Hoopes Vineyard, LLC v. County of Napa

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 13, 2026
• Docket: 25-3903
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HOOPES VINEYARD, LLC, a California No. 25-2715 limited liability company; SUMMIT LAKE D.C. No. VINEYARDS & WINERY, LLC, a 3:24-cv-06256-CRB California limited liability company; COOK'S FLAT ASSOCIATES A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, MEMORANDUM* DBA, Smith-Madrone,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF NAPA,

Defendant - Appellee.

HOOPES VINEYARD, LLC; SUMMIT No. 25-3903 LAKE VINEYARDS & WINERY, LLC; COOK'S FLAT ASSOCIATES A D.C. No. CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 3:24-cv-06256-CRB

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 10, 2026 San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges, and VERA, District Judge.**

Hoopes Vineyard, LLC (“Hoopes”), Summit Lake Vineyards & Winery,

LLC (“Summit Lake”), and Cook’s Flat Associates (“Smith-Madrone”) appeal the

district court’s orders dismissing their claims against the County of Napa (“Napa”).

We review a district court’s decision to abstain from hearing claims under Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), de novo. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Connors, 979

F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 2020). We also review a district court’s order granting a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) de novo. Mudpie, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 15 F.4th 885, 889

(9th Cir. 2021). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand. 1

1. “For civil cases, ‘Younger abstention is appropriate only when the state

proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve

** The Honorable Hernan Diego Vera, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 1 Napa’s motion for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 25) and supplemental motion for judicial notice (Dkt. No. 39) are granted.

2 25-2715 a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate

an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges.’” Yelp

Inc. v. Paxton, 137 F.4th 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting ReadyLink Healthcare,

Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014)). “If these

requirements are met, ‘we then consider whether the federal action would have the

practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an exception to

Younger applies.’” Id. at 951 (quoting ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759).

With the exception of Hoopes’ retaliation claim, the district court did not err

in applying Younger and abstaining from hearing Hoopes’ claims here. Hoopes has

pointed to no procedural bar to its ability to raise its federal claims in state court.

Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Utility Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1020

(9th Cir. 1999) (“The ‘adequate opportunity’ prong of Younger . . . . requires only

the absence of ‘procedural bars’ to raising a federal claim in the state

proceedings.”). Indeed, Hoopes is still actively pursuing these federal claims in

California state superior court and has not exhausted its state appellate remedies.

See Yelp, 137 F.4th at 951; Baffert v. Cal. Horse Racing Bd., 332 F.3d 613, 620

(9th Cir. 2003) (“The superior court’s decision, if unfavorable, may then be

appealed all the way through the California court system.”). Hoopes argues that the

superior court’s bifurcation of the case, staying Hoopes’s counterclaims until after

a decision on Napa’s claims, has denied it “timely and adequate review of its

3 25-2715 federal claims,” but a “bald assertion that state proceedings are lengthy does not

eliminate the grounds for Younger abstention.” Baffert, 332 F.3d at 620. And

Hoopes’ requests for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages would have

“the same practical effect” as enjoining the state court proceedings. Gilbertson v.

Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).

The district court erred, however, in abstaining from hearing Hoopes’ First

Amendment retaliation claim for damages. This claim is sufficiently separable

from Hoopes’ non-retaliation claims because, among other things, it challenges

Napa’s conduct involving the personal residence of Hoopes’ owner, which is not at

issue in the pending state case. See id. at 980 n.14; Herrera v. City of Palmdale,

918 F.3d 1037, 1049 (9th Cir. 2019). A determination that Hoopes is entitled to

monetary damages for Napa’s alleged retaliatory conduct “would not ‘have the

same practical effect as a declaration or injunction on’” the code-violation

enforcement proceeding against the winery. Herrera, 918 F.3d at 1049 (quoting

Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 968). Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision with

respect to Hoopes’ non-retaliation claims and reverse and remand with respect to

Hoopes’ First Amendment retaliation claim for damages.

2. At this stage of the litigation, Summit Lake and Smith-Madrone have

demonstrated that, under the framework of Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560–61 (1992), they have standing to bring their pre-enforcement First

4 25-2715 Amendment, Dormant Commerce Clause, due process, equal protection, permit

taking, and regulatory taking claims because they sufficiently alleged that Napa’s

regulations and enforcement actions injured them in a way that would be

redressable by a favorable court decision. Although the justiciability of their due

process, equal protection, and permit taking claims is a close question—their

claims would not be ripe without a final position adopted by Napa regarding the

wineries’ desired use of their land—we nevertheless conclude that they have met

the pleading-stage standard on the record before us. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l

Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 191 (1985) (final decision

requirement for takings claims in the land-use context), overruled on other

grounds by Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019); Hoehne v. County of

San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (final decision requirement for due

process and equal protection claims in the land-use context). The district court,

however, retains its authority to revisit Summit Lake and Smith-Madrone’s

standing and other justiciability issues as the case progresses.

3. The district court erred in applying Younger to abstain from hearing

Summit Lake and Smith-Madrone’s claims. These parties are distinct from Hoopes

and are not “so closely related that they should all be subject to the Younger

considerations which govern any one of them.” Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S.

922, 928 (1975).

5 25-2715 4. The district court erred in dismissing Summit Lake and Smith-Madrone’s

First Amendment retaliation claims. As “proximity in time between the protected

speech and the alleged retaliation” is an acceptable form of circumstantial evidence

to show retaliatory motive, Summit Lake and Smith-Madrone have raised

sufficient inferences to show that Napa’s actions against them were driven by

retaliatory animus. Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002). The

claims therefore survive Napa’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.2

2 The parties shall bear their own costs and attorneys’ fees on appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)(4).

6 25-2715