Hoop v. Hoop

Ninth Circuit

Hoop v. Hoop

295 F. App'x 211, 399 B.R. 211

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedSeptember 29, 2008

DocketNo. 07-35304

StatusPublished

This text of 295 F. App'x 211 (Hoop v. Hoop) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hoop v. Hoop, 295 F. App'x 211, 399 B.R. 211 (9th Cir. 2008).

Pincite

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

**

Darwin Kurt Hoop appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order declaring the judgment entered against Hoop by a Pennsylvania court to be nondischargeable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s decision, Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.

The district court properly concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it determined that the Pennsylvania court’s judgment against Hoop is nondischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (setting forth nondischargeability of debt for “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity”); see also Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1185-87 (9th Cir.1996) (defining “fiduciary” and “defalcation” for purposes of section 523(a)(4)).

The district court also properly concluded that Hoop is collaterally es-topped from attacking the Pennsylvania court’s judgment because the issues determined in state court were the same as the issues arising under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), [213]*213and Hoop participated in the state court proceedings. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Dujfield, 537 Pa. 485, 644 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1994) (setting forth elements of collateral estoppel under Pennsylvania law); see also Muegler v. Bening, 413 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir.2005) (explaining that for purposes of assessing “full and fair opportunity to litigate” element of collateral estoppel, the relevant procedural opportunities are those available to a party at the beginning of the original trial). Hoop’s contention that the Pennsylvania court’s judgment erroneously included certain of his personal property in the bankruptcy estate is unavailing. See Steen v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir.1997) (collateral estoppel applies even if the prior case was erroneously decided).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM

**

Darwin Kurt Hoop appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s order declaring the judgment entered against Hoop by a Pennsylvania court to be nondischargeable. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 158(d). We review de novo the district court’s decision, Ditto v. McCurdy, 510 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.

The district court properly concluded that the bankruptcy court did not err when it determined that the Pennsylvania court’s judgment against Hoop is nondischargeable. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (setting forth nondischargeability of debt for “fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity”); see also Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1185-87 (9th Cir.1996) (defining “fiduciary” and “defalcation” for purposes of section 523(a)(4)).

The district court also properly concluded that Hoop is collaterally es-topped from attacking the Pennsylvania court’s judgment because the issues determined in state court were the same as the issues arising under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), [213]*213and Hoop participated in the state court proceedings. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Dujfield, 537 Pa. 485, 644 A.2d 1186, 1189 (1994) (setting forth elements of collateral estoppel under Pennsylvania law); see also Muegler v. Bening, 413 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir.2005) (explaining that for purposes of assessing “full and fair opportunity to litigate” element of collateral estoppel, the relevant procedural opportunities are those available to a party at the beginning of the original trial). Hoop’s contention that the Pennsylvania court’s judgment erroneously included certain of his personal property in the bankruptcy estate is unavailing. See Steen v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir.1997) (collateral estoppel applies even if the prior case was erroneously decided).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 926, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 1384 William A. Steen Harold Hedlund Timothy Sandis John Heindel Lawrence Wlezien Wilbur Lockman Norman Neste, as Trustees and Land Surveyors of California Trust, and the Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors of California Health and Life Insurance Plan v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company Association Administrators and Consultants, Inc., William A. Steen v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, and Association Administrators and Consultants, Inc. v. Robert Lemond James Wooten Daniel Ogden Milton Bell Robert Bennett David Lancaster, Trustees of the Texas Society of Architects Insurance Benefit Trust (Texas Trustees) Donald Melander Michael Wirtanen Arnold Lucke Robert Mayeron Thomas H. Stahl, Trustees of the Minnesota Society, American Institute of Architects Employee Benefits Trust ("Minnesota Trustees"), Third-Party-Defendants-Appellees

106 F.3d 904 (Third Circuit, 1997)

Arthur G. Muegler, Jr. v. David J. Bening Alfred W. Harre

413 F.3d 980 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)

Ditto v. McCurdy

510 F.3d 1070 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Duffield

644 A.2d 1186 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1994)