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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 CORTNI MARIE HOLTHAUS, Case No. 3:25-cv-05257-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 RECUSAL v. 10 WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF 11 CORRECTIONS et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 I. ORDER 15 This matter comes before the Court on Pro Se Plaintiff Cortni Marie Holthaus’s Motion 16 for Recusal. Dkt. 30. For the reasons explained below, Ms. Holthaus’s motion is DENIED, and 17 pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3(f), the undersigned judge directs the clerk to refer the motion to 18 U.S. Chief District Judge David G. Estudillo. 19 Motions for recusal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Recusal is 20 required if a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned or if the judge has a personal 21 bias or prejudice concerning a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). In addition, recusal is required 22 pursuant to Section 144 when a party “files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before 23 whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any 24 1 adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. Critically, bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant recusal must 2 derive from an extrajudicial source. United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453–54 (9th 3 Cir. 1997). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
4 motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 5 Ms. Holthaus raises three concerns that she argues merit recusal. See generally Dkt. 30. 6 First, Ms. Holthaus asserts that the Court has mischaracterized her filings, suggesting that they 7 are “repetitive or duplicative” when she claims they are not. Dkt. 30 at 1. Second, she alleges 8 that the Court overlooked evidence, as the Court has not cited several of her submissions in its 9 orders. Id. at 1–2. And third, Ms. Holthaus notes that the Court has threated sanctions for filings 10 that she believes were “appropriate, necessary, and made in good faith.” Id. at 2. She claims 11 these “threats have created an atmosphere of hostility and have made it difficult for Plaintiff to 12 feel safe in accessing the Court.” Id.
13 The Court is unpersuaded that recusal is appropriate. First, Ms. Holthaus does not point 14 to any “extrajudicial” conduct that warrants recusal. See Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of California, 15 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (“To warrant recusal, judicial bias must stem from an 16 extrajudicial source.”) (citing cases). This means the basis for recusal must be “something other 17 than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course of trial.” United 18 States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554–56). 19 Yet Ms. Holthaus’s concerns all center around the Court’s orders. Ms. Holthaus takes 20 issue with the Court’s characterization of her filings in its orders. Dkt. 30 at 1. She argues that 21 the “continued characterization of these efforts as wasteful or duplicative misrepresents the intent 22 and content of Plaintiff’s filings.” Id. The Court understands that Ms. Holthaus disagrees with
23 the Court’s description of her filings. But disagreement with judicial decisions is not grounds for 24 recusal since making those decisions is within the undersigned’s judicial capacity. United States 1 v.Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The alleged prejudice must result from an 2 extrajudicial source; a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal.”). 3 Second, to the extent that Ms. Holthaus argues that the Court’s decision to deny her
4 requests was the result of bias or animus, see Dkt. 26 at 2, Dkt. 30 at 2, these allegations are 5 conclusory and unsupported. See United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 6 566 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (May 24, 1995) (“mere conclusory allegations . . . are 7 insufficient to support a claim of bias or prejudice such that recusal is required”) (citation 8 omitted). 9 Ms. Holthaus alleges that the Court’s orders failed to acknowledge or review evidence, 10 and that she fears the evidence was “disregarded.” Dkt. 30 at 1–2. Ms. Holthaus’s motions and 11 her evidence were fully considered, and only then was the relief sought denied. See id. The Court 12 explained the reasoning in each of its orders. Dkt. 11; Dkt. 16; Dkt. 19; Dkt. 21; Dkt. 25. For
13 example, in an order denying Ms. Holthaus emergency relief, the Court detailed the very high 14 bar required for ex parte emergency relief—that is, relief granted without notice to the other 15 party. Dkt. 16 at 2–3. The Court explained that, though Ms. Holthaus had provided thorough 16 evidence in her complaint, she had not offered any evidence showing compliance with the 17 requirements for service and notice necessary for emergency relief. Id. at 3. Additionally, the 18 Court noted, Ms. Holthaus’s motion had not addressed the relevant legal standard. Id. This was 19 alone a sufficient basis to deny the motion. Id. (citing cases). The Court highlighted that her 20 allegations were concerning but acknowledged that she had not met the high bar for ex parte 21 emergency relief. Id. at 4. 22 Ms. Holthaus sought reconsideration of this order. Dkt. 17. She filed a flash drive and
23 other evidence with the Clerk’s Office. Dkt. 18. The Court reviewed this evidence, as well as her 24 motion, and concluded that Ms. Holthaus had not met the standard for a motion for 1 reconsideration. See generally Dkt. 19. The Court noted that Ms. Holthaus had submitted new 2 evidence. Id. at 2. But, the Court explained, the motion for reconsideration standard requires that 3 the evidence be newly discovered by the party. Id. (citing Lipson v. On Marine Servs. Co. LLC,
4 No. C13-1747, 2014 WL 2048195, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2014)). The Court never said that 5 the information was duplicative, only that it was not “newly discovered” and could have been 6 offered earlier. Id. 7 Then, Ms. Holthaus again moved for emergency relief and offered a proposed 8 amendment complaint. Dkt. 20. The Court did note that the motion itself was identical to the 9 motion the Court had previously denied, save for what appeared to be a missing page and a new 10 cover page. Dkt. 21 at 2; see also Dkt. 20; Dkt. 13; Dkt. 16; Dkt. 19. The Court again reviewed 11 all of the materials Ms. Holthaus had submitted—including the digital evidence on the flash 12 drive submitted to the Court. See Dkt. 21; Dkt. 20. The Court noted that repetitive filings, such as
13 repeatedly filing identical motions, could be the basis for sanctions. Dkt. 21 at 2–3. 14 These orders serve as the basis for Ms. Holthaus’s motion for recusal. Dkt. 30 at 1–2. 15 Ms. Holthaus thus does not allege any actions by this Court to support a claim of bias or 16 prejudice that would warrant recusal. See $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d at 566. Thus, 17 contrary to Ms.
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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 CORTNI MARIE HOLTHAUS, Case No. 3:25-cv-05257-TMC 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 9 RECUSAL v. 10 WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF 11 CORRECTIONS et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 I. ORDER 15 This matter comes before the Court on Pro Se Plaintiff Cortni Marie Holthaus’s Motion 16 for Recusal. Dkt. 30. For the reasons explained below, Ms. Holthaus’s motion is DENIED, and 17 pursuant to Local Civil Rule 3(f), the undersigned judge directs the clerk to refer the motion to 18 U.S. Chief District Judge David G. Estudillo. 19 Motions for recusal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Recusal is 20 required if a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned or if the judge has a personal 21 bias or prejudice concerning a party. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). In addition, recusal is required 22 pursuant to Section 144 when a party “files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before 23 whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any 24 1 adverse party.” 28 U.S.C. § 144. Critically, bias or prejudice sufficient to warrant recusal must 2 derive from an extrajudicial source. United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453–54 (9th 3 Cir. 1997). “[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality
4 motion.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). 5 Ms. Holthaus raises three concerns that she argues merit recusal. See generally Dkt. 30. 6 First, Ms. Holthaus asserts that the Court has mischaracterized her filings, suggesting that they 7 are “repetitive or duplicative” when she claims they are not. Dkt. 30 at 1. Second, she alleges 8 that the Court overlooked evidence, as the Court has not cited several of her submissions in its 9 orders. Id. at 1–2. And third, Ms. Holthaus notes that the Court has threated sanctions for filings 10 that she believes were “appropriate, necessary, and made in good faith.” Id. at 2. She claims 11 these “threats have created an atmosphere of hostility and have made it difficult for Plaintiff to 12 feel safe in accessing the Court.” Id.
13 The Court is unpersuaded that recusal is appropriate. First, Ms. Holthaus does not point 14 to any “extrajudicial” conduct that warrants recusal. See Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of California, 15 993 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1993) (“To warrant recusal, judicial bias must stem from an 16 extrajudicial source.”) (citing cases). This means the basis for recusal must be “something other 17 than rulings, opinions formed or statements made by the judge during the course of trial.” United 18 States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554–56). 19 Yet Ms. Holthaus’s concerns all center around the Court’s orders. Ms. Holthaus takes 20 issue with the Court’s characterization of her filings in its orders. Dkt. 30 at 1. She argues that 21 the “continued characterization of these efforts as wasteful or duplicative misrepresents the intent 22 and content of Plaintiff’s filings.” Id. The Court understands that Ms. Holthaus disagrees with
23 the Court’s description of her filings. But disagreement with judicial decisions is not grounds for 24 recusal since making those decisions is within the undersigned’s judicial capacity. United States 1 v.Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The alleged prejudice must result from an 2 extrajudicial source; a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal.”). 3 Second, to the extent that Ms. Holthaus argues that the Court’s decision to deny her
4 requests was the result of bias or animus, see Dkt. 26 at 2, Dkt. 30 at 2, these allegations are 5 conclusory and unsupported. See United States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 6 566 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended (May 24, 1995) (“mere conclusory allegations . . . are 7 insufficient to support a claim of bias or prejudice such that recusal is required”) (citation 8 omitted). 9 Ms. Holthaus alleges that the Court’s orders failed to acknowledge or review evidence, 10 and that she fears the evidence was “disregarded.” Dkt. 30 at 1–2. Ms. Holthaus’s motions and 11 her evidence were fully considered, and only then was the relief sought denied. See id. The Court 12 explained the reasoning in each of its orders. Dkt. 11; Dkt. 16; Dkt. 19; Dkt. 21; Dkt. 25. For
13 example, in an order denying Ms. Holthaus emergency relief, the Court detailed the very high 14 bar required for ex parte emergency relief—that is, relief granted without notice to the other 15 party. Dkt. 16 at 2–3. The Court explained that, though Ms. Holthaus had provided thorough 16 evidence in her complaint, she had not offered any evidence showing compliance with the 17 requirements for service and notice necessary for emergency relief. Id. at 3. Additionally, the 18 Court noted, Ms. Holthaus’s motion had not addressed the relevant legal standard. Id. This was 19 alone a sufficient basis to deny the motion. Id. (citing cases). The Court highlighted that her 20 allegations were concerning but acknowledged that she had not met the high bar for ex parte 21 emergency relief. Id. at 4. 22 Ms. Holthaus sought reconsideration of this order. Dkt. 17. She filed a flash drive and
23 other evidence with the Clerk’s Office. Dkt. 18. The Court reviewed this evidence, as well as her 24 motion, and concluded that Ms. Holthaus had not met the standard for a motion for 1 reconsideration. See generally Dkt. 19. The Court noted that Ms. Holthaus had submitted new 2 evidence. Id. at 2. But, the Court explained, the motion for reconsideration standard requires that 3 the evidence be newly discovered by the party. Id. (citing Lipson v. On Marine Servs. Co. LLC,
4 No. C13-1747, 2014 WL 2048195, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2014)). The Court never said that 5 the information was duplicative, only that it was not “newly discovered” and could have been 6 offered earlier. Id. 7 Then, Ms. Holthaus again moved for emergency relief and offered a proposed 8 amendment complaint. Dkt. 20. The Court did note that the motion itself was identical to the 9 motion the Court had previously denied, save for what appeared to be a missing page and a new 10 cover page. Dkt. 21 at 2; see also Dkt. 20; Dkt. 13; Dkt. 16; Dkt. 19. The Court again reviewed 11 all of the materials Ms. Holthaus had submitted—including the digital evidence on the flash 12 drive submitted to the Court. See Dkt. 21; Dkt. 20. The Court noted that repetitive filings, such as
13 repeatedly filing identical motions, could be the basis for sanctions. Dkt. 21 at 2–3. 14 These orders serve as the basis for Ms. Holthaus’s motion for recusal. Dkt. 30 at 1–2. 15 Ms. Holthaus thus does not allege any actions by this Court to support a claim of bias or 16 prejudice that would warrant recusal. See $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d at 566. Thus, 17 contrary to Ms. Holthaus’s position, the Court took her claims, evidence, and filings into 18 account, and the Court’s decision against her does not evidence any bias or animus by the Court. 19 See Taylor, 993 F.2d at 712; Jacobs v. Lanterman Developmental Ctr., 202 F. App’x 201, 202 20 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming lower court’s dismissal of action with prejudice as a sanction for 21 repeated motions to recuse presiding judge where recusal was based “solely on adverse 22 rulings.”).
23 Ultimately, “a judge has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to 24 recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.” Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the l Cent. Dist. Of Cal., 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation modified). Ms. Holthaus has 2 || not provided a legitimate reason for the undersigned judge to recuse. The Court therefore 3 DENIES her motion for recusal (Dkt. 30) and directs the Clerk to refer the motion to U.S. Chief 4 || District Judge David G. Estudillo. 5 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and 6 || to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address. 7 Dated this 31st day of July, 2025. Li 9 Tiffany M. Cartwright United States District Judge 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24