Hom Chung v. Nagle

41 F.2d 126, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2738
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided May 19, 1930·No. No. 6031·Published·Cited by 7 cases

Opinion

WILBUR, Circuit Judge,

An application for habeas corpus was made in the District Court on behalf of Horn Chung, a 14 year old Chinese boy, who was held by the immigration authorities under an order for deportation, having been denied entry upon the ground that he had failed satisfaetorily to establish his relationship to his alleged father, Horn Quong, an American citizen. Upon his return from a visit to China in 1915, Horn Quong stated to the immigration authorities that he had married Ng Shee, and that they had a son, Horn Chung, born on the 6th day of September, 1915. When he later returned from China after another visit in 1925 he repeated the statement that he had a son named Horn Chung, bom September 6,1915, living in China with [127] his mother, Ng Shee, at Horn village, Hey Ping district, China. When this alleged son, Horn Chung, arrived at the port of San Francisco February 6,1929, he applied for admission into the United States on the ground that he is a foreign-bom son of Horn Quong, who is now living in Waterloo, Iowa.

The testimony of the alleged father in support of said application was taken at Omaha., Neb., of the son, who will be hereafter called the applicant, at San Francisco, and of his witness Quan Hay, in Los Angeles, Cal. There is no testimony directly opposed to that of the father and of the appellant as to their relationship, which is further corroborated by Quan Hay. As is the custom in these eases, the examination of the witnesses by the immigration authorities took a very wide range, not only concerning the relationship of the father and son, but also as to the family history, the names, and residences of the living relatives, the place of burial of deceased grandparents, and also as to the house in which the applicant Horn Chung was bom and lived, the number of houses in the village, the number of rooms in the schoolhouse attended by Horn Chung, etc. There are two evident purposes of this lino of examination: First, to ascertain appellant’s familiarity with the home and family in which he claims to have lived and to which he claims to belong ; and, second, to ascertain his familiarity with the village in which he claims to have resided. His father was also examined along the same linos, evidently to establish a basis of comparison. The immigration records show that the father departed from the United States for China on October 24, 1914, and again on June 14, 1923, and returned to the United States from China on December 24, 1915, and on May 19,1925. As he remained in China during these periods of absence, aggregating about three years, it may be assumed that he testified truthfully to the name of the village in which he lived during his absence, and that he is reasonably familiar with such village which he testifies contains only twelve houses. The applicant was denied admission because of discrepancies between his testimony and that of his father.

In order to determine the effect of discrepancies between the testimony of the alleged father and his alleged son it may be fairly assumed that the father is stating the facts concerning the village in which he resided in China as accurately as his memory permits him to do. If he hits deliberately and Willfully sworn falsely to secure the admission of the appellant into the United States, it is reasonable to assume that such perjury or falsehood is confined to the material fact of the appellant’s relationship to him, and does not extend to immaterial details concerning the village in which he lived. Any erroneous statements he may have made concerning the village or his home therein would have no tendency to discredit his testimony that the applicant was his legitimate son. There is no reason why the father should testify falsely with relation to his home or village in order to lay a foundation for a claim that the applicant was his son. We may fairly accept the statement of the father under the circumstances as a standard or basis by which to judge the accuracy and veracity of the testimony of the son for the purpose of determining whether or not in fact the appellant lived in the same home and in the same village as the alleged father. The discrepancies between the statements of the father and son may be divided into two classes, one concerning the home and family and the other concerning the village. If the applicant is from the same home and family, he would, of course, be from the same village, and it is altogether likely that he is the son he claims to be. On the other hand, if he is familiar with the village and not with the homo or family, it might have been inferred that an attempt has been made to substitute a boy from the same village as the alleged son of the father. The first question then is this: Was the boy from the home of the alleged father?

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Hom Chung v. Nagle, 41 F.2d 126, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 2738 (9th Cir. 1930).

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