Hooker v. Hooker

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Hooker v. Hooker

105 S.E. 701, 115 S.C. 297, 1919 S.C. LEXIS 205

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedDecember 22, 1919

Docket10304

StatusPublished

This text of 105 S.E. 701 (Hooker v. Hooker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hooker v. Hooker, 105 S.E. 701, 115 S.C. 297, 1919 S.C. LEXIS 205 (S.C. 1919).

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Opinion

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Chiee Justice Gary.

1 In his decree, his Honor, the County Judge, says: “The .sole question is whether there was such misrepresentation or undue influence as would vitiate the deed to the defendant from his mother. * * * In the cause at bar we have in dispute, a deed from mother to son. Does that relationship, ipso facto, raise a presumption of undue influence, the burden of rebutting which would be with the defendant? It does not. * * * There being no presumption of either undue influence or misrepresentation from mere relationship, has the plaintiff proven either? I hold not. Indeed, did the presumption of undue influence exist, my finding would be that it' had been met by the defendant and overcome.”

The following authorities show that there was error on the part of his Honor, the County Judge, in ruling that there was no presumption of undue influence arising from the relation of parent and child, and that the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff: Way v. Ins. Co., 61 S. C. 501, 39 S. E. 742; Craddock v. Weekley, 85 S. C. 329, 67 S. E. 308; Huguenin v. Adams, 110 S. C. 407, 96 S. E. 918.

2 Not only was there a failure on the part of the defendant to give a satisfactory explanation of the transaction between him and his mother, but the testimony in behalf of the plaintiff clearly shows that there was undue influence on the part of the defendant.

Mr. Justice Hydrick did not sit, because related to one of the parties.

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The opinion of the Court was delivered by

Mr. Chiee Justice Gary.

1 In his decree, his Honor, the County Judge, says: “The .sole question is whether there was such misrepresentation or undue influence as would vitiate the deed to the defendant from his mother. * * * In the cause at bar we have in dispute, a deed from mother to son. Does that relationship, ipso facto, raise a presumption of undue influence, the burden of rebutting which would be with the defendant? It does not. * * * There being no presumption of either undue influence or misrepresentation from mere relationship, has the plaintiff proven either? I hold not. Indeed, did the presumption of undue influence exist, my finding would be that it' had been met by the defendant and overcome.”

The following authorities show that there was error on the part of his Honor, the County Judge, in ruling that there was no presumption of undue influence arising from the relation of parent and child, and that the burden of proof rested upon the plaintiff: Way v. Ins. Co., 61 S. C. 501, 39 S. E. 742; Craddock v. Weekley, 85 S. C. 329, 67 S. E. 308; Huguenin v. Adams, 110 S. C. 407, 96 S. E. 918.

2 Not only was there a failure on the part of the defendant to give a satisfactory explanation of the transaction between him and his mother, but the testimony in behalf of the plaintiff clearly shows that there was undue influence on the part of the defendant.

Mr. Justice Hydrick did not sit, because related to one of the parties.

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Bluebook (online)

105 S.E. 701, 115 S.C. 297, 1919 S.C. LEXIS 205, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hooker-v-hooker-sc-1919.

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