Holmes v. Washington Department of Corrections

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided October 28, 2022·No. 3:18-cv-05735·Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 DAVID HOLMES, CASE NO. 3:18-cv-5735 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 12 v. TESTIMONY 13 WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al , 14 Defendant. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony 17 (Dkt. No. 83). Having reviewed the Motion, Defendants’ Response (Dkt. No. 86), the Reply (Dkt 18 No. 88), and all supporting materials, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff, David Holmes, is an incarcerated individual at Clallam Bay Corrections Center. 21 He was diagnosed with Pigmentary Dispersion Syndrome, an eye disease that can lead to 22 glaucoma, among other things, if unmonitored. (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 10-11 (Dkt. No. 59).) 23 In 2014, Dr. Copeland, an optometrist working as an independent contractor for the DOC, 24 1 examined Homes and noticed that his visual acuity had decreased to 20/200 in his right eye and 2 20/60 in his left eye. (Id. ¶ 13.) Dr. Copeland also diagnosed Holmes with cataracts in both eyes. 3 (Id.) Although cataract surgery is the recommended course of treatment for Holmes’ condition, 4 Holmes did not receive cataract surgery in his right eye until 2016 and 2019 for his left eye.

5 (Id. ¶¶ 21-29, 40-51.) 6 Holmes brings two Eighth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the 7 Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and several of its officials (collectively “Defendants”): (1) 8 were deliberately indifferent to his medical eye needs, and (2) promulgated an unconstitutional 9 health plan policy that effectively left him with monocular blindness. (Motion at 3-4.) 10 ANALYSIS 11 A. Legal Standard 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires parties to disclose the identities of each 13 expert and, for retained experts, requires that the disclosure includes the experts’ written reports. 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). These written reports must include:

15 (1) A complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them; 16 (2) The facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; 17 (3) Any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; 18 (4) The witness’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years; 19 (5) A list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an 20 expert at trial or by deposition; and 21 (6) A statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case. 22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). 23 24 1 The expert report required by Rule 26 must be “detailed and complete” and must “stat[e] 2 the testimony the witness is expected to present during direct examination together with the 3 reasons therefore.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 1993 amendment. Other 4 lower courts in the Ninth Circuit have held that “[t]he reason for requiring expert reports is the

5 elimination of unfair surprise to the opposing party and the conservation of resources.” Elgas v. 6 Colorado Belle Corp., 179 F.R.D. 296, 299 (D. Nev. 1998) (internal quotation and citation 7 omitted). “The test of a report is whether it was sufficiently complete, detailed and in compliance 8 with the Rules so that surprise is eliminated, unnecessary depositions are avoided, and costs are 9 reduced.” Id. 10 B. Discussion 11 1. Dr. Zollman 12 Defendants retained Dr. Zollman to provide expert testimony for the Defense regarding 13 the medical care Holmes received from the DOC. (Resp. at 5.) Holmes moves to exclude Dr. 14 Zollman’s testimony on the grounds that he provided an incompliant written disclosure. The

15 Court agrees. 16 The primary issue with Zollman’s report is that it does not appear to contain a complete 17 statement of opinions, along with the basis and reasons for them, the facts or data considered and 18 whether Zollman will use any exhibits. Zollman’s report is less than one and a half pages long 19 and includes one paragraph entitled ‘introduction’, three paragraphs entitled ‘history’ and one 20 paragraph entitled ‘summary’. (See Declaration of Michelle Hansen, Exhibit C – Zollman Report 21 (Dkt. No. 87-3).) The paragraph entitled ‘summary’ appears the be the entirety of Zollman’s 22 opinion. He states that “while the timing of [Holmes’] treatment was delayed from what is 23 typical in the civilian world, the records show that he was managed appropriately based on DOC

24 1 criteria.” (Hansen Decl., Exhibit C.) Notably absent from this summary is what is typical “in the 2 civilian world,” what the DOC criteria is, and what Zollman relied upon in comparing the two. 3 The only thing Zollman states that he reviewed was Holmes’ medical records spanning from 4 May 2010 to June 2019. (Id.) While Zollman states that the surgery Holmes received resulted in

5 excellent vision and that he would not have received better care “in the civilian world,” the 6 surgery is not the issue at hand. Rather, the issue lies in whether DOC policy diverges from 7 standard practice. Zollman’s summary is silent on this issue. The Court finds this is not a proper 8 report. 9 Defendants claim that they have until September 5, 2022, to provide a final report 10 compliant with Rule 26. (Resp. at 7.) But Defendants are applying the wrong rule. Parties must 11 make expert witness disclosures at the time and sequence that the Court orders. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 26(a)(2)(D). Defendants cite to Rule 26(a)(6)(B) in support, which does not exist. It appears they 13 intend to cite to a section of Rule 26(a)(2)(D), which states that “[a]bsent a stipulation or a court 14 order, the disclosures must be made: (i) at least 90 days before the date set for trial. . .” But the

15 Court made an order when it entered the Order Setting the Trial Date and Related Dates. (Dkt. 16 No. 78.) According to that Order, reports from expert witnesses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) 17 were due on May 9, 2022. (Id.) As such, Defendants’ reliance on the 90 day default deadline is 18 inapposite. 19 Defendants do not argue the improper disclosure is substantially justified or harmless. 20 “Rule 37 gives teeth to Rule 26’s disclosure requirements by forbidding the use at trial of any 21 information that is not properly disclosed.” Goodman v. Staples the Office Superstore LLC, 644 22 F.3d 817, 827 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 23 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1)). “Rule 37(c)(1) is a self-executing,

24 1 automatic sanction designed to provide a strong inducement for disclosure.” Id. (internal 2 quotation and citation omitted). The only exceptions to Rule 37(c)(1)’s exclusion sanction apply 3 if the failure to disclose is substantially justified or harmless. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). “The 4 burden to prove harmlessness is on the party seeking to avoid Rule 37’s exclusionary sanction.”

5 Goodman, 644 F.3d at 827 (internal citation omitted).

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