it is a question as to which there can be honest disagreement between equally intelligent individuals. If the answer to the question is never uncertain, or never subject to any doubt, there would be no need to vest a court with discretionary authority in its answer.

Yundt v. D & D Bowl, Inc., 259 Or. 247, 486 P.2d 553 (1971), makes the following observations:

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492 So. 2d 948, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hooten-v-state-miss-1986.