Hom Chung v. Nagle

41 F.2d 126, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2738
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 19, 1930
DocketNo. 6031
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 41 F.2d 126 (Hom Chung v. Nagle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hom Chung v. Nagle, 41 F.2d 126, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2738 (9th Cir. 1930).

Opinion

WILBUR, Circuit Judge,

An application for habeas corpus was made in the District Court on behalf of Horn Chung, a 14 year old Chinese boy, who was held by the immigration authorities under an order for deportation, having been denied entry upon the ground that he had failed satisfaetorily to establish his relationship to his alleged father, Horn Quong, an American citizen. Upon his return from a visit to China in 1915, Horn Quong stated to the immigration authorities that he had married Ng Shee, and that they had a son, Horn Chung, born on the 6th day of September, 1915. When he later returned from China after another visit in 1925 he repeated the statement that he had a son named Horn Chung, bom September 6,1915, living in China with [127]*127his mother, Ng Shee, at Horn village, Hey Ping district, China. When this alleged son, Horn Chung, arrived at the port of San Francisco February 6,1929, he applied for admission into the United States on the ground that he is a foreign-bom son of Horn Quong, who is now living in Waterloo, Iowa.

The testimony of the alleged father in support of said application was taken at Omaha., Neb., of the son, who will be hereafter called the applicant, at San Francisco, and of his witness Quan Hay, in Los Angeles, Cal. There is no testimony directly opposed to that of the father and of the appellant as to their relationship, which is further corroborated by Quan Hay. As is the custom in these eases, the examination of the witnesses by the immigration authorities took a very wide range, not only concerning the relationship of the father and son, but also as to the family history, the names, and residences of the living relatives, the place of burial of deceased grandparents, and also as to the house in which the applicant Horn Chung was bom and lived, the number of houses in the village, the number of rooms in the schoolhouse attended by Horn Chung, etc. There are two evident purposes of this lino of examination: First, to ascertain appellant’s familiarity with the home and family in which he claims to have lived and to which he claims to belong ; and, second, to ascertain his familiarity with the village in which he claims to have resided. His father was also examined along the same linos, evidently to establish a basis of comparison. The immigration records show that the father departed from the United States for China on October 24, 1914, and again on June 14, 1923, and returned to the United States from China on December 24, 1915, and on May 19,1925. As he remained in China during these periods of absence, aggregating about three years, it may be assumed that he testified truthfully to the name of the village in which he lived during his absence, and that he is reasonably familiar with such village which he testifies contains only twelve houses. The applicant was denied admission because of discrepancies between his testimony and that of his father.

In order to determine the effect of discrepancies between the testimony of the alleged father and his alleged son it may be fairly assumed that the father is stating the facts concerning the village in which he resided in China as accurately as his memory permits him to do. If he hits deliberately and Willfully sworn falsely to secure the admission of the appellant into the United States, it is reasonable to assume that such perjury or falsehood is confined to the material fact of the appellant’s relationship to him, and does not extend to immaterial details concerning the village in which he lived. Any erroneous statements he may have made concerning the village or his home therein would have no tendency to discredit his testimony that the applicant was his legitimate son. There is no reason why the father should testify falsely with relation to his home or village in order to lay a foundation for a claim that the applicant was his son. We may fairly accept the statement of the father under the circumstances as a standard or basis by which to judge the accuracy and veracity of the testimony of the son for the purpose of determining whether or not in fact the appellant lived in the same home and in the same village as the alleged father. The discrepancies between the statements of the father and son may be divided into two classes, one concerning the home and family and the other concerning the village. If the applicant is from the same home and family, he would, of course, be from the same village, and it is altogether likely that he is the son he claims to be. On the other hand, if he is familiar with the village and not with the homo or family, it might have been inferred that an attempt has been made to substitute a boy from the same village as the alleged son of the father. The first question then is this: Was the boy from the home of the alleged father?

The father, examined at Omaha, Neb., testifies that his wife is named Ng Shee; that she has natural feet; that she is thirty-three years of age; that she is living in the Horn village, Hoy Ping district, China; that she has two sons, the applicant and Horn Yit, who lived with her; that his parents are Horn Gen Yem father and Ng Shee mother; that they are both dead and are buried in Chong Loong Hot cemetery, about a mile "from the home village; that their graves are 'marked by a stone tablet; that when he was last in China he twice visited their graves, accompanied by the applicant; that his wife’s father, Ng Yook Wah, and mother, Soo Hoo, are living; that her father is a physician in Chong Sar Market; that he has an older brother, Horn Chun, fifty-two years old, living in the United States; that this brother was last in China between 1921 to 1924; that applicant frequently saw him there; the brother sometimes wore a beard and sometimes was smooth shaven; the brother has been twice married; that his brother’s first wife was named Dea Shee; that she is dead; that he has three sons, Horn Keung, aged [128]*128over twenty years and Horn Hing over twenty years, both living in the United States, and Horn Chee, aged eighteen living in China; that appellant has never seen Horn Keung, the eldest son, who came to the United States in 1915; that appellant has seen Horn Hing, who came to the United States in 1920; that his brother married Ng Shee after the death of his first wife. This second wife is thirty odd years old, living in China, and has three children, named Horn Ngin, aged sixteen years; Horn Yook, aged nine years, and Horn You, aged six years, all living in China and attending school there; that the applicant has attended school with them; that the home of applicant is constructed of brick, has two outside doors, one large and one small; the large door is on the east side; that the house has five rooms with tiled floors; that there is one window in each bedroom; that the bedroom on the east side has two beds, one in the northeast comer and one in the southwest corner; that the other bedroom was used for storage, purposes. When the father returned from China in 1897, 1915, and 1925, he testitled in agreement with his present testimony. The appellant testifying separately at San Francisco agrees with that of the alleged father on all these details as to the family.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Wong Gook Chun v. Proctor
84 F.2d 763 (Ninth Circuit, 1936)
Young Len Gee v. Nagle
53 F.2d 448 (Ninth Circuit, 1931)
Wong Sun Ying v. Weedin
50 F.2d 377 (Ninth Circuit, 1931)
Louie Lung Gooey v. Nagle
49 F.2d 1016 (Ninth Circuit, 1931)
Louie Poy Hok v. Nagle
48 F.2d 753 (Ninth Circuit, 1931)
Weedin v. Lee Gan
47 F.2d 886 (Ninth Circuit, 1931)
Chung Pig Tin v. Nagle
45 F.2d 484 (Ninth Circuit, 1930)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
41 F.2d 126, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2738, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hom-chung-v-nagle-ca9-1930.