Hooper v. Young Sales Corp.

288 S.W.2d 703, 199 Tenn. 629, 3 McCanless 629, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 363
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 9, 1956
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 288 S.W.2d 703 (Hooper v. Young Sales Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hooper v. Young Sales Corp., 288 S.W.2d 703, 199 Tenn. 629, 3 McCanless 629, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 363 (Tenn. 1956).

Opinion

MR. Justice Tomlinson

delivered the opinion of the Court. ■ •

This is a workmen’s compensation case, wherein the issues are (1) the extent of, a permanent disability of Mr. Hooper’s body as a whole,-and that extent having been ascertained, (2) the proper formula for determining the amount of compensation to be paid. -

Mr. Hooper was thirty odd years old. His occupation, since getting out of the army, has been confined entirely to that of roofing houses. He was injured while so engaged. He says that because of those injuries he will not be able to do that type of work again; hence, since this is the only work which he, a man of little education, knows how to do, the Court should have found that the permanent disability to his body is total rather than partial.

Booting is a work which principally involves physical labor, though it be, to some extent, skilled labor. Logically, it would not seem to follow that Mr. Hooper is totally disabled merely because the injuries received were such as to prevent him from engaging in that particular physical labor which roofing requires.

In - addition, there is substantial evidence that Mr. Hooper’s inability to do roofing is not total. The testimony of Dr. Sayers is that “by a system of re-education of his injured arm” he could, in this doctor’s opinion, [631]*631“do the work that is required of a roofer”, and “still be able to make a living with it”.

After Dr. Ashby gave it as his opinion that Mr. Hooper’s disability was between 50% and 55% there appears the following:

“Q. Doctor, in estimating this man’s disability yon do take into consideration that he is a skilled laborer, in contrast to common laborer? A. I am thinking abont the type of work which he was doing, and wonld ordinarily be doing in his work as a skilled laborer. However, in my estimate it seems to me that those things apply to both.”

Three doctors testified. They varied in their esimates of Hooper’s bodily disability from a low of 40% to a high of 58%. The Chancellor found it to be 50%. Therefore, this Court must consider this appeal on the basis of a 50% permanent partial disability of Mr. Hooper’s body as a whole.

■ The code section by which compensation must be determined in a disability of this character is as follows:

“All other eases of permanent partial disability not above enumerated shall be apportioned to the body as a whole, which shall have a value of three hundred (300) weeks, and there shall be paid compensation to the injured employee for the proportionate loss of use of the body as a whole resulting from the injury. Compensation for such permanent partial disability shall be subject to the same limitations as to maximum and minimum as provided in subsection (a).” Section 50-1007(c), last paragraph, T. C. A.

The limitations in sub-section (a) as to maximum and minimum amounts payable are: 60 % of the injured employee’s average weekly wage at the time of the injury, [632]*632subject to a maximum of $28 and a minimum of $12 per week. Section 50-1007(a), T. C. A.

At the time Hooper received this injury his average weekly wage was $67.30. He had a temporary total disability of 23 weeks. Since 60% of $67.30 is more than $28, the Chancellor was of the opinion that Hooper’s award must be calculated upon a basis of $28 per week. And, since Hooper had been paid temporary total disability for 23 weeks, the Chancellor concluded that the award must be calculated upon a basis of 277 weeks; that is, the maximum of 300 weeks was credited with this 23 weeks.

In reaching a final conclusion as to the amount of the award, the Chancellor’s method of computation was to take 50% (the amount of the disability) of $28 (the maximum weekly wage permissible) with the result that the award is a payment of $14 per week for a period of 277 weeks.

Hooper’s insistence is that (1) since the award is to be calculated upon the basis of 60% of the employee’s average weekly wage, the Chancellor should have proceeded on the basis of 60% of $67.30 (his average weekly wage at the time of the injury). Such percentage of such wage is $40.38; (2) that since his disability was 50%, the Chancellor should have taken 50% of this $40.38. Mr. Hooper’s reasoning is that since his disability is 50% he is entitled each week to 50% of 60% of his average weekly wage until such 50'% of such 60% reaches the maximum figure of $28 per week. If this method of computation is correct Mr. Hooper’s weekly payment should be $20.19 per week (50% of $40.38); and (3) that he is entitled to such $20.19 for each of 300 weeks because in a disability of this character the temporary total disability, says Mr. Hooper, is an amount which the statute allows in addition [633]*633to the amount to which he is entitled for permanent partial disability.

A strong argument is made in support of Mr. Hooper’s insistences (1) and (2). However, the Court is of the opinion that the pertinent statutory provision, Section 50-1007(a), T. C. A., is not susceptible of that construction. That section provides that the injured employee shall receive “sixty per cent (60%) of the average weekly wages * * * subject to a maximum compensation of twenty-eight dollars ($28.00) per week * * The natural construction of this language is that the employee is entitled to 60% of his average weekly wage until such 60% thereof reaches the maximum of $28 per week.

It is next necessary to determine the number of weeks for which Mr. Hooper is entitled to this $28. This is controlled by the provision in the last paragraph of Section 50-1007(c), T. C. A., hereinbefore quoted. That paragraph gives the body as a whole a value of 300 weeks in determining the amount of an award for a permanent partial disability of such body. The exact wording is í < * * * shall be apportioned to the body as a whole, which shall have a value of three hundred (300) weeks.”

If the body as a whole has a value of 3001 weeks, then, in calculating the amount payable for a permanent loss of a part of that body, or its use, it would necessarily follow that when the loss is 50% of the body, the loss suffered by the employee, and for which he is entitled to compensation, is 150 weeks. So, temporarily eliminating consideration of whether a credit should be taken for the weeks of temporary total disability, the result is that Mr. Hooper is entitled to be paid $28 per week for 150 weeks.

While the conclusion just stated amounts in dollars and cents to the same as when calculated at $14 per week for 300 weeks (the Chancellor’s method of computation), [634]*634there is, this Court thinks, a difference which should be noticed, to-wit, it is one thing for an injured employee who was accustomed to earning substantial wages to receive $28 per week for the support of self and family until he and his family become adjusted to his altered conditions, but quite a different, and mnch more detrimental thing for him and his family to receive $14 per week during a long*er period of time.

The next question is whether this 150 weeks should be credited with payments made for temporary total disability. The statute applicable to Mr. Hooper’s disability, and codified as Section 50-1007(c), T. C. A., is Section 2(e) of Chapter 111 of the Public Acts of 1953. As so codified, it has been quoted hereinbefore.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
288 S.W.2d 703, 199 Tenn. 629, 3 McCanless 629, 1956 Tenn. LEXIS 363, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hooper-v-young-sales-corp-tenn-1956.