Hood v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided August 24, 2018·No. 17-1642·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 17-1642V (Not to be published)

************************* TONYA HOOD, * Special Master Oler * Petitioner, * Filed: July 30, 2018 * v. * Attorney’s Fees and Costs; Good Faith; * Reasonable Basis; Reasonable Hourly Rate; * Duplicative Billing. SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND * HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * *************************

Mark Theodore Sadaka, Mark T. Sadaka, LLC, Englewood, NJ, for Petitioner.

Robert Paul Coleman, III, U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION ON ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS1

On October 31, 2017, Tonya Hood filed a petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (the “Vaccine Program”),2 alleging that she developed multifocal acquired demyelinating sensory and motor neuropathy as a result of, or significantly aggravated by an influenza vaccination administered to her on November 7, 2014. Petition, ECF No. 1. I issued a Decision Denying Compensation on June 26, 2018, dismissing

1 Although this Decision has been formally designated “not to be published,” it will nevertheless be posted on the Court of Federal Claims’ website in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. As provided by 42 U.S.C. § 300aa- 12(d)(4)(B), however, the parties may object to the Decision’s inclusion of certain kinds of confidential information. Specifically, under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the Decision in its present form will be available. Id. 2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) (“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act (but will omit that statutory prefix). Ms. Hood’s petition due to the lack of a proper plaintiff to maintain the action. See Decision Denying Compensation, ECF No. 26. Judgment was entered on July 27, 2018. ECF No. 30.

A Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs (“Fees Motion,” ECF No. 25) was filed on June 21, 2018. Petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Mark Sadaka, requests reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs in the combined amount of $9,423.17 (representing attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,801.63 and attorney’s costs in the amount of $621.54). Fees Motion, Exhibit (“Ex.”) A at 7- 8. Although a General Order No. 9 statement was not formally filed, Petitioner’s counsel affirmatively asserted that his “firm paid for all of the costs occurred in litigating this petition.”3 Certification at 6.

Respondent filed a response (“Respondent’s Response”) to the Fees Motion on July 2, 2018. ECF No. 27. Respondent stated that he “leaves it to the discretion of the Special Master to determine whether the statutory requirements for an award of fees and costs have been met in this case, particularly whether there was a reasonable basis for appealing the underlying Decision on entitlement.”4 Id. at 2 (citing Hirmiz v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 135 Fed. Cl. 260, 270 (2017)). Respondent provided no specific objection to the amount requested or hours worked, but instead, “respectfully recommends that the Special Master exercise her discretion and determine a reasonable award for attorneys’ fees and costs.” Id. at 3. A reply to Respondent’s response was filed on July 3, 2018. ECF No. 28.

For the reasons discussed below, I grant reimbursement of attorney’s fees and costs in the combined amount of $9,386.32 (representing $8,764.78 in fees and $621.54 in costs).

I. Applicable Legal Standards

The Vaccine Act permits an award of “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs.” § 15(e)(1). If a petitioner succeeds on the merits of his or her claim, the award of attorneys’ fees is automatic. Id.; see Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 373 (2013). However, a petitioner need

3 Mr. Sadaka filed a “Certification In Support For Attorney’s Fees and Costs” along with the Fees Motion (ECF No. 25). I will refer to such document as “Certification,” and cite to the page numbers in accordance with the CM/ECF generated header. I will cite to the page numbers of the Fees Motion and its Exhibit A in accordance with the document’s page numbers noted in the footer. 4 Using my discretion to determine “whether there was a reasonable basis for appealing the underlying Decision on entitlement” (Respondent’s Response at 2) is not appropriate in this case, and the holding in Hirmiz does not apply. The Decision Denying Compensation was issued on June 26, 2018, and Judgment entered on July 27, 2018. The allotted time for parties to file a motion for review of my decision under Vaccine Rule 23 has passed. I acknowledge Respondent’s statement that he “leaves it to the discretion of the Special Master to determine whether the statutory requirements for an award of fees and costs have been met in this case” (Respondent’s Response at 2), and will therefore use my discretion to determine whether Petitioner satisfies § 15(e)(1) in awarding fees and costs. 2 not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award as long as the petition was brought in “good faith” and there was a “reasonable basis” for the claim to proceed. § 15(e)(1).

The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes “reasonable attorneys’ fees” and “other costs” under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under this approach, “[t]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorney’s fee” is calculated by “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). That product is then adjusted upward or downward based on other specific findings. Id.

A “reasonable hourly rate” is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Id. at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). This rate is based on “the forum rate for the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of petitioner’s attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349). There is a “limited exception” that provides for attorneys’ fees to be awarded at local hourly rates when “the bulk of the attorney’s work is done outside the forum jurisdiction” and “there is a very significant difference” between the local hourly rate and forum hourly rate. Id. This is known as the Davis County exception. See Hall v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 640 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir.

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