Hood Rubber Co. v. Commonwealth

131 N.E. 201, 238 Mass. 369, 1921 Mass. LEXIS 1022
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court·Decided May 23, 1921·Published·Cited by 19 cases

Opinion

Rugg, C. J.

This is a petition under St. 1909, c. 490, Part III, § 70, for the recovery of an excise alleged to have been exacted unlawfully. The salient facts are that the petitioner, a business corporation organized under the laws of this Commonwealth, had, prior to October 27, 1920, an authorized capital stock of $10,-500,000, divided into fifty thousand shares of preferred stock, each share having a -par value of $100, and fifty-five thousand shares of common stock, of which fifty thousand shares had been issued, each of the same par value. On October 27,1920, the stockholders of the petitioner adopted the following vote: “ That the present authorized shares of Common Stock in this Corporation with par value of one hundred dollars ($100.) each be and the same are hereby changed into one hundred thousand (100,000) shares of Common Stock without par value and otherwise having the preferences, voting powers, restrictions, and qualifications of the present outstanding shares of Common Stock; and that the holders of the shares of outstanding Common Stock heretofore with a par value of one hundred dollars ($100.) a share shall exchange the same and the certificates therefor for shares of Common Stock without par value, on the basis of two shares without par value for one share with par value of one hundred dollars ($100.), such shares without par value being issued for and in place of said shares of Common Stock heretofore outstanding and without any capitalization or impairment of any existing surplus or accumulated and undistributed profits.” An excise was demanded by the Commonwealth for the filing of the proper certificate setting forth these facts, on the theory that the transaction constituted an increase of the capital stock of the corporation subject to tax under the business corporation law, St. 1903, c. 437, §§ 40 and 89, as respectively amended by §§ 6 and 9 of c. 349, St. 1920, the last section being further amended by St. 1920, c. 598, § 2. Such excise was paid under protest and the present petition is brought to recover it back. The case has been presented by both sides on the assumption that the money exacted was an excise and not a filing fee and it will be considered and determined on that footing.

The decision turns upon the meaning of the provisions of the [371] governing sections of the statute. It is provided by § 40 of the business corporation law as amended that “Every corporation may . . . authorize an increase or a reduction of its capital stock and determine the terms and manner of the disposition of such increased stock, or authorize such terms and manner of disposition to be determined in whole or in part by the board of directors or officers of the corporation.” These provisions relate to an enlargement of the capital assets of the corporation by the acquisition of such “ cash, property, tangible or intangible, services or expenses . . . actually received or incurred by, or conveyed or rendered to, the corporation,” for whiéh alone shares for capital stock originally can be issued under St. 1903, c. 437, § 14. See now G. L. c. 156, §§ 14, 15, 16. The words “capital,” “capital stock,” “ shares of capital, stock ” and “ stock ” may be used as synonyms or with different meanings dependent upon the context in which they occur and the subject matter to which they are applied. Wright v. Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. 216 U. S. 420, 424, 425. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 687. Wetherbee v. Baker, 8 Stew. 501, 505. United States Radiator Corp. v. State, 208 N. Y. 144, 149. See Smith v. Dana, 77 Conn. 543, 552, 553; Person & Riegel Co. v. Lipps, 219 Penn. St. 99, 109. We are of opinion that in the statute here involved the words “capital stock ” and “ such increased stock ” mean a genuine addition to the property permanently dedicated to the business enterprise for the prosecution of which the corporation was organized.

This record does not present any features of an attempt to conform to these provisions of § 40. No new assets were, or were intended to be, transferred into the treasury of the corporation. The transactions manifested by the vote of the corporation did not add anything to the value of the capital resources of the corporation. Its permanent funds to remain for the uses of its business free from the possibility of distribution of dividends have not been made larger or in any manner affected by the stockholders’ vote of October 27, 1920, and the execution of its terms. The 'property of the corporation will remain the same and the proportional interest of each shareholder in that property also will remain the same. There may be an increase of capital stock manifested by the issuance of shares without par value, and such an issue would be subject to the excise. That, however, is not the [372] situation shown in the case at bar. There was no effort to issue in disguise a stock dividend, because the vote expressly declared that the shares without par value should be issued simply for and in place of those shares of common stock theretofore outstanding “ without any capitalization or impairment of any existing surplus or accumulated and undistributed profits.” Upon demurrer, this assertion in the petition must be accepted as true for the purposes of this decision.

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Hood Rubber Co. v. Commonwealth, 131 N.E. 201, 238 Mass. 369, 1921 Mass. LEXIS 1022 (Mass. 1921).

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