Homero Ituralde-Sanchez v. Markwayne Mullin, et al.

Opinion

HOMERO ITURALDE-SANCHEZ No. 1:26-cv-4795 DC CSK (A-241-078-798), Petitioner, v. RECOMMENDATIONS MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al., Respondents. Petitioner Homero Ituralde-Sanchez (A-241-078-798), a native of Mexico who is proceeding without counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 This habeas action concerns petitioner’s detention by immigration authorities. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and ordering petitioner’s immediate release. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner has lived in the United States for over 29 years. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) On August 3, 2024, petitioner was arrested for DUI and unlawful carrying of a weapon. (Id.; ECF No. 8 at 1.) Soon after, petitioner was released from state custody by a judge. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) On or 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c)(17). about August 6, 2024, immigration authorities encountered petitioner, charged him with entry without admission or parole, placed him in removal proceedings and released him on an order of own recognizance. (ECF No. 8 at 1.) DHS determined that petitioner was not a flight risk or a danger to the public. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) On February 6, 2026, petitioner was re-detained by immigration authorities. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner has not been provided with a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker to assess danger or flight risk. (Id. at 3.) Respondents do not materially dispute petitioner’s factual allegations, but added information concerning his criminal arrest and pending immigration proceedings. (See ECF No. 8 at 1-2.) On June 22, 2026, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.) On July 2, 2026, respondents timely filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) On July 13, 2026, petitioner filed a motion to accept the late filing of his opposition, which accompanied his motion. (ECF No. 9.) Good cause appearing, petitioner’s motion is granted, and the opposition is deemed timely-filed. (ECF No. 10.) Briefing is complete. The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Generally, noncitizens are subject to civil immigration detention only if the noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention). Petitioner challenges his detention as a violation of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment (claims one, three and four) and on statutory grounds (claim two). (ECF No. 1 at 28-30.) Respondents do not argue that petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community, and instead argue that as an “applicant for admission,” petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). (ECF No. 8 at 2.) Respondents note that petitioner was arrested for DUI and the unlawful carrying of a weapon, but concede he was thereafter released on his own recognizance. (Id. at 1.) Respondents cite Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026) and Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), in support of their position that § 1225(b) is applicable here. (Id. st 2-3.) Respondents also argue that petitioner does not possess a right to freedom from immigration detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress. (Id. at 3.) Respondents “acknowledge that the current case mirrors the issues in numerous cases decided by the Courts in the Eastern District of California to find the government’s legal position to be incorrect and the alien’s detention unlawful.” (ECF No. 8 at 2 (citing, e.g., Perez v. Albarran, 2025 WL 3187578 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (ordering immigrant’s immediate release from detention) and O.A.C.S. v. Wofford, 2025 WL 3485221 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2025) (same)).) This Court interprets respondents’ acknowledgment to refer to the large volume of cases in which this district court has repeatedly rejected respondents’ new interpretation2 of Sections 1225 and 1226, finding that the detention or re-detention of a noncitizen without a pre-deprivation bond hearing violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and/or violates due process. After the petition was fully briefed, the Ninth Circuit decided this issue in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842, 2026 WL 2196424 (9th Cir. July 30, 2026). In Rodriguez Vazquez, the Ninth Circuit rejected respondents’ argument, concluding that noncitizens “present without admission who are apprehended in the interior of the United States are subject to the detention regime of § 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Id. at *3. The majority of courts nationwide 2 Until DHS changed its policy in July 2025, the Government consistently applied Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). agree, rejecting respondents’ new interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226. See, e.g., Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, 175 F.4th 61 (2d Cir. 2026); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, et al., 175 F.4th 713, 735 (6th Cir. 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, 175 F.4th 1258, 1285 (11th Cir. 2026); Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir. 2025); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting cases rejecting the government’s assertion that § 1225 empowers DHS to arrest and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has spent years in the U.S.); Cardona-Lozano v Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] construction of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] is incorrect and that petitioners who have long resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are entitled to relief.”) (collecting cases)); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (holding that § 1226 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as subject to discretionary detention and “who has been residing in the United States for two years” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at 3 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”); Guerro Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). Therefore, respondents’ argument that petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to § 1225(b) fails and, pursuant to Rodriguez Vazquez and based on respondents’ acknowledgment, the Court recommends denying respondents’ motion to dismiss, granting the petition, and ordering petitioner’s immediate release. In the petition, petitioner also raises due process claims (claims one, three, four). (ECF No. 1 at 28, 29-30.) Because the Court recommends granting the petition on the statutory claim (claim two), the Court need not address any additional claims (claims one, three, four) raised in the petition. See N.K. v. Noem, 1:26-cv-0292 KES SAB, 2026 WL 130345, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026) (granting habeas as to the second count of the petition and not addressing other counts because the petitioner was entitled to the relief sought based on the court’s ruling as to the second count); Constantinovici v. Bondi, No. 3:25-cv-2405 RBM AHG, 2025 WL 2898985, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2025) (granting habeas petition based on due process claim and “declin[ing] to address the remaining grounds in the Petition for seeking release.”). Petitioner is entitled to the habeas relief he seeks on the court’s ruling as to claim two. Petitioner filed a motion for appointment of counsel. (ECF No. 3.) There currently exists no absolute right to appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings. See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, the court can appoint counsel at any stage of the case “if the interests of justice so require.” See Rule 8(c), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases. Because the Court recommends that the petition be granted, petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied without prejudice. In summary, the Court recommends that respondents’ motion to dismiss be denied, and the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted on claim two. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Petitioner’s motion to accept late filing (ECF No. 9) is granted, and his opposition is deemed timely-filed. 2. Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3) is denied without prejudice. Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 1. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) be DENIED. 2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED on claim two. 3. Respondents be ordered to IMMEDIATELY release petitioner Homero Ituralde- Sanchez (A-241-078-798) and be ordered to provide petitioner with a copy of the release order at or near the time of release. If respondents have custody of petitioner’s documents (e.g., identification, passport, work permit, Social Security card, etc.), ] respondents shall return those to petitioner at the time of release. 4. Respondents be ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless the government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally justified. This injunction does not address other circumstances where detention authority is established under different authority than what is presented in this case (e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. § 1231). 5. Given petitioner’s pro se status, respondents be directed to file, within seven days of the adoption of these findings and recommendations, a status report addressing petitioner’s status. 6. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and close this case. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 53 Dated: August 17, 2026 7 _- Chan Spo UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE /Vftur4795.157.2241 .imm.RELEASE