IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-709
Filed 15 April 2026
Durham County, No. 24CVS001218-310
MONIQUE HOLSEY-HYMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
JARROD B. EDENS, EDENS INVESTMENTS, INC., SARA M. YOUNG, Individually and in her official capacity as City of Durham Planning Director, KIMBERLY M. REHBERG, Individually and in her official capacity as City Attorney for Durham, JILLIAN N. JOHNSON, Individually and in her official capacity as a member of the Durham City Council, MARK A. MIDDLETON, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Durham City Council and Mayor Pro Tempore, and THE CITY OF DURHAM, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants.
Appeal by Defendants from order entered 21 April 2025 by Judge Timothy W.
Wilson in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11
February 2026.
DeMent Askew Johnson & Marshall, LLP, by James T. Johnson and Jonathan W. Martin, and Law Offices of Corey Cartwright, PA, by Corey C. Cartwright, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Durham City Attorney’s Office, by John Roseboro and Aarin Miles, for Defendants-Appellants Sara M. Young, Jillian N. Johnson, Mark A. Middleton, and the City of Durham.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendants Sara M. Young, Jillian N. Johnson, Mark A. Middleton, and the
City of Durham appeal the trial court’s order denying their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Because Defendants have failed to show the trial court’s interlocutory order HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
Opinion of the Court
affects a substantial right, we dismiss this appeal.
I. Background
Plaintiff Monique Holsey‑Hyman was appointed to the Durham City Council
in May 2022. On 6 March 2023, the Council considered a development request for
the Carpenter Falls project. Plaintiff voted against the project; the resulting vote was
a 3–3 tie, and the request was denied. Five days later, developer Jarrod Edens
reported to Defendant Sara Young, the City’s Planning Director, that Plaintiff had
solicited a campaign contribution in exchange for her vote. Plaintiff alleges the
accusation was false and that Young, City Attorney Kimberly Rehberg, and
Councilmembers Defendants Jillian Johnson and Mark Middleton repeated or acted
upon the accusation without investigation.
Rehberg circulated written communications to Councilmembers on 13 and 14
March 2023, describing the extortion allegation; Plaintiff alleges these
communications implied her guilt and became public records. Plaintiff further
alleges that Middleton immediately demanded her resignation and that Johnson
later disclosed to the press that Plaintiff was the subject of the accusation. The
Council subsequently referred the matter to the State Bureau of Investigation
(“SBI”). The SBI ultimately exonerated Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also alleges that Johnson and Middleton prepared and presented a
Resolution of Censure at the 23 March 2023 Council meeting based on a separate
“city staffer” issue that had previously been investigated and resolved without finding
-2- HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
wrongdoing by Plaintiff. The Resolution was never voted on.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against numerous defendants, including Young,
Johnson, Middleton, and the City of Durham in state court on 5 March 2024. Plaintiff
alleged a federal claim under U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous state claims, including
slander, libel, civil conspiracy, negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants removed the case to federal court
where Plaintiff’s federal claim was dismissed, and her state claims were remanded to
state court. Defendants then filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court
allowed the motion in part and denied it in part. Defendants appealed the partial
denial.
II. Discussion
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
We first address our jurisdiction to hear Defendants’ appeal from the trial
court’s interlocutory order. “An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency
of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the
trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” C. Terry Hunt
Indus., Inc. v. Klausner Lumber Two, LLC, 255 N.C. App. 8, 11 (2017) (citation
omitted). “Generally, a party has no right of appeal from an interlocutory order.”
Edwards v. GE Lighting Sys., Inc., 193 N.C. App. 578, 581 (2008) (citation omitted).
However, immediate appeal from an interlocutory order may be allowed “if the trial
court’s decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right” that will be lost absent
-3- HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
immediate review. Woody v. Vickrey, 276 N.C. App. 427, 433 (2021) (citation omitted);
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a), 7A-27(b)(3)(a) (2023).
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint because “[l]egislative immunity
bars the claim[s] against Defendants Middleton and Johnson that are based on their
presenting a resolution of censure against Plaintiff during a City Council meeting.”
Defendants argue that the denial of legislative immunity to Johnson and Middleton
affects a substantial right and therefore permits immediate review of the entire order.
We disagree.
“[L]ocal officials are immune from suit if (1) they were acting in a legislative
capacity at the time of the alleged incident; and (2) their acts were not illegal[,] . . .
malicious, corrupt[,] or outside the scope of [their] official duties, even if they were
legislative in nature.” Providence Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Town of Weddington,
382 N.C. 199, 220 (2022) (cleaned up). Whether an act is legislative is determined
case-by-case. Id. Legislative immunity does not apply to administrative, executive,
or political acts, nor to conduct undertaken with malice or corruption. See id.; Vereen
v. Holden, 121 N.C. App. 779, 782 (1996).
The complaint alleges that Johnson and Middleton: leaked Plaintiff’s identity
to the press as the subject of an “extortion probe”; demanded Plaintiff’s resignation
within minutes of receiving the City Attorney’s letter; coordinated with a private
developer to remove Plaintiff from office; presented a Resolution of Censure they
knew was false; made defamatory statements during the 23 March 2023 meeting that
-4- HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
Plaintiff had engaged in illegal campaign activity; and used the censure process as a
tool to “defame, disparage, denigrate, humiliate and embarrass” Plaintiff.
The complaint further alleges that the Resolution of Censure: was not properly
before the Council under its Rules of Procedure because censure requires “extreme or
outrageous conduct,” which Defendants knew was absent; was never voted on; and
was introduced solely for reputational harm, not for any legitimate legislative
purpose.
Accepting these allegations as true at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the conduct
described is administrative, political, or personal–not legislative. See Providence, 382
N.C. at 220-21 (distinguishing legislative acts from administrative or retaliatory
conduct); Vereen, 121 N.C. App. at 783. Because the complaint alleges conduct
outside the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” Royal Oak Concerned Citizens
Ass’n v. Brunswick Cnty., 233 N.C. App. 145, 149 (2014) (citation omitted),
Defendants have failed at this stage to show that legislative immunity applies to
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-709
Filed 15 April 2026
Durham County, No. 24CVS001218-310
MONIQUE HOLSEY-HYMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
JARROD B. EDENS, EDENS INVESTMENTS, INC., SARA M. YOUNG, Individually and in her official capacity as City of Durham Planning Director, KIMBERLY M. REHBERG, Individually and in her official capacity as City Attorney for Durham, JILLIAN N. JOHNSON, Individually and in her official capacity as a member of the Durham City Council, MARK A. MIDDLETON, Individually and in his official capacity as a member of the Durham City Council and Mayor Pro Tempore, and THE CITY OF DURHAM, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants.
Appeal by Defendants from order entered 21 April 2025 by Judge Timothy W.
Wilson in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11
February 2026.
DeMent Askew Johnson & Marshall, LLP, by James T. Johnson and Jonathan W. Martin, and Law Offices of Corey Cartwright, PA, by Corey C. Cartwright, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Durham City Attorney’s Office, by John Roseboro and Aarin Miles, for Defendants-Appellants Sara M. Young, Jillian N. Johnson, Mark A. Middleton, and the City of Durham.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendants Sara M. Young, Jillian N. Johnson, Mark A. Middleton, and the
City of Durham appeal the trial court’s order denying their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. Because Defendants have failed to show the trial court’s interlocutory order HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
Opinion of the Court
affects a substantial right, we dismiss this appeal.
I. Background
Plaintiff Monique Holsey‑Hyman was appointed to the Durham City Council
in May 2022. On 6 March 2023, the Council considered a development request for
the Carpenter Falls project. Plaintiff voted against the project; the resulting vote was
a 3–3 tie, and the request was denied. Five days later, developer Jarrod Edens
reported to Defendant Sara Young, the City’s Planning Director, that Plaintiff had
solicited a campaign contribution in exchange for her vote. Plaintiff alleges the
accusation was false and that Young, City Attorney Kimberly Rehberg, and
Councilmembers Defendants Jillian Johnson and Mark Middleton repeated or acted
upon the accusation without investigation.
Rehberg circulated written communications to Councilmembers on 13 and 14
March 2023, describing the extortion allegation; Plaintiff alleges these
communications implied her guilt and became public records. Plaintiff further
alleges that Middleton immediately demanded her resignation and that Johnson
later disclosed to the press that Plaintiff was the subject of the accusation. The
Council subsequently referred the matter to the State Bureau of Investigation
(“SBI”). The SBI ultimately exonerated Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also alleges that Johnson and Middleton prepared and presented a
Resolution of Censure at the 23 March 2023 Council meeting based on a separate
“city staffer” issue that had previously been investigated and resolved without finding
-2- HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
wrongdoing by Plaintiff. The Resolution was never voted on.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against numerous defendants, including Young,
Johnson, Middleton, and the City of Durham in state court on 5 March 2024. Plaintiff
alleged a federal claim under U.S.C. § 1983 and numerous state claims, including
slander, libel, civil conspiracy, negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendants removed the case to federal court
where Plaintiff’s federal claim was dismissed, and her state claims were remanded to
state court. Defendants then filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court
allowed the motion in part and denied it in part. Defendants appealed the partial
denial.
II. Discussion
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
We first address our jurisdiction to hear Defendants’ appeal from the trial
court’s interlocutory order. “An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency
of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the
trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy.” C. Terry Hunt
Indus., Inc. v. Klausner Lumber Two, LLC, 255 N.C. App. 8, 11 (2017) (citation
omitted). “Generally, a party has no right of appeal from an interlocutory order.”
Edwards v. GE Lighting Sys., Inc., 193 N.C. App. 578, 581 (2008) (citation omitted).
However, immediate appeal from an interlocutory order may be allowed “if the trial
court’s decision deprives the appellant of a substantial right” that will be lost absent
-3- HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
immediate review. Woody v. Vickrey, 276 N.C. App. 427, 433 (2021) (citation omitted);
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a), 7A-27(b)(3)(a) (2023).
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint because “[l]egislative immunity
bars the claim[s] against Defendants Middleton and Johnson that are based on their
presenting a resolution of censure against Plaintiff during a City Council meeting.”
Defendants argue that the denial of legislative immunity to Johnson and Middleton
affects a substantial right and therefore permits immediate review of the entire order.
We disagree.
“[L]ocal officials are immune from suit if (1) they were acting in a legislative
capacity at the time of the alleged incident; and (2) their acts were not illegal[,] . . .
malicious, corrupt[,] or outside the scope of [their] official duties, even if they were
legislative in nature.” Providence Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Town of Weddington,
382 N.C. 199, 220 (2022) (cleaned up). Whether an act is legislative is determined
case-by-case. Id. Legislative immunity does not apply to administrative, executive,
or political acts, nor to conduct undertaken with malice or corruption. See id.; Vereen
v. Holden, 121 N.C. App. 779, 782 (1996).
The complaint alleges that Johnson and Middleton: leaked Plaintiff’s identity
to the press as the subject of an “extortion probe”; demanded Plaintiff’s resignation
within minutes of receiving the City Attorney’s letter; coordinated with a private
developer to remove Plaintiff from office; presented a Resolution of Censure they
knew was false; made defamatory statements during the 23 March 2023 meeting that
-4- HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
Plaintiff had engaged in illegal campaign activity; and used the censure process as a
tool to “defame, disparage, denigrate, humiliate and embarrass” Plaintiff.
The complaint further alleges that the Resolution of Censure: was not properly
before the Council under its Rules of Procedure because censure requires “extreme or
outrageous conduct,” which Defendants knew was absent; was never voted on; and
was introduced solely for reputational harm, not for any legitimate legislative
purpose.
Accepting these allegations as true at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, the conduct
described is administrative, political, or personal–not legislative. See Providence, 382
N.C. at 220-21 (distinguishing legislative acts from administrative or retaliatory
conduct); Vereen, 121 N.C. App. at 783. Because the complaint alleges conduct
outside the “sphere of legitimate legislative activity,” Royal Oak Concerned Citizens
Ass’n v. Brunswick Cnty., 233 N.C. App. 145, 149 (2014) (citation omitted),
Defendants have failed at this stage to show that legislative immunity applies to
Johnson and Middleton. Without a valid claim of immunity, no substantial right is
implicated.
Furthermore, interlocutory review based on legislative immunity would extend
only to the immunity issue. Johnson and Middleton cite no authority permitting
review of all other issues they raise on appeal simply because they assert immunity.
See Beroth Oil Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 256 N.C. App. 401, 410-11 (2017) (party
must show why each challenged ruling affects a substantial right).
-5- HOLSEY-HYMAN V. EDENS
Defendants further argue that, because Johnson and Middleton assert
legislative immunity, this Court should review claims involving Young and the City
“in the interest of judicial economy.”
First, Defendants have failed at this stage to show that legislative immunity
applies to Johnson and Middleton such that a substantial right is implicated.
Furthermore, when an interlocutory appeal is properly before the Court, we may
review only those issues that themselves affect a substantial right. Id. Defendants
identify no substantial right implicated by the denial of the motion to dismiss as to
Defendant Young or the City. Defendants’ assertion that it “makes sense” to review
everything now is insufficient as a matter of law. Id.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants have failed to show that the trial court’s
order affects a substantial right. The appeal of this interlocutory order is dismissed.
See C. Terry Hunt Indus., Inc., 255 N.C. App. at 11.
DISMISSED.
Judges WOOD and STADING concur.
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